tuttcrs 


IN  DEFENCE 


IB!  A  IB  37  ff©  IB  IS) 


AND 


THE  PEOPLE 


OF 


MASSACHUSETTS. 


BOSTON  : 

PUBLISHED  BY  SIMON  GARDNER. 


A.  Sampson,  Printer. 

1824. 


.7 


ADVERTISEMENT. 


IN  presenting  to  the  public  this  collection  of 
MR.  OTIS'  LETTERS  upon  the  Hartford  Convention, 
we  do  him  no  more  than  justice  in  declaring  our 
conviction  that  he  has  amply  redeemed  his  promi 
ses.  He  has  demonstrated  not  merely  the  moral, 
but  the  physical  impossibility  of  a  secret  combi 
nation,  so  often  charged  on  that  assembly;  and 
though  obliged  to  refer  to  facts  and  events  which 
transpired  during  the  war,  he  has  forborne  reviving 
topics  of  controversy,  and  has  provided  an  armour 
for  the  defence  of  the  honor  of  the  State,  which  even 
his  political  opponents  need  not  be  backward  to  put 
on.  Expectation  too  may  be  entertained  that  the 
brow  beaten  and  calculating  friends  of  the  primitive 
plan  of  the  Convention,  (if  any  such  there  be)  who 
have  kept  aloof  and  borne  with  exemplary  fortitude 
censures  inflicted  on  their  agents,  will  no  longer  be 
ashamed  or  afraid  to  put  in  a  word,  though  a  com 
mendable  prudence  may  forbid  their  taking  up  a 
Cudgel  iu  behalf  of  their  old  Forlorn  Hope. 

The  censors  of  the  Hartford  Convention  may  be 
divided  into  three  classes.  First  the  "  Enragees," 
or  those  who  affect  to  be  patriots  "par  excellence." 
They  are  like  all  pretenders  to  excessive  virtue  in 
both  sexes,  much  to  be  suspected — persons,  to  whom, 
as  Lord  Bacon  says,  "the  mixture  of  a  lie  doth  ever 
add  pleasure,"  and  whose  miads,  "if  there  were 

M198491 


IV 

"  taken  out,  vain  opinions,  flattering  hopes,  false 
" valuations,  imaginations  as  one  would,  and  the 
"like,  would  be  left  poor,  shrunken  things."  They 
love  fiction,  which  his  lordship  calls  "Vinum  Dse- 
monum."  In  the  brewing  of  this  adulterated  "  Vi- 
num,"  the  Hartford  plot  is  a  principal  ingredient, 
and  as  the  DjEMOnes  cannot  live  without  it,  we 
must  let  them  continue  brewing. 

There  is  in  the  second  place  a  much  larger  and 
more  respectable  description  of  prejudiced  persons, 
whom  the  writer  of  the  letters  has  apparently  aimed 
to  disabuse — men  who  think  ill  of  the  Convention, 
who  are  of  fair  minds  and  sound  understandings, 
but  whose  pride  of  opinion  will  not  yield  without  a 
struggle.  Such  persons  are  humbled  in  discovering 
themselves  to  have  been  dupes  to  a  mere  fiction — 
that  what  they  have  regarded  as  a  "BLUE  LIGHT" 
was  a  mere  ignis  fatuus,  and  that  the  Pandemonium 
of  Hartford  was  harmless  as  a  Quaker  meeting.  To 
these  persons  it  may  be  a  consolation  to  know  that 
their  case  is  not  absolutely  new ;  and  though  even 
with  the  aid  of  Matthew  Carey's  Vindicise,  it  is  im 
possible  to  refer  them  to  the  story  of  any  false  plot, 
the  belief  in  which,  like  that  of  the  one  in  question, 
was  current  upon  no  evidence  whatever;  yet  in 
stances  are  not  wanting  to  shew  that  the  disease  of 
the  imagination  is  sometimes  epidemical,  and  that 
good  sense  affords  no  protection  against  it,  when  the 
predisposition  to  it  is  strong.  Of  this  the  history  of 
animal  magnetism  is  a  striking  illustration.  Accord 
ing  to  the  discoverer  of  the  system,  there  is  "a  fluid 
universally  diffused  and  filling  all  space,  being  the 
medium  of  a  reciprocal  influence  between  the  celes- 


tial  bodies,  the  earth  and  living  beings."  One  great 
conductor  of  this  animal  magnetism  was  SOUND.  Vast 
numbers  of  persons  surrounding  an  iron  chest  in 
circles,  were  magnetized  by  a  tune  upon  a  forte 
piano — by  hearing  each  others'  voices,  touching  each- 
others'  thumbs,  holding  the  same  string,  and  even  in 
different  apartments,  without  any  contact  whatsover. 
By  this  means  they  experienced  various  sorts  of  con 
vulsions,  were  cured,  or  thought  themselves  so,  of 
divers  maladies,  and  were  affected  by  almost  every 
variety  of  agitation,  and  of  the  heats  and  colds,  which 
are  common  in  popular  assemblies  and  governments, 
and  are  produced  in  the  same  way,  by  the  magnet 
ism  of  sympathy.  This  imposture  was  gravely  up 
held  by  ingenious  and  scientific  writers,  (superior, 
with  respect  be  it  spoken,  to  the  Dsemones)  and 
believed  by  thousands ;  and  such  was  the  general 
excitement  even  in  Paris,  that  a  commission  was 
instituted,  of  which  Doctor  Franklin  was  one,  which 
was  occupied  many  days,  and  in  regular  sittings,  in 
trying  to  detect  and  explode  it.  When,  therefore, 
we  find  sensible  persons  believing  in  the  diffusion  of 
this  animal  magnetism,  by  the  contact  of  thumbs, 
ropes,  and  wires,  and  the  percussion  of  sound  upon 
the  atmosphere,  it  requires  no  great  stretch  of  imagi 
nation  beyond  this,  to  conceive  that  the  Legislatures 
of  Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  and  other  States, 
might  have  been  magnetized  with  a  plot-making 
sympathy — and  as  the  one  was  propagated  by  sound 
from  room  to  room,  why  might  not  the  other  have  • 
found  its  way  from  State  to  State  by  the  "still  voice" 
of  newspapers  or  other  invisible  ftiediums,  among 
those  who  vrws  pulling  the  same  string/ 


VI 

It  is  fair  to  console  this  well  disposed  class,  by 
reminding  them  of  this  and  other  instances,  shewing 
that  a  proneness  to  credulity  being  often  constitu 
tional,  is  not  always  a  reproach  to  the  head,  though 
a  malignant  perseverance  in  error,  despite  of  evi 
dence,  is  so  to  the  heart.  The  great  Johnson  be 
lieved  in  apparitions.  The  miracles  of  Prince  Ho- 
henloe,  attested  "by  grave  and  reverend  signiors," 
divide  with  intrigues  for  the  Presidency  the  public 
attention  in  the  Metropolis  of  the  Union.  And  it  is 
quite  possible  there  may  be  in  Boston,  disciples  of 
GALL,  who,  if  they  had  a  chance  of  lecturing  upon 
Mr.  Otis'  skull,  would  place  their  finger  upon  the 
plot-making  region  with  the  moralizing  solemnity  of 
the  Grave  Digger  in  Hamlet 

„  Apart  from  these  classes — the  violent  and  the  cre 
dulous,  are  great  numbers  of  persons  who  have 
thought  unfavorably  of  the  Convention  from  having 
heard  only  one  side  of  the  story,  and  to  whom  cor 
rect  information  will  be  acceptable.  Included  in 
these,  is  the  class  who  in  the  course  of  ten  years, 
have  grown  up  from  childhood  and  youth  to  man 
hood.  Since  the  conclusion  of  the  war,  the  Feder 
alists  have  withdrawn  to  their  farms  and  their  mer 
chandize,  and  have  talked  about  "good  feelings," 
and  conducted  themselves  as  if  it  did  not  require  as 
many  parties  to  lay  aside  a  quarrel  as  it  does  to 
make  one.  Meanwhile  the  efforts  to  keep  alive  the 
excitement  of  the  old  controversy  have  been  inces 
sant  on  the  part  of  the  conductors  of  the  democratic 
papers,  and  the  Governor  incites  the  children*.to  dis 
honor  their  fathers  for  opinions  which  have  long 
ceased  to  have  any  relation  to  the  present  state  of 


Vll 

affairs.  By  this  great  mass  of  ingenuous  young  men 
it  must  be  desirable  to  be  furnished  with  the  mate 
rials  contained  in  and  referred  to  by  these  Letters ; 
and  it  is  due  to  that  interesting  portion  of  the  com 
munity  to  let  them  see  that  their  Governor  has  no 
better  right  in  reason  than  he  has  by  the  Constitu 
tion,  to  call  upon  them  to  blush  for  their  country. 

With  respect  to  Mr.  Otis  himself — he  has  refrain 
ed  from  every  thing  like  a  personal  vindication,  and 
given  his  reasons  for  that  forbearance.  We  shall 
not  therefore  connect  with  this  pamphlet  any  such 
vindication,  as  it  might  be  presumed  to  receive  his 
assent,  and  have  an  air  of  evasion.  It  cannot  be 
amiss  however  to  say,  that  knowing  perfectly  well 
the  part  he  acted  during  the  war,  and  his  affinity  to 
the  oldest  whig  and  republican  families  in  the  coun 
try,  it  would  be  incomparably  more  easy  for  us  to 
shew  the  injustice  done  him  by  imputing  to  him  a 
disposition  to  violent  or  high-handed  or  disorgani 
zing  measures  at  any  period,  than  to  account  for  the 
peculiar  and  virulent  persecution  by  which  it  has 
been  attempted  to  father  upon  him,  whatever  mea 
sures  by  misrepresentation  and  the  course  of  events 
are  most  liable  to  be  regarded  as  at  variance  with 
the  republican  and  federal  principles  of  our  Union. 


LETTER  I. 

TO  THE  EDITOR  OF  THE  CENTINEL. 

Aliud  est  maledicere — aliud  accusarc — accusatio  crimen  desiderat  reum 
ut  definiat,  hominem  ut  notet — argumento  probet,  teste  confirraet.  Maledic- 
tio  antcm  nihil  habet  propositi  praetcr  contumeliam.  Cic:  pro  M  Ccello. 

SIR, 

SEVERAL  months  have  elapsed  since  the  speech  of  His  Ex 
cellency  the  Governor  was  made  to  the  Legislature  upon  his 
accession  to  the  chair.  In  that  speech,  His  Excellency  appears 
in  the  novel  character  of  public  accuser  of  the  State  and  people 
over  which  he  is  called  to  preside,  and  requites  them  for  the 
honor  of  their  suffrages  by  bearing  record  to  the  past  infamy  of 
their  political  character  and  conduct.  He  imputes  to  them 
perseverance  in  a  course  of  odious  and  criminal  violation  of 
their  federal  obligations,  and  desertion  of  the  common  cause  in 
a  time  of  urgent  peril,  and  charges  them  with  advancing  to 
the  very  brink  of  treason.  This  "unhallowed"  series  of  enor 
mities,  he  says,  was  consummated  by  an  "authorized  combi 
nation,"  (that  is,  as  he  intends,  an  illegal  confederacy,  au 
thorized  by  law,)  the  mischievous  consequences  of  which  he 
describes  in  the  language  of  one  flushed,  if  not  intoxicated 
with  a  new  authority.  This  combination  (whose  alias  dictus  is 
the  Hartford  Convention)  consisted  of  persons  deputed  by  the 
Legislatures  of  several  States,  as  Committees  to  meet  together 
and  consult  upon  a  pressing  emergency  and  to  report  their 
proceedings.  Of  this  number,  twelve  only  were  appointed  by 
Massachusetts ;  so  that  (their  names  being  matter  of  public  re 
cord)  they  may  consider  themselves  denounced  as  individuals 


before  both  branches  of  the  Legislature,  hot  less  than  if  they 
had  been  described  with  the  technicality  of  an  indictment.  In 
that  assembly  no  voice  was  raised  in  their  defence  by^their 
friends,  who  were  the  minority,  and  who  thought,  perhaps 
wisely,  that  silence  was  the  most  expressive  reply,  while  the 
majority  substantially  echoed  the  music  of  the  speech,  and 
were  soothed  for  the  insult  offered  to  the  State  by  the  flat 
tering  unction  which  His  Excellency  poured  forth  upon  them 
selves.  Thus  the  members  of  that  Convention,  for  going  upon 
a  State-errand,  undertaken  with  known  reluctance,  are  accused 
by  their  Governor,  and  in  fact  attainted  by  an  act  of  the  Gen 
eral  Court,  of  misdemeanors,  which  although  they  cannot  by 
the  Constitution,  work  forfeiture  or  corruption  of  blood,  ought 
justly  to  be  visited  with  forfeiture  of  character,  and  are  by  the 
public  accuser  and  his  court  intended  to  produce  that  effect.^/ 
In  these  circumstances — in  a  country  whose  Constitution  pro 
hibits  the  passing  of  bills  of  attainder,  and  secures  to  the  hum 
blest  culprit  the  right  of  a  hearing  and  defence  and  trial  by 
his  peers ;  it  would  not  probably,  be  deemed  in  any  view  of 
equity,  a  departure  from  the  respect  due  to  the  Chief  Magis 
trate  and  his  friends, -for  the  parties  thus  criminated  to  appear 
before  the  public  in  vindication  of  their  characters ;  though  they 
would  still  be  in  the  predicament  of  those  unfortunates,  who, 
under  the  very  ancient  "  regime"  of  a  country  from  which  I 
trust  His  Excellency  would  not  wish  to  take  example,  were 
jlrst  scourged,  and  then  heard  in  their  defence.  Perhaps  al 
lowance  would  be  made  by  the  liberal  (of  which  I  hope  there 
are  many)  among  His  Excellency's  supporters,  for  a  tone  of  in 
dignation,  in  the  aged  patriots,  statesmen,  and  warriors  of  the 
revolution,  (who  from  different  States  were  members  of  that 
Convention)  in  defending  their  civic  and  military  wreaths  from 
the  indecorous  grasp  of  a  Chief  Magistrate  with  whom  they 
need  not  shrink  to  compare  their  claims  in  every  department 
of  merit  and  duty  to  their  country.  And  even  the  humble  in 
dividual  who  addresses  you,  after  many  years  of  service  in 
public  life,  might  be  excused  for  protesting  with  some  vehe 
mence  against  the  injustice  of  being  sent  to  .his  account  as 
a  conspirator  against  the  government  of  his  country  in  conse 
quence  merely  of  having  served  upon  a  Committee  of  the  Gen- 


eral  Couvt  sitting  in  Hartford  instead  of  Boston,  and  thus 
undertaking  a  mission  forced  upon  him  by  three-fourths  of  the  f 
Legislature  against  his  most  earnest  remonstrance,  and  to  the 
great  'sacrifice  of  his  convenience ;  ivithout  any  equivalent  in 
diplomatic  perquisites  and  outfits  by  which  the  wreaths  and 
laurels  of  His  Excellency  have  been  gilded.  But  whatever 
hope  I  might  reasonably  cherish  of  a  fair  indulgence  from 
every  friend  of  justice  in  repelling  this  official  libel;  yet  if  the 
solitary  interest  of  my  own  good  name  were  all  that  was  en 
dangered  by  it,  I  should  suffer  it  to  waste  its  venom  "  on  the 
desert  air,"  and  leave  to  posterity  to  award  the  praise  or  cen 
sure  that  shall  hereafter  appear  to  be  due  to  "combinations," 
authorized  or  unauthorized — civil  or  military ;  whether  at  Hart 
ford,  the  supposed  scene  of  my  machinations,  or  at  Newburgh, 
where  history  has  laid  a  plot  in  which  some  of  His  Excellency's 
intimate  friends  were  thought  to  be  implicated.  (See  Note  Jl.) 
To  this  impartial  tribunal  I  would  refer  my  own  cause  rather 
than  appear  before  the  public  in  any  communication  which  may 
wear  the  semblance  of  a  labored  vindication  of  my  own  politi 
cal  character.  My  disinclination  to  enter  upon  any  such  vin 
dication  has  ever  been  invincible.  In  proof  of  its  reality  I  can 
adduce  the  restraint  which  I  have  invariably  imposed  upon 
myself.  In  a  long  course  of  public  vocations,  (which  I  sin 
cerely  wish  had  been  as  beneficial  to  my  country  as  they  have 
been  laborious  and  unproductive  to  me,)  no  personal  justifica 
tion  has  ever  been  attempted  by  me  in  any  recollected  instance 
against  the  pitiless  censures  and  calumnies  which  have  been 
showered  upon  me.*  It  has  been  my  fashion  of  thinking,  that 
if  a  man  is  sustained  by  public  favor,  he  has  no  occasion  to 
engage  in  the  difficult  task  of  speaking  of  himself.  If  on  the 
contrary,  the  people  have  grown  tired,  or  dissatisfied  with  his 
services,  he  becomes  an  object  of  pity  if  not  of  contempt,  when 
(destitute  of  the  resource  which  in  a  retreat  from  public  sta 
tion,  ministers  not  only  to  consolation,  but  delight— a  retro 
spection  of  the  best  motives,  and  of  a  constant  communion  of 
sentiment  with  wise  and  honorable  men,)  he  whines  over  the 

*I  do  not  consider  a  letter  once  written  to  Gen.  Heath,  nor  a  series  of 
numbers  written  by  "One  of  the  Convention,"  nor  a  late  letter  on  the  sub« 
}e<;t  of  the  Massachusetts  Claim,  as  forming  exceptions  to  this  remark. 


4 

variableness  of  the  popular  fancy,  and  by  becoming  his  own 
trumpeter  provokes  the  sneers  of  his  enemies  and  loses  the 
esteem  of  his  friends.  In  all  such  instances,  the  attempt  to 
write  one's  self  into  favor — to  roll  up  hill  a  recoiling  popular 
ity,  is  like  the  labor  of  Sysiphus — torment  without  hope.  To 
such  torment  I  would  not  willingly  be  thought  capable  of  the 
weakness  and  folly  of  dooming  myself.  Not  that  I  ever  held 
myself  above  explanation  to  candid  inquiry  from  the  humblest 
citizen  of  any  party,  or  affected  indifference  to  the  popularity 
"which"  follows,"  But  having  never,  when  youthful  ardor 
availed  me,  given  chase  to  "  that  popularity  which  must  be  run 
after,"  I  would  not  at  this  day,  with  an  impaired  alacrity,  phy 
sical  and  moral,  for  all  the  pursuits  of  this  world,  expose  myself 
to  the  ridicule  of  hobbling  after  the  butterfly  on  my  crutch,  and 
throwing  off  my  oldfashioned  vesture  in  order  to  quicken  my 
speed.  This  forbearance  to  engage  in  a  wordy  war  on  my  own 
account,  connected  with  the  recollection  that  I  am  no  longer 
the  competitor  of  His  Excellency,  and  that  T  consider  my  pub 
lic  "occupation  gone,"  will,  I  hope  obtain  credit  for  my  assu 
rance  that  the  remarks  I  propose  to  make  upon  a  part  of  the 
speech,  are  prompted  by  a  sense  of  duty  to  my  native  State, 
and  by  no  view  to  any  personal  gratification  or  object. 

The  part  to  which  I  allude  is  the  "authorized  combination." 
This  undignified  fling  was  a  poisoned  shaft  which  could  not  harm 
the  Convention — a  dead  enemy;  but  which  adheres  to  the  bosom 
of  the  Commonwealth.  The  very  terms,  though  sufficiently  inac 
curate,  establish  this  truth.  A  combination  in  the  ill  sense  used 
by  His  Excellency,  is  a  league  for  a  bad  purpose,  in  which 
those  who  authorize  it  are  principals.  Such  a  combination 
among  agents  in  behalf  of  their  principals,  affecting  the/orwier 
only  with  guilt,  and  leaving  the  latter  innocent,  is  a  solecism 
and  absurdity.  It  is  then  the  good  old  State  and  people  of 
Massachusetts — that  people  who  appointed,  approved,  and 
cheered  the  Convention;  whose  honor  is  assailed  by  their 
Governor.  The  Convention  itself  is  the  stalking  horse.  The 
Commonwealth  of  1823  is  still  the  Commonwealth  of  1814— 
"  Shorn  of  its  beams"  it  is  true — mutilated  by  political  sur 
geons  and  reduced  to  second  rate  dimensions  by  the  intrigues 
of  low  ambition—doomed  for  a  long  time,  perhaps  forever,  to 


exhaust  its  political  strength  and  influence  in  wranglings  grow 
ing  out  of  personal  and  contemptible  antipathies  and  predilec 
tions.  But  nevertheless,  the  same  sober,  moral,  firm,  and 
patriotic  community  then  and  now.  All  this  His  Excellency- 
seems  not  to  comprehend.  He  begins  with  censure  and  ends 
with  praise.  The  end  of  his  Commonwealth,  like  Gonzalo's  in 
the  Tempest,  forgets  the  beginning — And  he  is  not  aware  that 
he  dishonors  the  people  who  rocked  the  cradle  of  independ 
ence,  by  charging  upon  them  a  "  combination"  to  consign  it 
prematurely  to  a  tomb.  It  thus  (for  reasons  which  shall  be 
explained)  becomes  a  claim  of  justice  which  the  State  has  a 
right  to  prefer,  that  some  member  of  that  Convention,  under 
the  pledge  of  his  own  name  and  character,  should  take  issue 
upon  the  guilt  of  the  people  of  Massachusetts,  in  regard  to  that 
particular.  To  those  who  know  the  relation  in  which  I  have 
stood  both  to  that  Convention  and  to  the  Governor,  no  apology 
can  be  necessary  for  my  taking  up  the  gauntlet  at  this  moment, 
nor  for  my  omitting  to  do  it  till  now.  What  I  propose  to  offer 
will  be  merely  in  the  nature  of  an  historic  memoir,  presenting 
the  transaction,  not  entirely  in  a  new  light,  which  is  impossi 
ble  ;  but  in  one,  by  which  the  friends  to  the  honor  of  the  State, 
of  whatever  party,  should  be  glad  to  view  it,  and  accompanied 
by  such  remarks  only  as  are  extorted  by  the  speech.  Arid 
while  I  disclaim  the  intention  of  giving  just  cause  of  offence  to 
ingenuous  and  liberal  men,  of  whatever  political  bias,  I  calcu 
late  upon  having  about  my  ears,  an  "  irritable  genus"  of  a  dif 
ferent  description,  which  I  am  neither  ambitious  to  propitiate, 
nor  fearful  to  offend. 

H.  G.  OTIS. 


LETTER  II. 

4» 

SIR, 

IN  selecting  from  the  catalogue  of  crimes  for  which  His 
Excellency  has  arraigned  his  native  State,  the  affair  of  the 
Hartford  Convention  for  the  subject  of  my  remarks,  I  do  not 
proceed  merely  under  an  impression  that  this  is  the  most  hein- 


6 

ous  of  the  charges.  Indeed  to  do  justice  to  the  whole  speech 
would  require  a  dispassionate  retrospect  of  all  the  measures 
adopted  by  the  State  in  the  troublous  times  which  succeeded 
Mr.  Jefferson's  accession 'to  power.  For  His  Excellency  covers 
the  whole  ground  of  the  "  long-.continued  opposition,"  though 
not  intending  to  include  (I  presume)  his  own  opposition  to 
Jay's  treaty  and  to  the  measures  and  character  of  Washington, 
the  object  of  his  later  admiration-.' ,  He  accuses  the  State  as 
false  and  recreant  to  its  federal  obligations — as  shrinking  from 
the  danger  of  battles  which  other.  States  were  obliged  to  fight 
in  its  defence,  "paralyzing  the  means  and  agents"  employed 
to  shield  it  from  the  assaults  of  a  common  enemy,  and  sacrifi 
cing  the  "vital  interests"  of  the  country  to  an  "unhallowed" 
spirit  of  party.  In  short,  His  Excellency  by  throwing  into  one 
dark  group  the  deformities  of  the  factious  monster,  has  pre 
sented  to  the  world  the  picture  of  a  degenerate  State,  resem 
bling  the  decayed  and  rotten  republics  of  which  we  read,  in 
the  last  periods  of  their  decline.  It  is  true,  however,  that  with 
the  pretensions  of  a  skilful  painter,  he  aims  to  relieve  the  ob- 
&CUTO  by  the  claro,  and  exclaims  (in  substance)  in  a  sort  of 
gubernatorial  ecstacy, 

"What  though  your  crimes  were  many  and  were  great, 
"What  though  they  shook  the  basis  of  the  State  !" 

Yet  now  J°u  have  made  me  Governor,  your  sins  which  were  of 
scarlet,  are  made  white  as  snow,  and  you  are  readmitted  into 
the  "American  family."  "Jam  nova  progenies  coelo  demitti- 
tur  alto." 

But  it  certainly  is  not  my  peculiar  province,  nor  my  inten 
tion  to  analyze  this  extraordinary  specimen  of  an  inauguration 
speech — neither  am  I  influenced  by  a  wish  that  it  should  do 
His  Excellency  political  harm,  nor  a  belief  that  it  will  have 
that  effect.  The  zeal  of  those  who  delight  in  the  aliment  offer-  j 
ed  to  their  unextinguishable  resentments,  and  of  those  whose 
hopes  would  be  blasted  by  the  return  of  a  spirit  of  general  con 
cord,  will  always  prevail  over  the  passive  disapprobation  of 
persons  of  better  feelings,  who,  though  supporters  of  His  Ex 
cellency,  condemn  his  speech.  It  will  therefore,  probably  add 
io  the  number  of  his  voters.  But  in  that  part  of  the  speech 


which  adverts  to  the  Hartford  Convention,  my  associates  and 
myself  are  stigmatized  by  every,  designation  short  of  the  "  appel 
nominal.'*  Circumstanced  as  I  was  in  respect  to  His  Excel 
lency,  his  hearers  could  not  but  look  about  them  to  see  if  I 
were  present — to  see  him  point  his  "slow"  and  "moving" 
finger  at  me  from  the  top  of  the  ladder  to  which  he  had  ascend 
ed.  I  thus  feel  myself  called  upon  to  answer  in  behalf  of  my 
old  constituents.  My  friends  will  lament  on  my  account,  what 
they  will  regard  as  a  supgrltuous  and  thankless  task.  The  sub 
ject  they  will  be  ready  to  say 'is  already  comprehended  by  all 
who  have  examined  it  with  a  wish  for  correct  information — 
that  the  superficial  will  not  examine,  and  that  the  perverse  will) 
never  own  their  conviction.  Above  all  that  a  subject  now  dry 
and  obsolete  will  find  no  readers,  while  the  time  is  pregnant 
with  questions  and  events  of  more  urgent  and  attractive  inter 
est.  There  is  much  of  truth  in  these  suggestions.  The  history 
of  the  Convention  and  of  all  the  material  facts  connected  with 
its  institution  and  proceedings,  have  from  the  beginning  been 
in  possession  of  all  who  have  seen  fit  to  consult  public  docu 
ments.  The  story  of  a  plot  or  secret  combination,  imputed  to 
that  body,  is  regarded  as  impossible  in  the  nature  of  things,  by 
those  who  reflect  upon  the  publicity  and  nature  of  our  modes 
of  legislation.  And  the  declaimers  and  essayists  who  use  it  as 
a  Phantasmagoria  on  the  approach  of  an  election,  cannot  con 
verse  together  upon  the  imposture,  by  themselves,  without  I 
laughing  in  each  other's  faces. 

But  while  all  this  is  undeniable,  it  is  not  less  certain  that  the 
history  of  human  credulity  affords  no  example  of  a  more  gener 
al  illusion  than  yet  prevails  in  relation  to  the  origin  and  objects 
of  that  assembly.  A  deep  rooted  and  undefinable  prejudice  is 
found  among  thousands  whose  distempered  imaginations  resist 
the  prescriptions  of  truth  and  reason.  They  choose  to  believe 
that  it  was  organized  at  first  for  some  bad  purpose,  or  that  it 
spontaneously  brooded  over  some  atrocious  conspiracy,  heresy, 
or  schism.  Nothing  it  is  admitted  was  done,  nothing  publicly 
suggested  repugnant  to  the  duty  of  good  citizens.  But  this  to 
these  jealous  persons  only  proves  that  the  plot  was  stifled  in 
embryo.  Nobody,  say  they,  can  shew  that  the  Convention  did 
not  intend  to  dissolve  the  Union  or  make  a  separate  peace.  1 


is  vain  to  reply  that  it  was  equally  within  their  power  to  have 
turned  the  course  of  the  Mississippi  for  the  convenience  of 
General  Pakenham;  and  that  the  same  demand  for  negative 
proof,  would  oblige  them  to  stand  mute  to  a  charge  of  plotting 
to  blow  up  Congress  with  gunpowder,  or  the  President  with  an 
infernal  machine.  The  "rising  generation"  it  seems  too,  who 
can  hardly  be  expected  to  delve  into  the  dry  details  of  legisla 
tive  proceedings,  must  be  taught  to  believe  that  the  Convention 
was  a  cabal  menacing  the  integrity  of  the  Union  and  disgrace 
ful  to  the  State — its  parent.  Many  honest  and  zealous  indi 
viduals  join  in  the  outcry  against  this  legitimate  child  of  the 
State,  as  if  its  crimes  could  disgrace  only  half  of  the  family,  or 
as  if  their  posterity  could  always  carry  abroad  the  parish  re 
gisters  in  their  pockets,  and  escape  the  dishonor  of  a  traitorous 
pedigree  by  shewing  that  their  fathers  were  not  among  the  pub 
licans  and  sinners. 

While  these  idle  misapprehensions  could  be  ascribed  only  to 
the  ordinary  sources  of  fiction,  to  that  portion  of  our  editors, 
debaters,  tub-orators,  and  attorneys  without  cases,  who  consti 
tute  the  "  cheap  defence"  of  our  nation,  there  was  reason  to 
hope  that  they  would  expire  in  time  with  the  embers  of  those 
passions  which  gave  rise  to  them ;  and  like  the  mania  of  witch 
craft,  (which  in  its  day  was  current,  with  much  more  plausible 
evidence,)  serve  merely  to  show  that  in  a  season  of  discontent, 
the  propensity  to  believe  in  the  marvellous  bears  an  exact  pro 
portion  to  the  incredibility  of  the  tale.  But  a  new  aspect  is 
now  given  to  vulgar  calumny  by  the  Speech  of  a  Governor. 
The  discredit  of  the  Hartford  Convention  is  no  longer  derived 
from  the  flourishes  of  electioneering  rhetoric  or  the  "tales  of 
my  landlord."  It  rests  upon  what  ought  to  be  the  best  and 
most  reluctant  testimony — that  of  a  Chief  Magistrate  bound  by 
a  sense  of  his  own  dignity,  and  the  ties  of  natural  attachment 
to  construe  in  the  most  favorable  sense  the  transactions  of  the 
people  of  his  own  State.  This  Governor  feels  himself  compel 
led,  to  admit  and  proclaim  that  the  "good  name"  of  the  State 
had  incurred  a  "reproach"  by  a  long  continued  course  of  dis 
loyalty,  by  which  it  was  regarded  as  excommunicate  from  the 
"American  family."  And  this  language  he  holds  upon  an  oc 
casion  when  grateful  emotions  naturally  suggest  that  of  pane- 


9 

gyric,  when  immemorial  usage  demands  that  of  civility ;  and 
when,  if  ever,  the  people  have  a  right  to  expect  that  the  man  of 
their  choice  will  cover  with  the  mantle  of  office  their  political 
errors.  All  these  enormities  he  thinks  were  aggravated  by  the 
Hartford  Convention.  Now,  when  these  things,  under  these 
circumstances,  are  solemnly  said  by  a  Governor,  I  appeal  to 
the  candid  of  all  parties,  whether  it  can  be  proper  to  let  them 
pass  "as  old  wives  tales?"  How  will  this  aftair  stand  with 
posterity,  and  what  must  be  the  measure  of  humiliation  and 
permanent  loss  of  credit  and  influence  of  this  State,  if  those 
members  of  that  Convention  who  are  upon  the  stage,  acquiesce 
in  this  description  of  their  own  times  and  characters !  Wo 
see  how  easily  the  history  of  events  passing  under  our  own 
eyes  is  distorted,  and  the  difficulty  of  forming  correct  esti 
mates  of  the  characters  and  motives  of  men,  and  of  the  origin 
and  object  of  measures,  from  what  is  written  with  professed 
impartiality. 

Hereafter  it  will  be  too  late  to  efface  the  blot  made  by  His 
Excellency  upon  the  historic  page,  by  alleging  that  his  speech 
was  intended  merely  to  chime  with  the  slang  of  the  day.  It 
will  be  answered  (plausibly  though  untruly)  that  the  accused 
party  in  the  Legislature  quailed  under  the  pungent  rebuke 
from  the  chair,  and  that  the  members  of  the  Convention  con 
tinued  to  be  dumb  as  sheep  before  their  shearer.  Will  then 
future  generations  be  consoled  for  the  disgrace  of  the  State,  by 
the  compliment  paid  to  the  "rising  generation"  for  having  dis 
avowed  the  deeds  of  their  undutiful  fathers  ?  Or  will  not  the 
rising  generations  of  this  State  burn  with  shame  and  indignation 
when  it  shall  constantly  be  thrown  in  their  teeth  by  the  rising 
generations  of  other  States,  that  their  base  blood  has  crept  to 
them  through  ancestors  who  silently  admitted  themselves  to  be 
stigmatized  as  outlaws  from  the  "American  family!"  What 
must  be  the  feelings  of  the  sons  of  Massachusetts  when,  on  any 
public  occasion  requiring  a  statement  of  her  claims,  the  boast 
of  her  former  deeds  shall  be  met  with  the  reproach  of  her  later 
recreancy  ?  When  the  spirit  which  inspired  the  impulse  and 
suggested  the  emblem  of  "join  or  die,"  shall  be  contrasted  with 
the  infatuation  that  would  divide  the  States;  and  when  the 
glory  of  that  Provincial  Congress  which  shone  forth  upon  the 


10 

nativity  of  the  Union,  shall  be  regarded,  on  the  confession  of  a 
Governor,  as  extinguished  in  the  obscurity  of  an  authorized 
conclave,  whose  dark  designs,  in  a  time  of  war,  disheartened 
the  friends  of  the  country  and  encouraged  its  foes. 

These  anticipations  open  a  field  for  observations  pertinent  to 
the  subject  that  would  fill  a  volume.  They  are  suggested  as  my 
inducement  and  justification  for  appearing  before  the  public, 
but  will  be  pursued  no  further  than  to  repel  the  charge  and  sug 
gestions  in  that  speech,  and  to  shew  that  the  character  of  the 
Hartford  Convention,  whether  for  good  or  evil,  rests  upon  the 
broad  shoulders  of  the  community,  and  consequently  that  every 
friend  to  the  honor  of  the  State,  of  whatever  party,  has  a  deeper 
interest  in  rescuing  both  the  State  and  Convention  from  the 
disparagement  of  "disloyal  motives"  (be  his  opinion  of  the  ex 
pediency  of  past  measures  as  it  may)  than  he  can  have  in  the 
issue  of  any  electioneering  tournament,  or  the  downfall  of  any 
political  antagonist. 

H.  G.  OTIS. 


LETTER  III. 

SIR, 

THE  first  position  which  I  mean  to  establish  is  this :  That 
the  project  of  the  Hartford  Convention  and  its  proceedings 
were  more  in  conformity  with  the  public  sentiment  of  Mas- 
1  sachusetts  Proper,  than  any  measure  which  had  been  adopted 
by  that  State,  since  the  acceptance  of  the  Federal  Constitution. 
How  stands  the  proof?  In  October,  1814,  the  Legislature  con- 
*P  vened  in  a  special  session,  upon  a  call  from  the  Governor,  for 
the  express  purpose  of  concerting  measures  for  the  defence  of 
the  State  from  her  own  resources.  The  members  apprized  of 
the  object,  and  bringing  with  them  the  recent  feelings  and  sen 
timents  of  their  constituents,  raised  a  Committee  of  both  Houses 
to  report  such  measures  as  the  exigency  required.  Among  those 
was  the  resolution  proposing  a  Convention.  In  favor  of  this, 
after  the  usual  course  of  proceedings  and  debate,  the  vote  in 


11 

the  Heuse  stood — ayes  260,  nays  90.     In  Senate,  22  to  12. 
The  vote  of  the  Representatives  of  Massachusetts  Proper  was 
226  to  67.    In  the  winter  session  of  the  same  Legislature,  three 
months  after  the  last,  (the  members  having  had  another  oppor 
tunity  of  consulting  their  constituents)  the  proceedings  of  the 
Convention  were  reported,  and  referred  to  a  Committee  of  both 
Houses.     The  report  of  this  Committee  is  conceived  in  terms 
of  the  most  cordial  and  unqualified  approbation.     The  expedi 
ency  of  the  call  of  the  Convention  is  reiterated  and  justified. 
A  sense  of  the  "wisdom  and  ability  with  which  they  have  dis 
charged  their  arduous  trust,"  is  expressed.    Resolutions  "highly 
approving"  their  proceedings,  and  recommending  provisions  for 
giving  them  effect,  were  reported,  and  this  most  full  and  lauda 
tory  report  was  accepted  in  the  same  popular  branch  by  a  vote 
of  the  members  of  Massachusetts  Proper,  159  to  48.     In  the 
interval  between  the  adjournment  of  the  autumnal  and  the 
commencement  of  the  winter  session,  all  the  harsh  and  viru 
lent  invective  which  had  been  lavished  upon  the  Convention  by 
its  leading  opponents  in  the  General  Court,  (and  which  indeed 
was  the  source  of  all  the  prejudice  and  misconception  that  have- 
since  prevailed)  was  circulated  far  and  near.     Nothing  was 
omitted  to  inflame  the  resentment,  awaken  the  jealousy,  alarm 
the  fears,  and  extend  the  sphere  of  an  enraged  opposition,  and 
conjure  up  against  the  framers  and  members  of  the  Convention, 
a  blast  of  po'pular  fury.     But  the  people  were  firm,  and  the 
clamor  was  unheeded.     This  is  not  all.     The  delegates,  who   v 
were  the  inhabitants  of  Massachusetts  Proper,  as  well  as  the 
persons  deputed  to  Washington  with  these  proceedings,  con 
tinued,  from  the   epoch  of  the  Convention  to  that  of  the  last 
political  year,  to  receive  as  ample  testimonials  of  public  confi 
dence  as  were  ever  conferred  upon  the  same  number  of  persons 
in  the  same  period.     With  the  exception  of  two,  (Mr.  Cabot 
and  Mr.  Dane,  who  had  long  since  retired  from  political  em 
ployment,  universally  esteemed  and  honored,)  they  were  con 
stantly  appointed  or  chosen  to  distinguished  public  stations  in 
the  Commonwealth,  (those  who  have  died,  having  been  in  office 
to  the  time  of  their  death.)  Throughout  the  entire  period,  there 
was  no  occurrence  to  justify  the  belief  in  any  change  of  the 
popular  sentiment  in  Massachusetts  respecting  that  Conven- 


12 

tion,  but  611  the  contrary,  every  public  indication  of  an  ad 
herence  to  the  same  opinions  was  manifested  in  the  political 
complexion  of  the  government,  and  in  the  whole  progress  of 
affairs. 

From  this  compendious  state  of  facts,  which  it  would  be  easy 
to  extend,  the  result  is  inevitable  that  the  people,  government, 
and  Convention  of  Massachusetts  were  identified,  in  relation 
to  that  measure  at  the  time  of  its  adoption,  and  that  as  well 
after  as  before  that  period,  there  reigned  among  the  majority 
of  the  people  and  their  representatives,  and  the  individuals 
who  served  in  the  Convention,  a  more  perfect  union  of  politi 
cal  sentiment,  than  is  usually  realized  for  such  a  length  of 
time  in  popular  governments,  between  the  people  and  their 
public  servants.  To  impute  these  measures  to  a  faction,  is  to 
set  truth  and  reason  at  defiance.  The  feelings  which  gave  rise 
to  them  pervaded  a  majority  of  all  classes  in  town  and  country, 
including  a  very  ample  portion  of  those  most  distinguished  in 
every  profession  and  calling,  by  virtue,  talents,  wealth,  and  all 
the  qualities  which  merit  and  command  influence  among  an  in 
telligent  people.  This  is  not  at  all  the  history  or  character  of 
faction.  The  powers  of  a  republic  may  indeed  be  usurped  by 
individuals,  and  the  rights  and  the  will  of  the  people  may  be 
come  a  prey  to  the  tyranny  of  three,  ten,  thirty,  or  five  hundred 
tyrants,  without  involving  them  in  the  culpability  of  misgovern- 
ment.  An  oligarchy,  or  if  you  please,  a  junto  of  ambitious  and? 
unprincipled  men,  may  obtain  a  temporary  ascendency  in  the 
most  perfect  Commonwealth,  by  the  consent  of  the  people ;  but 
unless  they  retain\oy  force,  what  they  have  gained  by  deception 
or  surprize,  the  people  are  in  fault.  But  this  is  not  a  case  of 
usurpation,  or  of  short  lived  faction,  nor  of  surprize  or  fraud. 
If  the  Convention  was  a  measure  of  political  profligacy,  the 
people  of  Massachusetts  are  either  an  intelligent  people  and 
guilty  with  premeditation — or  they  are  an  ignorant  people,  and 
the  dupes  were  hoodwinked  and  led  by  the  knaves. 

This  latter  hypothesis  nobody  will  seriously  maintain — Upon 
the  former,  (which  is  the  hypothesis  of  the  speech,)  not  only  is 
the  character  of  the  State  dishonored,  but  the  confidence  and 
hopes  of  the  votaries  of  our  Republican  system  are  built  upon 
the  sand.  The  experiment  of  a  Republican  Government  can 


13 

never  be  made  with  more  advantage  than  it  has  been  with  the 
sons  of  the  Pilgrims.  They  founded  the  "American  family" 
upon  a  republican  rock  at  Plymouth.  They  were  republicans  at 
heart  before  their  emigration — the  manners,  habits,  prejudices, 
and  education  of  their  descendants;  their  intelligence,  state  of 
property,  and  sense  of  interest,  growing  out  of  actual  prosper 
ity,  all  conspired  to  render  the  scene  and  the  circumstances  of 
the  experiment  eligible  beyond  any  which  mankind  had  witness 
ed.  They  had  realized  the  mutual  protection  and  advantages 
of  ft  Confederation,  forty  years  together,  a  century  and  a  hall 
ago.  If  then,  the  imputations  of  those  who  would  hunt,dowif\ 
the  Hartford  Convention  are  correct,  there  must  be  in  republi 
can  government,  among  the  most  intelligent  and  virtuous  peo 
ple,  and  under  the  most  favorable  circumstances,  an  inherent 
arid  irreversible  tendency  to  degenerate ;  against  which,  we  in 
this  western  world,  shall  have  in  vain  provided  the  checks  and 
balances  of  paper  Constitutions.  If,  for  example,  the  majority 
of  a  great  people  of  that  description  in  one  or  more  States,  with 
ample  means  of  information,  and  intimate  acquaintance  with 
public  characters,  instigated  by  an  unhallowed  spirit  of  party, 
could  persevere  through  many  consecutive  years,  in  confiding 
the  administration  of  affairs,  to  men  who,  belying  characters 
free  from  former  stain  or  reproach,  had  become  so  dead  to 
shame,  and  gangrened  at  heart,  by  party -hate,  as  to  "combine" 
to  favor  the  views  of  a  public  enemy,  by  discouraging  the 
defence  of  the  country  in  a  war  to  whose  scourge  they  and  their 
children  and  fortunes  were  indiscriminately  exposed — If,  I  say, 
the  citizens  of  well  balanced  republican  governments,  exerci 
sing  the  faculty  of  annual  elections,  knowing  their  men,  and 
forewarned  of  their  policy,  continued  to  "heart  on"  and  cheer 
with  encouragement,  those  who  (in  the  spirit  of  the  tenants  of 
a  penitentiary)  would  delight  in  undermining  tne  very  founda 
tions  of  the  Constitution — well  might  the  friends  of  monarchy 
exclaim,  of  what  value  is  the  parchment  citadel !  naturally 
might  they  consider  the  cause  of  republics  desperate,  and  that 
such  a  state  of  affairs  implied  the  want,  and  must  be  followed 
by  the  possession  on  somebody's  head,  of  that  "thing  which  is 
hung  up  in  the  tower  and  shewn  to  strangers  for  sixpence,"  to 
save  the  people  from  their  own  enemies — themselves. 


14 

r-^~, 

/  It  is  no  answer  to  these  suggestions,  that  the  body  of  the  na 
tion  was  sound  and  that  the  disease  was  local.  It  was  in  a 
vital  part — it  was  in  New  England — a  part  not  predisposed  to 
such  an  infection.  Besides,  symptoms  of  at  least  equal  malig 
nity,  with  less  of  exciting  cause,  have  been  manifested  in  those 
regions  of  our  body  politic  which,  during  the  war,  were  regard 
ed  as  the  most  healthful.  When  the  measures  of  government 
or  any  of  its  departments  bear  hard  upon  the  predilections  of 
the  States,  most  eminently  patriotic,  (if  we  take  their  word  for 
it,)  we  hear  a  warmer  tone  of  expostulation ;  and  a  louder  note 
of  preparation  for  resistance  than  was  ever  sounded  by  the  Yan 
kee  bugle.  A  Missouri  question — a  contested  claim  of  juris 
diction  by  the  Supreme  Court — the  establishment  of  a  bank,  the 
sale  of  a  lottery  ticket,  or  a  proposition  to  modify  the  tariff, 
produce  speeches,  resolutions,  and  remonstrances,  in  such  "bold 
words,"  as  shew  a  determined  spirit  of  resistance,  and  would, 
if  followed  by  "deeds  as  bold,"  soon  break  up  the  "family" 
establishment,  and  bring  down  the  house  itself  upon  our  heads. 
I  put  it  then  with  confidence  to  those  friends  of  Republican 
Government,  who  are  not  eaten  up  with  prejudices — and  to 
such  of  the  "rising  generation"  as  have  no  disposition  to  sully 
the  grey  hairs  of  their  fathers,  (in  order  to  obtain  an  admission 
into  the  "American  family"  by  His  Excellency's  back  stairs,) 
whether  it  be  not  their  duty,  and  ought  not  to  be  their  pleasure 
to  furnish  themselves  with  the  means  of  repelling  a  scandal 
which  leads  to  these  sinister  conclusions.  To  examine  impar 
tially  the  history  of  the  period  reviewed  in  the  speech — to  judge 
from  documents  which  cannot  deceive,  and  from  undeniable 
facts,  whether  there  were  not  two  sides  to  the  great  questions, 
and  especially  to  that  of  the  war;  concerning  which,  honest 
minds  might  innocently  differ — to  determine  in  a  spirit  of  can 
dor,  whether  the  then  great  federal  party  might  not  have  sin 
cerely  felt  similar  apprehensions  of  danger  to  the  liberties  of 
Europe,  and  of  America  also,  from  the  avowed  principles  and 
ambitious  strides  of  the  Emperor  of  France;  to  those  which 
are  now  inspired  by  the  demonstrations  of  the  Holy  Alliance. 
Whether  that  danger  would  be  at  this  moment  too  remote  and 
visionary  to  justify  common  precaution,  if  the  despotism  of  Na 
poleon,  by  events  (admitted  in  the  speech  of  Mr.  Madison  to 


15 

have  been  out  of  ordinary  calculation)  had  not  been  annihilated ; 
and  whether  opposition  to  the  war  did  not  grow  out  of  a  sense 
of  that  danger ;  and  anxiety  for  peace  (after  that  had  subsided) 
out  of  the  fear  of  national  bankruptcy  (suspended  by  a  hair)  and 
of  an  exhausting  conflict  without  indemnity  or  redress.  Let 
such  persons,  now  that  jealousy  and  pride  ought  to  be  laid 
asleep,  inquire  whether,  under  this  aspect,  the  opposition  was 
not  perfectly  natural,  and  whether  under  the  adverse  events  of 
a  protracted  war,  (had  it  continued)  it  might  not  have  appeared 
that  more  of  reason  was  on  its  side.  Let  them  also  consider 
how  far  its  objects  have  been  obtained  and  the  predictions  of 
its  opponents  accomplished. 

To  those  who  are  not  afraid  to  commence  and  pursue  such  in 
quiries,  with  a  view  to  truth  alone,  a  momentous  question  is  pre 
sented.  On  what  ground  do  the  interest  and  honor  of  the  State 
(which  by  the  supposition  that  the  Republican  party  has  the  as 
cendency,  is  their  interest  and  honor)  require  them  to  place  the 
late  opposition?  must  it  be  on  that  of  "unhallowed"  party  feel 
ings,  on  insensibility  to  the  honor  and  danger  of  the  country — on 
disaffection  to  the  Union  and  traitorous  combinations  ?  or  is  it  not 
sufficient  for  all  the  fair  and  honorable  objects  of  party  to  ar 
raign  the  wisdom,  policy,  and  expediency  of  the  system  pursued 
by  those  who  had  influence  with  the  people  under  former  ad 
ministrations,  and  for  those  reasons  only  to  transfer,  if  they  see 
fit,  their  confidence  to  those  who  with  them  were  opposed  to 
the  old  order  of  things.  This  may  be  done  without  discredit  to 
a  State,  and  no  man  is  entitled  to  expostulate  or  complain. 
The  people  may  change  men  whenever  a  revolution  happens  in 
public  opinion  respecting  men  or  measures.  Let  the  change 
happen,  if  you  please,  through  a  real  persuasion  of  its  fitness, 
through  a  fondness  for  rotation  in  office,  through  the  charm  ol 
new  talents  or  new  faces,  nay,  even  through  caprice,  or  any  of 
the  causes  which  operate  upon  the  man  or  the  million.  All  this 
is  unobjectionable,  because  it  is  in  the  natural  course  of  things, 
but  when  it  shall  become  the  settled  habit  of  our  Governments 
for  those  who  come  into  power  by  the  suffrage  of  the  people,  to 
launch  forth  in  revilings  of  those  who  go  out,  we  shall  exhibit  a 
miserable  spectacle  of  hostile  factions,  like  those  which  brought 
the  republics  of  ancient  and  modern  times  to  ruin.  Men  of 


16 

principle  and  talent  will  not  devote  their  lives  to  the  study  of 
the  "Commonwealth's  affair^"  with  a  certain  anticipation  that 
upon  every  change  of  public  opinion  they  are  not  only  to  lose 
place,  (which  they  ought  to  expect  and  be  reconciled  to,)  but 
character  also.  The  powers  of  government  will  then  fall  suc 
cessively  into  the  hands  of  those  who  will  deserve  all  the  ill 
they  can  say  of  each  other,  and  who  will  indemnify  themselves 
for  the  loss  of  the  little  reputation  they  have  at  stake  by  turning 
through  their  sterile  grounds,  the  streams  which  flow  from  the 
public  treasury.  Every  man  will  have  a  price  for  himself  and 
his  relations — every  place  its  perquisites,  to  the  profits  of  which 
the  prices  in  the  statute  book  will  afford  no  clue.  While  the 
high  minded  and  disinterested  will  seek  in  disgust  the  shade  of 
private  life,  and  leave  the  republic  to  its  fate. 

H.  G.  OTIS. 


LETTER  IV. 

SIR, 

IN  this  "  era  of  good  feelings,"  the  propensity  to  forget  being 
entirely  on  one  side,  it  may  be  necessary  to  refresh  the  memory 
of  the  once  "  disloyal,"  but  now  penitent  majority  of  Massachu 
setts,  by  quoting  the  specimen  of  the  sublime  and  virulent, 
wherewith  it  has  pleased  His  Excellency  to  chastise  them  for 
their  former  offences.  These  are  his  words : 

"The  long-  continued  opposition  to  the  federal  government,  but  more 
especially  the  measures  pursued  in  this  State  during  the  eventful  and  critical 
period  of  the  late  war — the  withholding  from  the  general  government  the 
constitutional  means  of  defence — the  pai'alyzing  influence  exercised  over  the 
means  and  agents  of  that  government,  which  occasioned  double  sacrifices 
of  life  and  treasure  ;  while  the  citizens  of  other  States  were  exerting  their, 
utmost  energies  against  a  common  enemy  ;  when  a  gallant  army  and  navy 
were  covering  themselves  with  glory,  and  retrieving  and  establishing,  on  an 
imperishable  basis,  the  national  character,  on  the  ocean  and  on  the  land ;  at 
this  portentous  crisis,  when  our  liberties  and  independence  were  at  hazard, 
an  unhallowed  spirit  of  party  was  permitted  to  prevail  over  the  vital  interests 
of  the  country — an  authorized  combination  was  formed,  and  meetings  held 
in  a  neighboring  State,  which,  whatever  may  have  bee«  its  professed  object, 


17 

«foad  the  certain  effect  of  encouraging  the  enemy,  of  discouraging  and  impairing 
the  means  and  resources  of  the  country,  and  of  alienating  the  minds  of  the 
citizens  from  that  "unity  of  government,"  which,  in  the  emphatic  language 
of  WASHINGTON,  "constitutes  us  one  people, — is  the  main  pillar  in  the  edifice 
of  our  real  independence,  the  support  of  our  tranquillity  at  home,  our  peace 
abroad,  of  our  safety,  of  our  prosperity,  of  that  very  liberty  which  we  so 
highly  prize."  The&e  measures  and  this  course  had  cast  a  reproach  on  the 
good  name  of  the  State,  which  is  now  disavowed  and  removed.  Massachusetts 
is  at  length  restored  to  the  American  family.  Her  character  is  redeemed  in 
the  estimation  of  the  patriots  of  our  own  country  and  of  every  statesman 
in  Europe.  The  rising  generation,  who  could  have  had  no  agency  in  this 
disloyal  course,  appear  to  have  taken  an  honorable  and  an  earnest  interest 
in  its  disavowal." 

The  cruelty  of  this  bitter  invective  is  aggravated  by  those 
characteristics  which  distinguish  calumny  from  legal  accusa 
tion.  By  an  absence  of  all  specification  of  time,  place,  and 
circumstance,  and  by  the  indiscriminate  phraseology  of  the  pub 
lic  tribunal,  which  condemned  to  the  guillotine  "those  suspect 
ed  of  being  suspicious." 

It  is  an  advantage  enjoyed  in  the  military  and  naval  service, 
that  those  who  are  charged  by  the  voice  even  of  rumor,  with 
deviation  from  duty,  can  cause  to  be  instituted  such  inquiry 
into  their  conduct  as  will  compel  their  accusers  to  specify  or 
to  abandon  their  charges.  But  for  those  who  serve  the  State 
in  the  civil  department,  no  such  recourse  is  provided.  They 
are  at  the  mercy  of  every  popinjay  who  can  throw  a  squib  or 
discharge  an  air  gun  from  a  garret  window— of  editors  who 
pander  for  the  bad  passions  of  party — and  for  rivals  who  hum 
ble  themselves  to  imitate  the  starlings  and  "halloo  Mortimer," 
instead  of  giving  an  elevated  tone  to  the  public  sentiment,  in 
which  all  men  of  high  minds,  even  of  their  own  party,  would 
be  glad  to  harmonize. 

Although  in  the  foregoing  quotation,  the  Governor  has  embo 
died  the  substance  of  all  the  insinuations  of  hostility  to  the 
Oovernment,  on  the  part  of  Massachusetts  and  the  Convention, 
whiclf  have  been  wire-drawn  through  endless  speeches,  essays, 
and  volumes,  he  has  not  alleged  a  single  fact  susceptible  of  a 
direct  issue.  His  nearest  approach  to  precision  is  in  the  impu 
tation  of  certain  effects  which  he  avers  to  have  been  the  result  of 
the  Convention.  These  effects  are : — First,  encouragement  to 
the  enemy.  Second,  discouragement  of  the  country,  and  im- 
3 


18 

pairing  its  means  and  resources.  Third,  alienating  the  minds 
of  the  citizens  from  the  unity  of  government,  &c.  Now  admit, 
for  a  moment,  (what  shall  be  disproved)  that  these  "effects" 
had  followed  the  institution  or  the  proceedings  of  the  Hartford 
Convention,  they  would  not,  unless  in  connexion  with  its  avow 
ed  intentions  and  actual  misdeeds,  furnish  any  just  ground  for 
questioning  its  patriotism  and  integrity.  On  the  contrary,  i 
pretensions  to  these  attributes  are  demonstrable  beyond  all  pos 
sible  doubt,  by  those  rules  of  evidence  which  are  founded  in 
the  principles  of  eternal  justice,  and  by  which  alone  we  can 
fairly  estimate  the  motives  of  men  and  the  objects  of  associa 
tions.  Nobody  will  deny  that  consequences  often  enable  us  to 
form  a  judgment  of  intellectual  endowments,  of  the  wisdom  of 
schemes,  and  of  the  sagacity  and  foresight  of  their  projectors. 
But  the  only  standard  of  intentions  is  words  and  actions  taken 
together. 

It  would  be  then,  a  simple  and  conclusive  answer  to  every 
calumnious  aspersion  of  the  Convention,  that  it  was,  correctly 
speaking,  a  war  measure,  rather  than  a  peace  measure — It  was 
one  of  a  series  of  propositions  for  raising  men  and  money  for 
public  defence.  And  if  its  proceedings  were  confirmatory  of 
that  profession,  it  is  not  responsible  with  its  character,  for  any 
sinister  consequences  which  incidentally  followed. 

Apart  from  this  doctrine,  neither  individuals,  or  societies,  or 
governments  can  find  protection  from  calumniators  in  and  out 
of  office.  He  who  makes  a  profession  of  religion,  and  whose 
whole  life  is  devoted  to  the  observance  of  its  ordinances  and  the 
practice  of  its  duties,  may  be  branded  as  a  hypocrite.  He  whose 
example  is  a  mirror  o-f  all  the  moral  virtues  before  men,  may  be 
charged  with  retiring  from  their  busy  haunts  with  a  purpose  of 
solitary  intemperance.  Societies  for  propagating  the  Gospel, 
may  be  charged  with  the  secret  design  of  disseminating  the  Age 
of  Reason.  Bible  societies  may  be  accused  of  an  intent  to  bring 
the  Scriptures  into  disrepute — and  the  society  for  Foreign  Mis 
sions,  of  aiming  to  establish'  the  influence  and  empire  of  this 
world,  like  their  predecessors,  the  Jesuits.  Just  as  the  early 
Christians  were  actually  denounced  by  the  Governor  of  Bythin- 
ia,  (whose  politeness,  if  he  had  held  his  office  from  their  choice, 
would  probably  have  spared  them  the  outrage,)  for  holding  Con- 


19 

ventions  of  the  most  dangerous  tendency,  though  the  only  pro 
fessions  made  by  them,  were  of  the  sublimest  morality  to  which 
their  lives  were  conformable,  and  their  only  overt  acts  of  trea 
son  consisted  in  singing  hymns  and  doing  homage  to  the  Saviour. 
It  seems  strange  that  a  fundamental  rule,  by  which  our  con 
duct  in  all  the  ordinary  transactions  of  life  is  governed,  should 
require  illustration ;  that  in  the  affair  of  the  Convention,  their 
own  words  and  acts,  which  are  the  only  test  of  character,  should 
be  disregarded,  and  that  they  should  be  charged  with  promo 
ting  tendencies  to  disunion  which  it  was  their  avowed  inten 
tion  to  counteract,  and  against  which,  their  proceedings  are  a 
formal  protest. 

As  a  disregard  of  this  plain  rule  is  the  cause  of  all  the  misap 
prehension;  let  us  try  it  by  another  case.     It  was  predicted  of 
Mr.  Jefferson's  administration,  and  conscientiously  believed, 
that  it  would  prove  fatal  to  the  funding  system,  and  detrimental 
to  our  religious  institutions;  that  it  would  endanger  the  Consti 
tution  and  sacrifice  the  public  peace  to  foreign  partialities.    But 
upon  his  accession  to  power  he  promulgated  principles  favorable 
to  the  support  of  public  credit  and  of  the  Constitution,  and 
avowed  the  strongest  attachment  to  a  system  of  neutrality. 
The  measures  of  his  administration  were  ostensibly  adapted, 
and  by  him  and  his  friends  avowed  to  be  intended  to  conform 
to  this  exposition  of  his  creed.    His  opponents  however  thought, 
and  probably  still  think,  that  the  tendency  of  his  system  was  to 
an  opposite  end.     Public  credit  was  however  cherished — no  di 
rect  violation  of  the  Constitution  (the  repeal  of  the  Judiciary 
act,  concerning  which,  there  are  two  opinions,  excepted,)  was 
encouraged,  and  the  peace  of  the  country,  though  often  endan- 
;  gered,  was  preserved  during  his  time.     Is  it  not  then  regarded 
'  by  the  friends  of  that  administration  as  flagrant  injustice,  as 
well  as  indecency,  to  return  to  the  old  charge  ?  to  insist  that 
{  what  he  said  and  did  while  he  was  at  the  helm,  shall  be  ac- 
(  counted  for  nothing  ?  that  he  nevertheless  harbored  a  secret  un- 
'  friendliness  to  the  Constitution,  and  panted  for  a  British  war? 
N  And  in  affirmance  of  these  allegations  to  adduce  the  incautious 
speeches,  and  intemperate  essays,  of  anonymous  writers  of  his 
party,  and  the  violent,  indecorous,  and  extravagant  language  of 
the  public  newspapers  that  were  enlisted  in  his  support,  and  the 


20 

editors  of  which  were  Said  to  be  under  his  special  patronage  ? 
This  is  a  course  pursued  by  no  fair  adversary  at  this  day.  A 
conviction  of  the  impolicy  of  that  administration  is  still  deeply 
rooted  in  the  minds  of  many,  but  base  and  unconstitutional  views 
|  are  imputed  to  it  by  none.  It  stands  upon  the  foundation  of  its 
.,«  own  history.  Not  so  the  Hartford  Convention.  In  their  case 
the  appeal  is  made  in  vain  to  profession  and  practice,  to  wit 
nesses  and  records  of  their  own  transactions.  The  feast  which 
malignity  and  credulity  are  invited  to  make  at  their  expense  is 
composed  of  scraps  from  newspapers,  and  Olive  Branches,  and 
stump  orations — a  gallimaufrey,  which,  after  feeding  multitudes, 
is  simmered  down  by  His  Excellency  into  a  portable  sauce  pi- 
quante,  for  the  Senators  and  Representatives  to  take  home  to  their 
^'American  family"  dinners.  Proceeding  still  on  the  supposi 
tion  (for  the  sake  of  argument)  that  these  "effects"  on  the  friends 
'  and  foes  of  the  country  were  realized ;  it  follows  conclusively, 
that  if  nothing  to  authorize  them  was  countenanced  by  the  Con 
vention,  they  must  have  been  the  fruit  of  impressions  made  by 
misrepresentation.  It  is  then,  an  abomination  in  the  Directors 
of  the  Party  Mint,  to  stamp  the  name  of  the  Convention  upon 
their  base  coin,  instead  of  their  own  image  and  superscription. 

Beside  these  considerations,  it  would  be  quite  pertinent  to 
insist,  that  in  a  time  of  war,  those  who  are  dissatisfied  with  a 
continuance  of  hostilities,  and  who  desire  a  return  to  a  pacific 
policy,  are  not  to  be  gagged,  lest  the  disclosure  of  their  senti 
ments  should  encourage  the  enemy.  At  least,  this  was  the 
creed  of  Chatham,  when  he  thanked  "God  that  America  had 
resisted."  Of  this  persuasion  was  the  republican  party,  during 
our  short  war  with  France.  Of  the  Whigs  in  England,  before 
the  peace  of  Ryswic,  and  of  the  Tories,  when  they  compelled 
the  peace  of  Utrecht.  There  is,  first  or  list,  a  peace  party  in 
all  free  governments,  and  they  will  spcjofc  fearlessly.  This 
party  was  formidable,  and  respectable  and  audible  from  the  be 
ginning  of  the  war  between  England  and  France  until  the  peace  ' 
of  Amiens,  in  the  British  Parliment.  It  was  a  Peace  Party 
whose  opposition  to  the  invasion  of  Spain,  found  favor  in  this 
country,  and  the  late  Mr.  Dexter,  eloquently  observed,  that 
the  friends  of  peace  have  sometimes  no  alternative  but  to  speak 
loud,  at  the  risk  of  being  overheard  by  the  enemy,.  It  is  inevi- 


21 

table  in  all  wars  that  an  enemy  should  place  some  hope  in  the 
known  disposition  of  the  party  desirous  of  peace.  But  it  has 
little  or  no  effect  upon  his  plans  of  operation ;  and  if  through  a 
reluctance  to  encourage  this  hope,  all  should  forbear  to  recom 
mend  a  pacific  policy,  wars  would  be  eternal,  as  was  the  case  in 
the  Grecian  Republics,  where  exile  or  death  frequently  await 
ed  those  who  dared  to  oppose  their  predominant  frenzy  for  the 
tented  field. 

These  remarks  would  be  strictly  in  point,  if  in  consequence 
of  the  Hartford  Convention,  (though  a  war  measure  in  itself) 
being  a  measure  of  the  Peace  Party,  the  result  had  been,  through 
a  misapprehension  of  its  views,  to  encourage  the  enemy  and  dis 
courage  the  friend.  But  it  so  happens,  that  they  are  not  all  es 
sential  to  the  vindication  of  the  Convention,  from  a  responsi- 
bleness  for  the  "certain  effect,"  by  His  Excellency,  referred  to 
that  source.  Because  His  Excellency  is  mistaken,  and  no  such 
certain  effect  ever  took  place. 

H.  G.  OTIS. 


LETTER  V. 

SIR, 

THE  Hartford  Convention,  though  irreconcilably  opposed  to 
the  origin  and  conduct  of  the  war,  and  most  anxious  for  peace, 
was  nevertheless,  as  I  have  asserted,  professedly  and  truly  a 
Council  of  tiPar ;  created  to  make  a  more  effectual  provision 
for  the  public  defence.  It  is  inconceivable  by  what  force  of 
imagination  it  could  have  been,  in  any  possible  event,  said  to 
produce  the  "certain  effect"  of  discouraging  friends,  or  encour 
aging  the  enemy.  Still,  had  it  been  true  in  fact,  that  these  ef 
fects  had  been  produced  by  any  cause  whatever,  there  would 
have  been  the  same  difficulty  in  disproving  His  Excellency's  as 
sertion,  which  is  always  incident  to  what  is  termed  in  logic, 
proving  a  negative.  We  must  have  rested  on  the  natural  in 
credibility  of  the  fact — on  the  impossibility  of  any  connexion 
between  such  a  cause  and  such  an  effect — on  the  tendency  of  the 


22 

cause  to  produce  an  opposite  effect,  and  in  a  word,  upon  the  total 
i  destitution  of  proof  on  his  part.  But  the  true  and  conclusive 
reply  to  this  direct  assertion  of  the  speech  (already  given)  is, 
that  between  the  time  of  the  institution  of  the  Hartford  Con- 
:  vention  and  the  end  of  the  war,  no  such  "certain  effects"  as  are 
mentioned,  took  place.  No  such  events  happened — no  instance 
can  be  adduced  demonstrative  of  increased  confidence  in  the 
enemy,  or  of  depression  in  the  defenders  of  the  country.  The 
very  reverse  of  all  this  may  be  established  by  the  history  of  that 
I  period.  The  appalling  occurrences  of  the  war,  all  happened 
I  prior  to  the  era  of  the  Convention.  Before  that  time  the  ene- 
I  my  had  hovered  over  and  threatened  the  coast  from  Maine  to 
\^  Georgia.  They  had  made  descents  in  many  places,  ravaging 
them  with  fire  and  sword.  They  had  marched  almost  without 
molestation  to  the  metropolis  of  the  Union,  and  destroyed  with 
Vandal  hands  the  public  buildings.  Never  was  the  aspect  of 
our  affairs  more  perilous,  the  attitude  of  the  enemy  so  menacing, 
his  pretensions  so  lofty,  and  the  discontent  with  the  measures 
of  government  so  feverish  among  the  people  of  Massachusetts, 
(though  always  loyal  and  alert  for  measures  of  defence,)  as  in 
the  season  immediately  preceding  the  organization  of  the  Con 
vention.  It  was  this  posture  of  affairs  wliich  induced  the  Ex 
ecutive  of  Massachusetts  to  convene  the  Legislature,  and  which 
suggested  to  that  body,  the  expediency  of  a  Convention,  among 
other  resolutions  providing  defensive  measures.  The  Legislature 
was  summoned  in  September,  1814.  The  act  instituting  the  Con 
vention,  passed  in  October  following.  The  Convention  was  in  ses- 
>aon  from  the  15th  of  December  in  that  year,  to  the  5th  day  of  the 
next  January.  Throughout  this  entire  period,  and  thencefor 
ward  to  the  termination  of  the  war,  not  a  new  project  was  form 
ed,  nor  enterprize  commenced,  nor  new  pretension  advanced,  nor 
advantage  of  any  moment  gained  by  the  enemy.  On  the  other 
hand,  to  this  same  period,  (dating  from  the  act  establishing  the 
Convention)  may  be  referred,  a  more  united  disposition  in  the 
people  to  prepare  the  means  of  protracted  resistance,  not  indeed 
from  acquiescence  in  the  hostile  policy  which  occasioned  the 
war,  but  from  a  persuasion  of  its  being  the  only  mean  of  safety. 
And  it  may  be  truly  affirmed  that  no  period  of  the  war -was  dis 
tinguished  by  so  much  of  military  vigor  and  brilliant  success, 


23 

and  so  much  of  unity  in  the  national  feeling  on  the  part  of  this 
people ;  and  so  palpable  a  lowering  of  tone  on  that  of  the  enemy, 
as  that  immediately  following  the  sittings  of  the  Convention. 
The  President  of  the  United  States  at  this  time,  appears  to  have 
entertained  no  apprehensions  from  the  disaffection  of  Massachu 
setts,  or  of  New  England.  In  the  same  month  of  September, 
in  his  Message,  he  expatiates  upon  the  undaunted  spirit  which 
pervaded  the  nation,  upon  the  heroic  arid  enlightened  patriotism 
of  their  constituents,  and  'upon  the  promptness  and  alacrity 
"every,  where"  displayed  in  sustaining  the  publk>burdens.  The 
expedition  against  New  Orleans  (as  was  justly  apprehended  by 
our  Commissioners  at  Ghent,  and  foreseen  by  our  Government)  . 
was  doubtless  planned  in  the  British  Cabinet  at  the  commence 
ment  of  the  campaign,  and  perhaps  could  not  have  been  aban 
doned  by  the  commanding  general.  Yet  if  the  tendency  of 
the  Hartford  Combination  had  been  to  encourage  the  enemy, 
one  would  expect  to  see  this  "effect"  realized  in  those  States  or 
their  neighborhood,  which  were  the  seat  of  disaffection.  The 
enemy  were  certainly  bound  to  be  in  readiness  to  make  some 
demonstrations,  in  the  way  of  co-operation  with  their  Hartford 
auxiliaries.  But  this  encouraged  enemy,  though  apprized  by 
public  documents  of  the  project  of  the  Convention,  transferred 
altogether  the  prosecution  of  hostilities  to  the  extreme  South, 
ivhile  our  discouraged  brethren  in  that  quarter,  with  the  same 
information,  continued  to  prepare  with  vigor  for  the  defence  of 
New  Orleans;  and  Jackson  obtained  his  splendid  victory  on 
the  day  when  he  had  every  reason  to  conclude  that  the  Conven 
tion  was  in  session.  From  the  address  of  that  general  to  his 
victorious  troops,  recurring  to  the  whole  series  of  military  ope 
rations,  from  September  to  January,  it  is  apparent  that  the  "zeal 
and  alacrity"  of  the  people  and  of  the  military  of  all  that  region 
could  not  be  surpassed.  And  his  congratulations  and  encomi 
ums  upon  the  spirit  and  unanimity  in  which  every  symptom  of 
disaffection  had  been  merged,  were  expressed  in  the  most  glow 
ing  and  unqualified  terms.  In  a  word,  all  the  operations  of  the 
war,  from  the  time  of  the  first  public  mention  of  a  Convention 
to  the  termination  of  hostilities,  were  carried  on  in  the  South, 
JThey  were  likewise  of  a  most  encouraging  complexion. 

To  what  other  region  shall  we  look,  for  the  "certain  effect?." 


24 

attributed  to  the  combination  ?  Let  us  for  a  moment,  take  a 
peep  into  the  British  Cabinet  and  observe  there  the  effects  upon 
its  policy.  If  we  find  that  administration,  instead  of  presum 
ing  upon  hopes  inspired  by  the  known  existence  of  the  Hart 
ford  Convention,  and  rising  in  their  terms  of  peace,  in  antici 
pation  of  its  depressing  influence  upon  this  country ;  actually 
descending  from  their  high  ground,  and  conceding  in  negotia 
tion,  points  of  which  they  had  formerly  been  tenacious,  the 
inference  is  irresistible  that  the  "effects"  of  that  formidable 
association,  were  not  such  as  to  elate  the  hopes  of  the  British 
ministry.  This  then  seems  to  have  been  the  actual  course  of 
events.  The  correspondence  of  our  ministers  at  Ghent  disclo 
ses  the  fact,  that  in  the  same  month  of  October,  (when  the  pro" 
ject  of  the  Convention  then  recently  convened  and  agitated 
could  not  have  been  known  in  Europe,)  the  tone  of  the  British 
negotiators  was  such  as  forbade  the  hope  of  terminating  their 
discussions  by  an  amicable  treaty.  Their  demands  bore  the 
stamp  of  a  most  presumptuous  confidence.  While  they  requir 
ed  stipulations  for  dismantling  the  forts  on  our  frontier  and 
discontinuing  our  naval  armament  on  the  lakes  without  any 
corresponding  concessions  on  their  part,  they  also  insisted  (as 
a  sine  qua  non,)  upon  the  actual  dismemberment  of  our  terri 
tory,  by  a  renunciation  of  jurisdiction  over  an  immense  region 
in  favor  of  their  Indian  friends,  and  upon  an  admission  of  the 
latter  as  parties  in  adjusting  the  terms  of  peace.  Such  was  the 
forbidding  aspect  of  the  negotiation,  and  the  arrogance  of  the 
British  pretensions,  at  a  time  when  they  could  by  no  possibility 
have  heard  of  any  such  measure  as  the  project  of  the  Hartford 
Convention.  But  in  December  they  must  have  been  well  in 
formed  of  tke  fact,  that  such  a  Convention  would  be  held ;  of 
the  time  of  its  intended  meeting,  and  of  the  views  ascribed  to 
it  by  its  opponents; — yet  far  from  presuming  upon,  and  waiting 
only  a  few  da}rs  for  an  issue  favorable  to  their  wishes — for  the 
work  of  disunion  to  be  consummated—they  at  that  moment  ac 
tually  abandon  their  high  and  inadmissible  pretensions,  recede 
from  the  sine  qua  non,  and  (although  they  undoubtedly  calcu 
lated  that  New  Orleans  had  fallen)  they  concluded  a  treaty  of 
peace  conformable  to  the  instructions  of  our  government.  This 
fact  alone  is  conclusive  in  dieaffinnance  of  the  consequences  im- 


25 

puted  to  the  Convention  by  His  Excellency— but  independently 
of  all  these  remarks,  it  is  sufficient  that  any  just  and  candid 
person  by  reverting  to  general  considerations  must  perceive  and 
admit  that  no  blame  in  this  particular  could  attach  to  the  Con 
vention.     The  only  incentives  to  an  enemy,  that  could  have 
grown  out  of  the  Hartford  Convention  must  be  found  either  in 
its  avowed  objects,  its  actual  proceedings,  or  in  the  suggestions 
of  the  fears,  jealousies,  or  malice  of  its  opponents.    But  its 
avowed  object,  as  described  in  the^ct  of  its  creation,  was  "to 
unite  in  the  most  vigorous  measures  for  defending  the  State 
and  expelling  the  invader,"  "laying  aside  all  party  feelings 
and  political  dissentions."     Its  proceedings  speak  for  them 
selves  the  language  of  patriotism  and  union,  and  contain  the 
distinct  project  of  a  vigorous  system  for  defence,  and  for  the 
effect  of  timidity,  jealousy,  or  malignity,  they  could  not  be  re 
sponsible.     Had  the  Legislature  called  upon  His  Excellency 
for  documents  to  justify  and  support  his  allegations  of  "certain 
effects,"  he  must  have  found  himself  embarrassed  under  a  total 
destitution  of  that  evidence,  which  alone,  a  Chief  Magistrate, 
consulting  what  is  due  to  his  own  dignity,  should  make  the 
basis  of  his  communications.     If,  indeed,  the  invasion  of  this 
State  and  of  Connecticut — the  assaults  upon  Eastport  and  Cas- 
tine,  Belfast,  Scituate,  Wareham,  in  the  former,  and  Petipauge 
and  Stonington  in  the  latter,  had  been  cotemporaneous  with, 
or  immediately  followed  the  project  of  the  Convention,  there 
might  have  been  some  fudnt  color,  for  the  presumption  that 
the  enemy  were  encouraged  to  make  these  onsets  in  the  belief 
that  the  measure  was  indicative  of  a  spirit  of  disaffection  of 
which  advantage  might  be  taken.     But  even  then,  the  fault 
would  have  been  in  the  painters  and  not  in  the  model.     But 
these  hostile  incursions  preceded  the  Convention.     They  were 
of  a  nature  to  excite  alarm,  to  produce  detestation  and  resist 
ance  ;  to  allay  the  flame  of  party,  to  awaken  a  sense  of  com 
mon  danger  and  a  concert  of  common  counsels  among  States 
bordering  on  each  other  and  exposed  to  similar  hostile  visita 
tions.    They  had  that  "effect"  and  none  other.     It  is  impossi 
ble  that  an  enemy  could  have  calculated  upon  any  other,  and 
it  will  be  with  posterity,  only  an  additional  instance  of  the 
blindness  and  uncharitableness  of  party  feeling,  that  the  reverse- 
4 


26 

of  this  effect  should  have  been  ascribed  to  that  association, 
Those  of  the  rising  generation,  whose  curiosity  prompts  them 
to  investigate  the  causes  which  damped  the  ardour  of  their 
countrymen,  and  stimulated  the  enterprize  of  the  enemy,  must 
look  far  Behind  the  Hartford  Convention.  They  must  raise  the 
veil  which  those  who  rejoiced  in  the  salvation  of  their  country, 
by  a  period  put  to  the  war,  have  been  willing,-  its  promoters 
should  drop  over  the  egregious  errors  which  marked  its  com 
mencement.  Many  of  these  causes  may  then  be  discerned  in 
the  declaration  of  war  itself  by  one  half  of  the  country,  in  the 
total  improvidence  of  means  anji  preparation  for  such  an  event, 
and  the  absence  of  the  commanding  talents  in  the  War  Depart 
ment  which  could  in  any  measure,  by  the  creation  of  resources,, 
counterbalance  the  evils  of  this  precipitancy — in  contriving  so 
to  manage  matters,  as  to  enable  the  enelny  on  the  frontier  to 
get  the  first  intelligence  of  the  war  and  capture  an  important 
post  before  its  defenders  were  apprized  of  the  event — in  a  plan 
of  operations,  which  is  the  standing  jest  and  wonder  of  all  mil 
itary  men,  adopted  under  His  Excellency's  auspices,  by  which 
Canada  was  assailed  in  the  point  to  which  those  entrusted  with 
its  defence,  whether  French  or  English,  had  always  eftdeavored 
to  transfer  the  seat  of  war — in  marching  our  forces  to  the  inter 
minable  wilderness  to  breathe  a  vein  in  the  little  finger  of  the 
enemy  instead  of  pushing  directly  for  his  heart.  Thus  expo 
sing  whole  armies  to  be  captured  and  scalped  in  this  Ultima 
Thule  of  the  civilized  creation,  where  success  would  have  been 
of  little  avail.  In  the  deplorable  waste  of  the  "materiel'*  of 
war  and  subsistence  and  its  transportation,  through  places,  over 
which  the  "foul  fiend"  had  been  the  only  pioneer,  at  an  ex 
pense  exceeding  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  lading.  These  and 
the  disasters  of  the  two  first  campaigns,  together  with  a  strong 
impression  of  the  hopelessness  of  the  contest,  had  doubtless  the 
"certain  effect"  of  depressing  the  spirit  of  the  country.  But 
even  these  dangers  were  considered  insignificant  in  comparison 
with  another.  The  despotism  of  Napoleon  at  the  commence 
ment  of  our  war  overshadowed  Europe.  And  it  was  the  sober 
and  deliberate  persuasion  of  many  of  the  firmest  and  wisest 
patriots,  in  every  part  of  New-England,  that  the  extension  of 
its  baleful  influence  to  our  country  would  be  promoted,  by  a 


27 

war  with  his  enemy,  leading  to  an  alliance  (at  least  tie  facto) 
with  the  tyrant  himself. 

These  considerations  doubtless  produced  a  deep  sensation, 
and  strong  desire  in  this  people  to  abide  by  the  armistice  made 
between  Generals  Dearborn  and  Provost  soon  after  the  com 
mencement  of  hostilities,  and  afterwards  to  embrace  the  terms 
of  peace  offered  through  Admiral  Warren.  When  these  terms 
(which,  as  was  anticipated,  and  as  the  event  has  proved,  were 
as  favorable  as  there  was  a  prospect  of  ever  obtaining)  were  re 
jected  ;  no  doubt  a  bitter  feeling  of  regret  and  resentment  elec 
trised  the  people  of  Massachusetts,  who  had  just  taken  the  gov 
ernment  from  the  hands  of  the  war  party.  They  posted  in  all 
directions  to  meetings  of  their  primary  assemblies,  and  the 
voice  of  opposition  to  the  policy  of  the  war,  like  peals  of  inces 
sant  thunder,  echoed  from  every  point  of  the  compass.  It  was 
instinct,  and  not  influence  which  produced  the  universal  desire 
to  compel  the  administration  to  reconsider  and  accept  at  that 
period,  those  terms  which  after  two  years  and  a  half  of  hard 
fighting,  they  boast  as  a  merit  of  having  obtained. 

This  hope  however,  was  exceedingly  enfeebled  by  subsequent 
events.  Although  the  gratifying  sense  of  security  to  the  liber 
ties  of  the  country,  in  the  downfall  of  Bonaparte,  outweighed 
the  dread  of  danger  from  the  continuance  of  the  war,  yet  it 
could  not  be  disguised  that  this  danger  had  become  more  seri 
ous,  from  circumstances  which  increased  the  confidence  of  the 
enemy ;  and  that,  probably,  the  administration  had  suffered  to 
escape  the  favorable  time  for  negotiating  peace.  It  became 
then,  the  duty  of  the  people  to  prepare  to  meet  a  foe  whose 
means  of  annoyance  were  augmented  on  their  own  coasts,  and 
at  their  own  home.  On  none  but  God  and  herself  could  New 
England  rely  for  succour — yet  her  principal  States,  simply  for 
entertaining  a  constitutional  doubt,  (in  a  new  case)  authorized 
by  the  Judges  of  her  highest  tribunal,  (whose  ermine  was  as  spot 
less  as  their  talents  were  great)  were  considered  as  outcasts 
from  the  "American  family;"  and  for  concerting  the  means  of 
defending  themselves  from  the  catastrophies  of  Havre  de  Grace, 
Alexandria,  and  Washington,  by  an  array  of  their  own  sons, 
they  are  charged  with  authorizing  "combinations ;"  and  the 


28 

portraits  of  Strong  and  Cabot,  and  Tread  well  and  Goodrich, 
and  West,  are  placed  in  his  Excellency's  collection,  by  the 
sides  of  those  of  Cataline  and  Cethegus. 

H.  G.  OTIS. 


LETTER  VI. 

"I  do  not  know  the  method  of  drawing1  up  an  indictment  against  a  whole 
people.  I  am  not  ripe  to  pass  sentence  on  the  gravest  public  bodies,  en 
trusted  with  magistracies  of  great  authority  and  dignity,  and  charged  with 
the  safety  of  their  fellow  citizens  upon  the  very  same  title  that  I  am.  I  re 
ally  think  that  for  wise  men,  this  is  not  judicious :  for  sober  men,  not  decent: 
for  minds  tinctured  with  humanity,  not  mild  or  merciful." 

Burke's  Speech  on  Conciliation  with  America. 

SIR,  ""% 

IT  has,  I  trust,  been  successfully  demonstrated  that  the  in 
stitution  and  proceedings  of  the  Hartford  Convention,  whatever 
were  its  objects,  were  attended  with  no  detriment  to  the  nation. 
Certainly  none  for  which  the  State  or  Convention  are  responsi 
ble.  I  will,  in  the  course  of  this  letter,  attempt  to  arrange  the 
multitudinous  charges  included  in  the  speech,  under  such  gen 
eral  heads,  as  may  enable  me  to  refute  them  without  a  particu 
larity  of  detail,  that  would  forbid  the  expectation  of  engaging 
the  attention  to  a  subject,  upon  which  more  are  ready  to  decide 
than  are  patient  to  examine.  » 

To  those,  however,  who  wish  for  a  short  answer,  and  to  all 
who  are  the  professed  advocates  of  State  Rights,  the  suggestion 
ought  to  be  conclusive — that  the  charge  of  a  "combination"  as 
preferred  against  a  Free  and  Independent  State,  or  its  consti 
tutional  Government,  or  (which  is  the  same  thing)  its  approved 
Agents,  is  in  itself  preposterous  and  not  predicable  of  such  a 
State. 

I      There  can  be  no  limitation,  but  its  own  discretion,  to  the 
f  right  of  each  of  these  United  States,  to  consult  with  any  other 


29      « 

State,  upon  subjects  of  joint  interest,  and  upon  the  nature  and 
extent  and  the  mode  of  performing  its  duties  to  the  Union,  as 
also  upon  the  means  of  causing  those  due  to  itself  to  be  respect 
ed.  It  may  be  very  inexpedient  to  exercise  this  right  upon  light 
occasions — but  of  this  the  State  must  of  necessity  be  exclusively 
the  judge;  and  neither  can  it  nor  its  agents  be  justly  chargea 
ble  with  any  species  of  offence  for  holding  such  consultation, 
the  power  to  do  it  having  never  been  relinquished,  and  conse 
quently  being  reserved  to  the  State. 

If  Mr.  Burke  had  lived  in  these  times,  he  would  have  been 
relieved  from  the  difficulty  which  he  found  in  drawing  up  an 
indictment  against  a  whole  people  by  the  precedent  now  afford 
ed.  He  would  have  also  learnt,  that  a  whole  people,  (not  mere 
ly  subjects  of  a  colony,  but  constituting  an  Independent  State) 
might  be  guilty  of  a  "combination" — and  what  must  have  ap 
peared  to  that  great  man,  a  more  extraordinary  novelty,  would 
have  been  the  discovery  that  the  passing  of  an  act  by  a  Legis 
lative  Body  with  open  doors,  the  appointing  of  a  Committee 
for  a  constitutional  inquiry  into  the  state  of  public  grievances, 
and  the  sitting  of  such  Committee  with  closed  doors,  were  ipso 
facto,  withou  any  overt  act  or  proof  of  evil  intention,  evidence 
of  such  combination ;  notwithstanding  the  result  of  such  private 
deliberation,  should,  when  published  to  the  world,  be  free  from 
all  color  of  criminality.  It  is  not  believed  that  Mr.  Burke, 
from  the  exhaustless  storehouse  of  his  memory  and  with  his 
unwearied  patience  of  research,  could  have  produced  a  narra 
tive  of  any  plot  or  combination,  real  or  fabricated,  which  had 
excited  a  public  sensation  and  obtained  credit,  (and  there  is  no 
history  of  a  war,  foreign  or  domestic,  without  one)  that  was  not 
countenanced  by  evidence  true  or  false  of  some  fact,  proving 
either  intention  or  overt  act.  In  those  periods  of  English  his 
tory  when  the  scaffold  has  been  drenched  with  blood  shed  in 
punishment  of  constructive  treasons,  the  imputed  crime  was  al 
ways  fixed  by  evidence  of  some  act  deemed  criminal  in  law, 
upon  the  accused  party.  At  one  period,  writing  was  consider 
ed  as  an  overt  act — (scribere  est  agere:)  but  even  then,  the 
public  accuser  was  held  to  prove  that  the  criminal  matter  was 
in  the  hand  writing  of  the  culprit.  Until  this  point  was  estab 
lished,  Sydney  could  not  be  sacrificed  upon  account  of  writings 


30 

found  in  his  closet.  The  Popish  Plot,  the  standing  reproach 
of  the  credulity  and  bigotry  of  a  great  nation  in  an  enlightened 
age,  was  attempted  to  be  substantiated  by  perjured  witnesses, 
testifying  to  falsehoods  in  the  form  of  facts.  Had  there  been 
no  allegation  of  facts  whatever,  nothing  but  a  mere  outcry  of 
plot,  popery,  combination,  without  a  pretext  of  fact  to  uphold 
it,  that  imposture  would  not  probably  have  run  like  wildfire 
over  England. 

In  the  days  of  witchcraft  and  demonology,  the  victims  to  the 
prevailing  delusion  were  not  hanged,  without  a  charge  of  some 
magical  or  infernal  act  done  by  them,  and  proved  by  at  least, 
one  witness — somebody  was  pinched  or  tormented — the  color 
faded — the  flesh  rotted — the  speech  failed,  or  the  senses  were 
benumbed.  The  weird  sisters  or  brothers  were  always  proved 
to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury,  to  have  occasioned  a  "toil  and 
trouble"  in  some  mode  or  other.  It  was  not  essential  to  have 
a  very  clear  conception  of  their  metempsychosis,  or  mode  of 
travelling  through  the  air,  or  process  of  incantation — but  still 
there  was  a  formal  accusation  of  witchcraft,  and  witnesses  to 
prove  it. 

The  Hartford  case  out-herods;  all  these.  The  accusers  are 
agreed,  neither  in  regard  to  the  offenders,  nor  the  crimes.  His 
Excellency  includes  in  his  indictment,  first  "the  State" — next, 
the  Legislature  who  authorized  the  "combination,"  and  of  course 
the  combination  itself.  Others  (writers  from  whom  His  Excel 
lency  catches  his  enthusiasm)  affect  to  discriminate  between  the 
whole  body  of  Federalists  in  the  Legislature,  and  the  few  who 
were  supposed  to  draw  the  "Leviathan  with  a  hook."  Some 
regarded  all  the  members  of  the  Convention  as  in  "pari  delicto." 
Others  pick  out  the  speckled  birds  by  their  own  sagacity.  One 
essayist  of  distinguished  prolixity,  who  is  thought  by  his  parti- 
zans  to  have  exhausted  the  subject,  acquits  the  members  from 
Connecticut,  (as  I  am  credibly  informed,  having  never  read  his 
numbers)  because  they  were  restrained  by  their  instructions 
from  disloyal  enterprizes  against  the  Union; — but  condemns 
those  of  Massachusetts,  whose  instructions  (doubtless  not  then 
read  by  him)  were  of  the  same  tenor. 

In  Essex,  the  established  character  of  Mr.  Dane  for  moderation 
and  probity  being  in  their  way,  the  Salem  papers  excepted  him 


31 

from  the  general  charge,  and  admit  that  he  consented  to  serve 
in  the  Convention,  merely  to  control  the  evil  propensities  of 
others. 

This  attempt  in  Essex,  to  make  converts  of  the  "rising 
generation"  by  excepting  Mr.  Dane  from  the  conspirators,  re 
minds  me  of  an  anecdote  in  the  memoirs  of  Madam  de  Main- 
tenon  ( I  think)  which  I  quote  from  memory.  A  young  lady  of 
the  Huguenot  pursuasion,  was  compelled  to  become  a  Catholic, 
and  it  was  required  of  her,  to  admit  by  subscribing  the  accus 
tomed  formalities,  that  the  Protestants  were  all  doomed  to  eter 
nal  perdition — as  this  included  most  of  her  friends,  she  resisted, 
but  finally  agreed  to  give  over  all  but  an  excellent  aunt  to  whom 
she  was  devoted — and  the  Confessors  were  obliged  to  let  her 
give  in  her  adhesion  to  the  Romish  Church,  with  an  express 
reservation  that  her  aunt  was  not  to  be  included  among  the 
castaways. 

There  is  as  little  of  consistency  in  the  offences  imputed,  as 
of  agreement  respecting  the  culprits.  The  sticklers  for  the  free 
dom  of  the  press  and  the  opposers  of  sedition  acts  go  far  beyond 
the  maxims  of  law,  which  our  English  ancestors  in  the  days  of 
the  third  Edward  found  intolerable.  They  strain  points,  which 
were  not  thought  tenable  by  the  legal  assassins  of  Algernon 
Sydney.  They  will  have  it,  not  only  that  speaking  and  ivri- 
ting  against  the  war-measures  of  an  administration  are  misde 
meanors  and  acts  of  moral  treason,  but  that  one  man's  writing 
and  speaking  is  evidence  of  treason  in  others  who  are  of  his 
political  party.  They  hold  the  Legislature  and  Convention  i 
responsible  not  for  what  appears  in  their  own  records,  but  for 
all  the  ebullitions  of  zeal  and  resentment  which  burst  forth 
from  all  quarters  of  the  State  and  of  New  England  against  the 
war — for  the  noise  and  threatenings  of  the  "drums  ecclesiastic;" 
for  the  animated  remonstrances  of  the  county  and  town  meet 
ings,  expressive  of  the  regret  and  indignation  of  an  astounded 
people ; — for  the  impassioned  and  frequently  inconsiderate 
essays  in  the  public  papers,  in  which  individuals  of  all  classes 
proclaimed  their  fears  of  the  "variety  of  wo,"  which  impended 
over  the  country.  All  these  symptoms  of  discontent,  in  a  nat 
ural  course  of  events  agitating  a  people  bitterly  averse  to  the 
war  policy,  and  finding  vent  through  the  usual  and  safest  ave- 


32 

nues  of  public  opinion,  have  been  laid  to  the  charge  of  the  Con 
vention  by  whose  instrumentality,  they  were  in  truth  not  encourt 
aged  but  attempered.  The  opposition  to  these  war  measures 
though  confined  to  words  is  viewed  as  equivalent  to  overt  acts 
of  aid  to  the  public  enemy;  and  the  fashion  has  been  that 
whencesoever  they  proceeded,  the  Convention  from  whom  they 
did  not  proceed,  must  sustain  the  odium  attached  to  them. 
Thus  while,  agreeably  to  the  fundamentals  of  our  Constitution, 
no  man  can  be  held  to  answer  for  even  a  petty  larceny,  till  the 
same  be  formally  described ;  the  best  citizens  may  be  held  up  to 
the  execration  of  their  country  and  the  world  upon  the  ram 
bling  suggestions  of  a  Chief  Magistrate  and  the  echo  of  his 
friends. 

It  is  this  chaos  of  accusation  which  those  who  would  reply  to  it 
must  reduce  and  mould  into  some  manageable  shape.  Although 
I  know  nothing  of  the  calumnious  writings  against  the  Conven 
tion  which  have  appeared  the  last  year,  except  from  the  occa 
sional  remarks  in  answer  to  them  which  have  chanced  to  fall  in 
my  way ;  I  am  satisfied  that  the  authors  though  equal  in  the 
qualifications  of  malignity  and  arrogance  to  their  predecessors, 
are  entirely  deficient  in  pretensions  to  their  talents  for  fabrica 
tion  and  sophistry.  Nor  can  they  have  added  any  new  matter 
to  the  idle  and  oft  repeated  medley  of  discordant  slanders-— or 
done  more  than  bedizen,  the  stories  of  other  times,  with  the 
trumpery  of  their  own  bad  taste.  I  therefore  proceed  on  the 
presumption,  that  whatever  has  or  can  be  urged  against  the 
Hartford  Convention,  or  its  creators,  must  be  included  in  some 
one  or  more  of  the  following  propositions  : 

First.  That  the  resolve  of  the  Legislature  instituting  the 
Convention,  was  upon  the  face  of  it,  unconstitutional. 

Second.  That  if  not  unconstitutional  in  terms,  its  makers 
intended  under  cover  of  it,  to  attempt  some  object  adverse  to 
1he  Constitution  or  laws  of  the  Union. 

Third.  That  admitting  the  Legislature  to  be  innocent  in 
act  and  intention,  the  Convention  were  nevertheless  guilty  in 
one  or  the  other  of  these  respects. 

Fourth.  That  the  whole  procedure  was  in  any  event  in 
expedient. 

To  those  who  feel  a  sufficient  interest  in  the  subject  to  pur- 


33 

sue  the  inquiry,  I  trust  the  following  suggestions  will  appeal- 
reasonable  : 

1st.  That  every  reader  desirous  of  correct  information  is 
bound  either  to  peruse  the  legislative  proceedings  which  origi 
nated  and  followed  the  Convention,  as  well  as  the  report  of  the 
Convention  itself,  or  take  upon  credit  the  substantial  accuracy 
of  the  brief  quotations  and  statements  that  shall  be  made  of 
their  contents. 

2d.  That  every  reader  will  in  like  manner,  either  acquaint 
himself  with  the  contents  of  the  Private  Journal  of  the  Conven 
tion,  of  which,  the  original  is  in  the  office  of  the  Secretary  of 
State  of  Massachusetts,  and  copies  of  which,  were  published 
last  Spring  in  the  Boston  newspapers,  by  reading  the  same,  or 
give  credit  to  the  assertion,  that  it  contains  nothing  repugnant 
to  the  public  report. 

I  also  advance  the  following  distinct  facts  as  incontrovertible : 

That  the  Legislature  of  Massachusetts,  during  the  war,  pas 
sed  no  act  or  resolve  whatsoever,  authorizing  obstruction  to  the 
due  execution  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States. 

That  the  language  of  opposition  and  disapprobation  of  the 
national  policy  expressed  by  that  Legislature  in  those  proceed 
ings  which  are  regarded  by  their  opponents  as  most  objectiona 
ble,  is  coupled  with  strong  and  uniform  assurances  of  attach 
ment  to  the  Federal  Union. 

That  the  Executive  Government  of  the  State  is  equally  un- 
obnoxious  to  the  charge  of  any  act  of  opposition  to  the  National 
Government. 

That  the  omission  on  the  part  of  that  Executive  Government 
to  comply  with  the  requisition  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  was  confined  to  one  particular.  It  was  a  refusal  to 
place  the  militia  at  the  control  of  a  Prefect  sent  without  aa 
accompanying  force  to  take  command  from  the  hands  of  the 
Governor.  It  was  given  upon  the  faith  of  the  opinion  of  the 
Judges  of  the  Supreme  Court,  his  sworn  advisers,  upon  a  con 
stitutional  question.  The  incompliance  extended  only  to  the 
form  and  not  to  the  substance  of  the  requisition.  The  duty  re 
quired  was  performed,  fully  and  faithfully. 

I  submit  also,  the  following  opinions  as  decJuciWe  from  ag- 


34 

knowledged  principles  and  facts  which  command  the  assent  of 
impartial  judgment : 

That  the  Legislative  and  Executive  Branches  of  the  State 
Government,  and  the  Hartford  Convention,  are  amenable  for 
their  own  acts  alone — and  not  for  sentiments  expressed  by 
others,  under  any  circumstances  whatsoever,  whether  from  the 
pulpit  or  the  press,  whether  in  writing  or  speaking. 

That  the  property,  real  and  personal,  of  the  advocates  and 
supporters  of  the  measures  of  those  States  which  patronized  the 
Convention,  was  held  by  them  in  a  proportion,  at  least  com 
mensurate  with  their  numerical  majorities :  That  their  inter 
ests  in  the  public  funds,  and  the  immense  capital  of  banks  and 
other  institutions  connected  with  them,  probably  much  exceed 
ed  that  proportion  :  That  their  character  as  men,  and  citizens, 
and  friends  to  the  Federal  Union,  from  the  beginning  would 
fairly  compare  with  those  of  their  opponents. 

That  a  secession  from  the  Union,  would  have  been  attended 
probably  with  a  civil  war,  certainly  with  a  prostration  of  public 
credit,  with  deplorable  depreciation,  if  not  annihilation  of  prop 
erty  in  the  funds,  with  fearful  changes  and  insecurity  to  prop 
erty  of  all  other  description,  and  an  aggravation  of  every  public 
calamity,  which  the  most  "fearful  looking  for'*  of  judgments 
could  hardly  exaggerate. 

It  is  by  no  means  essential,  that  all  these  facts  and  opinions 
be  established,  in  order  to  exculpate  the  Hartford  Convention. 
Yet  the  admission  of  their  truth  (and  I  perceive  not  that  any  of 
them  can  be  questioned,)  must  leave  its  merit  or  demerit,  to 
rest  upon  the  footing  of  its  reported  and  published  transactions, 
and  be  found  irreconcilable  with  every  imputation  of  illegal 
combinations  and  disloyal  designs. 

H.  G.  OTIS. 


•LETTER  VII. 


SIR, 

IT  has  never,  I  believe,  been  seriously  insisted  that  the  re^ 
solve  of  the  Legislature  of  Massachusetts  appointing  the  Hart- 


35 

ford  Convention  is  upon  its  face  repugnant  to  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  State^.     It  was  in  these  words : 

"Resolved,  That  twelve  persons  be  appointed  as  Delegates  from  this  Com 
monwealth  to  meet  and  confer  with  Delegates  from  the  other  New  England 
States  or  any  other,  upon  the  subject  of  their  public  grievances  and  concerns, 
and  upon  the  best  means  of  preserving  our  resources,  and  of  defence  against 
the  enemy,  and  to  devise  and  suggest  for  adoption  by  those  respective  States 
such  measures  as  they  may  deem  expedient ;  and  also  to  take  measures,  if 
they  shall  think  it  proper,  for  procuring  a  Cony^tion  qf  Delegates  from  all 
the  United  States,  in  order  to  revise  the  ^E^tt^fei^Ad^0^  and  more  effect 
ually  to  secure  the  support  and  attachm^t  oKiSfi  tnepeople  by  placing  all 
upon  the  basis  of  fair  representation." 

Coupled  with  this  resolution  it  is  also  proper,  though  noi 
essential  to  the  inquiry,  to  take  into  view  the  circular  letter 
written  under  an  order  of  the  General  Court  by  the  President 
of  the  Senate,  and  Speaker  of  the  House,  to  the  Executives  of 
other  States,  from  which  is  made  the  following  extract : 

"The  geueral  objects  of  the  proposed  Conference  are,  first,  to  deliberate 
upon  the  dangers  to  which  the  eastern  section  of  the  Union  is  exposed  by  the 
course  of  the  war,  and  which  there  is  too  much  reason  to  believe  will  thicken 
round  them  in  its  progress,  and  to  devise,  if  practicable,  means  of  security 
and  defence  which  may  be  consistent  with  the  preservation  of  their  resources 
from  total  ruin  and  adapted  to  their  local  situation,  mutual  relations  and 
habits,  and  NOT  REPUGNANT  TO  THEIR  OBLIGATIONS  AS  MEM 
BERS  OF  THE  UNION." 

The  constitutionality  of  the  foregoing  resolve  must  be  deter 
mined  by  a  comparison  of  its  tenor  with  the  provisions  of  the 
Constitution  itself.  It  is  presumed  that,  the  only  clauses  in 
that  instrument  bearing  on  this  poy^t,  are  in  the  10th  section 
of  the  first  article.  "  No  State  shall  enter  into  any  treaty,  al 
liance,  confederation,"  &c.  This  is  peremptory  and  unquali 
fied.  Again,  ."No  States  shall,  without  the  consent  of  Congress, 
enter  into  any  compact  or  agreement  with  another  State,"  &c. 
It  is  then  beyond  dispute  that  States  with  the  consent  of  Con 
gress,  may  enter  with  each  other  into  compacts  or  agreements, 
not  being  treaties,  alliances,  or  confederations.  They  must 
then  have  a  right  to  meet  and  confer  together  previously  to  the 
consent  of  Congress,  so  as  to  be  able  to  discuss  and  adjust  tin- 
terms  of  a  compact  or  agreement,  to  be  submitted  to  Congress 
for  its  subsequent  consent.  Otherwise  in  many  cases  the  pow 
er  to  make  such  compacts  with  the  consent  of  Congress  wou^ 


36 

be  nugatory— tfor  such  consent  could  not  always  be  expected, 
until  the  agreement  on  which  it  was  to  operate,  should  be  di 
gested  into  sucji  form  as  would  enable  Congress  to  act  with  a 
full  understanding  of  its  true  character.  The  consent  of  Con 
gress  is  then  not  requisite  as  preliminary  to  meeting  and  con 
ference.  If  an  agreement  be  made  to  which  the  sanction  of 
Congress  is  refused,  it  becomes  void  ab  initio,  and  this  is  an  alt- 
sufficing  security.  The  practice  of  all  the  States  having  ques 
tions  of  interest  or  controversies  with  each  other  is  in  unison 
with  this  theory.  Massachusetts  and  Maine  have  had  repeated 
Conventions,  on  the  subject  of  their  lands  and  other  property. 
That  is  to  say,  their  respective  Commissioners  have  met  and 
conferred  with  each  other.  And  it  would  seem  to  be  a  rigid 
construction  of  the  Constitution  which  has  never  entered  any 
brain,  that  two  States  could  not  determine  a  question  of  bound 
ary,  or  of  a  common  road,  or  river  navigation,  or  confer  upon 
the  project  of  a  canal  through  their  respective  territories,  in  the 
first  instance.  A  different  usage  has  prevailed,  it  is  believed, 
universally.  A  deputation  from  the  Legislature  of  Kentucky 
was  lately  sent  to  that  of  Virginia — afterwards  another  was 
sent  from  Virginia  to  Kentucky.  If  the  respective  Commis 
sioners  had  met  each  other,  instead  of  meeting  the  several  Le 
gislatures,  this  would  have  been  a  Convention ;  or  if  they  had 
any  way  settled  the  matter  in  controversy  between  them,  they 
would  have  made  an  inchoate  compact.  Still  more  lately  a 
Convention  from  several  States  has  been  held  at  Washington, 
for  the  purpose  of  making  a  canal,  and  it  is  expected  that  the 
Legislatures  of  these  States  will  first  concur  in  the  project,  and 
then  apply  to  Congress  for  aid  and  consent.  And  it  is  pre 
sumable,  if  the  Legislatures  of  three  or  four  States  favorable  to 
the  views  of  administration,  had  appointed  Commissioners  to 
meet  at  Richmond  or  Norfolk  during  the  war,  to  concert  meas 
ures  for  aiding  the  National  Government  in  fortifying  or  de 
fending  the  Chesapeake,  that,  far  from  affixing  to  such  meeting 
the  stigma  of  being  unconstitutional,  thousands  of  pens  would 
have  "leaped"  from  their  inkstands  to  vindicate  the  patriotic 
procedure. 

In  the  case  in  question,  it  will  be  remembered,  that  the  au 
thority  of  the  members  of  the  Harflbrd  Convention  was  merely 


37 

ff£o  meet  and  confer" — to  "devise  and  suggest  for  adoption  by 
the  States,"  measures,  &c.  This  was  the  pith  of  their  commis 
sion.  They  could  make  no  compact  or  agreement.  They  could 
merely  recommend  "means  of  security  and  defence  not  repug 
nant  to  their  obligations  as  members  of  the  Union."  Thus  it 
seems  to  be  a  self  evident  proposition,  that  in  this  nation, 
(where  the  right  of  the  people  by  themselves  or  their  delegates 
peaceably  to  assemble  at  their  own  will  and  pleasure  is  univer 
sally  recognised)  an  authority  given  by  one  body  of  men  to 
another,  to  meet  and  confer  and  suggest  measures  not  repug 
nant  to  a  constitution,  must  be  a  constitutional  authority,  who 
ever  may  be  the  constituents,  and  whoever  the  delegates. 

As  then  the  institution  of  the  Convention  was  consonant  to 
the  letter  of  the  Constitution,  it  was  equally  so  with  its  spirit. 
To  disprove  this  position  it  is  not  sufficient  to  shew  that  the 
object  of  it  was  to  effect  a  lawful  end  by  a  mode  different  from 
that  expressly  provided  by  the  Constitution;  but  it  must  also 
be  made  to  appear  that  the  proposed  me^s  wrere  not  only  dif 
ferent,  but  at  variance  with  the  Constitution. 

If  the  States  of  Pennsylvania  and  Delawar^^r  New  York 
and  New  Jersey  in  time  of  war  should,  by  Oommissioners 
meeting  for  the  purpose,  devise  a  plan  for  impeding  the  pas 
sage  of  a  fleet  up  the  Delaware  or  Hudson,  by  boomj^  and 
chains,  and  hulks,  (admitting  it  to  be  practicable,)  and  should 
offer  Congress,  to  place  and  maintain  the  same,  upon  stipula 
ted  conditions,  it  is  not  perceived  wherein  this  procedure 
would  militate  with  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution.  This  was 
the  utmost  extent  of  the  principle  involved  in  the  Massachu 
setts  resolve.  Its  aim  was  to  devise  means  of  "security  and 
defence"  adapted  to  their  "local  situation,"  &c.  The  report 
pursued  the  instructions.  It  suggested  a  plan  and  recommend 
ed  an  application  to  Congress  for  its  sanction.  And  the  most 
important  consideration  of  all  is,  that  this  sanction  was  given 
by  Congress. 

After  the  adjournment  of  the  Convention,  an  act  passed  and 
is  now  found  in  the  statute  book,  permitting  the  States  indi 
vidually  to  do  that,. which  it  was  the  principal  object  of  the 
States  represented  in  the  Convention  to  obtain  permission  to 
do.  To  receive  into  the  [fay  and  service  of  the  United  States, 


38 

"  troops  raised,  organized  and  officered  under  the  authority  of 
any  of  the  States."  It  was  approved  by  the  President,  on  the 
very  day  of  the  passing  of  the  resolve  in  Massachusetts  requir 
ing  the  Governor  to  appoint  Commissioners  to  proceed  to  Wash 
ington.  Had  this  act  been  promulgated  and  its  provisions 
understood  in  Massachusetts  at  that  time,  it  would  have  super 
seded  the  necessity  of  the  application  to  the  National  Govern 
ment.  And  had  it  been  in  existence  prior  to  the  institution  of 
the  Convention,  it  would  in  all  probability  have  foreclosed  that 
project.  Thus  the  reasonableness,  and  constitutionality  of  the 
main  object  of  the  Hartford  Convention  are  in  fact  ratified  by 
a  solemn  act  of  the  United  States.  The  title  of  this  act  is,  "an 
act  to  authorize  the  President  of  the  United  States  to  accept  the 
services  of  State  troops  and  volunteers."  Add  in  imagination, 
the  words  "and  to  ratify  the  proposal  of  the  Hartford  Conven 
tion,"  and  thereupon  read  the  act  and  compare  it  with  the  re 
port  of  the  Convention,  and  you  will  find  nothing  incongruous 
in  the  amended  title.  Compare  also  the  instructions  to  the 
Commissioners,  with  the  phraseology  of  the  act.  By  the  for 
mer,  they  are  instructed, 

':To  make  earnest  and  respectful  application  to  the  Government  of  the 
United  States,  requesting  their  consent  to  some  arrangement  whereby  the 
State  ^IF  Massachusetts  separately  or  in  concert  with  the  neighboring  States, 
may  be  enabled  to  assume  the  defence  of  their  territories  against  the  enemy, 
and  that  to  this  end  a  reasonable  portion  of  the  taxes  collected  within  said 
States,  may  be  paid  into  the  respective  treasuries  thereof,  and  appropriated 
to  the  payment  of  the  balance  due  to  the  sakl  States  and  to  the  future  de 
fence  of  the  same." 

Now  what  says  the  act?  That  the  President  of  the  United 
States  be 

"Authorized  and  required  to  receive  into  the  service  of  the  United  States- 
any  corps  of  troops  which  may  have  been,  or  may  be  raised,  organized,  and 
officered  under  the  authority  of  any  of  the  States,  whose  term  of  service  shall 
not  be  less  than  twelve  months,  which  corps  when  received  into  the  service 
of  the  United  States,  shall  be  subject  to  the  rules  and  articles  of  war,  and 
finfiloyed  in  the  Slate  raising  the  same  or  in  an  adjoining  State}  and  not 
elsewhere,  except  with  the  consent  of  the  Executive  of  the  State  raising  the 
same." 

Here  then,  (with  the  exception  of  the  reimbursement  of  the 
debt  already  Accrued  and  thg,  mofle  proposed  for  defraying 


39 

future  expense,)  was  a  full  and  ample  concession  of  all  that 
Massachusetts  had  asked  from  the  beginning.     Here  was  an 
end  put  to  the  whole  subject  of  controversy  between  the  Presi 
dent  and  the  State  Governors,  and  an  anticipation  of  the  object 
of  the  Commissioners  which  would  have  left  them  nothing-  to 
do  even  if  peace  had  not  been  announced  immediately  after 
their  arrival  at  Washington.     For  with  regard  to  the  fund  for 
the  payment  of  the  State  troops  proposed  by  the  instructions 
to  be  paid  into  the  State  treasuries ;  it  was  a  consideration  al 
together  secondary — a  mere  suggestion  of  a  convenient  mode 
of  making  the  provision.     The  State  could  not  be  otherwise 
than  indifferent  as  to  the  choice  of  the  channel  through  which 
the  money  should  be   applied  to  the  object — And  as  to  the 
balance  then  due,  (that  which  constitutes  the  Massachusetts 
claim,)  a  bill  had  passed  the  Senate  and  lay  on  the  table  of  the 
House  for  the  adjustment  of  this  and  similar  claims,  when 
tidings  of  the  treaty  were  received.     Had  the  war  continued, 
you  can  judge  with  what  consistency  Government  could,  (or 
indeed  can  now)  reject  the  claim,  after  having  virtually  rati 
fied,  as  already  suggested,  the  principle  on  which  it  was  found 
ed.     Apart  therefore,  from  the  proposal  of  amendments  to  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  found  in  the  report  of  the 
Convention,  (which  at  worst  were  harmless  or  inexpedient; 
though  originating  in,  and  designed  to  obviate  the  same  un 
equal  operation  of  the  existing  system,  which  was  felt  by  all 
the  opponents  of  the  Missouri  question,)  it  may  be  truly  af 
firmed  that  Government  had  become  proselytes  to  the  belief 
that  reliance  for  the  most  efficient  defence,  in  the  event  of 
protracted  hostilities,  must  be  placed  on  State  troops,  under 
their  own  officers.     And  it  is  true  without  rhetorical  exagger 
ation — notwithstanding  the  prejudices  of  the    credulous,  the 
pride  of  the  opinionative,  and  the  fury  of  the  violent — though 
language  has  been  moulded  into  every  shape  of  obloquy  and  ri 
baldry  by  citizens  of  Massachusetts  to  bring  shame  upon  the 
Convention.     It  is  yet  true,  that  the  very  system  recommend 
ed  by  that  Convention,  BECAME  BY  ACT  OF  CONGRES^ 
THE  LAW  OF  THE  LAND.     So  far  then  as  the. proceed 
ings  of  that  assembly,  involved  measures  to  which  the  consent 
of  Congress  is  necessary,  to  give  them  a  constitutional  stamp >• 


40 

they  had  that  consent.  Forthwith  upon  the  adjournment  of  the 
Convention  without  day  their  report  was  published.  In  nine 
teen  days  after  that  adjournment  the  act  of  Congress  in  ques 
tion  was  passed.  The  report  aaid  the  views  of  the  Convention 
were  accordingly  before  those  who  made  the  act.  What  influ 
ence  resulted  from  it  is  unknown.  It  is  enough  to  know  that 
the  justness  of  those  views  is  virtually  admitted — CONGRESS 
AND  THE  CONVENTION  WERE  AGREED  IN  OPINION,  RESPECTING 
THE  MOST  EXPEDIENT  SYSTEM  OF  DEFENCE  FOR  THE  FUTURE. 
.By  this  consent  expressed  in  the  act,  the  error  of  the  Hartford 
procedure  (if  error  there  was)  became  ratified,  and  the  impress 
of  the  highest  national  authority  was  stamped  upon  its  inno 
cence  and  constitutionality,  and  upon  the  expediency  of  its 
policy.  The  power  of  holding  the  State  troops  requisite  for 
defence,  in  the  hands  of  their  own  officers  was  confirmed.  The 
claim  of  the  State  "for  the  past,"  was  recognized  by  the  Sen 
ate,  and  security  "for  the  future"  would  have  resulted  from 
the  act  both  of  Senate  and  House,  had  peace  been  delayed. 
But  from  this  judgment  in  their  own  favor,  the  persecutors  of 
the  Convention  appeal  to  the  chancery  of  public  opinion,  and 
urge  their  suit  on  those  occasions  when  it  comes  to  the  turn  of 
passion  to  preside.  The  decree,  if  they  prevail,  will  be  in  His 
Excellency's  words,  that  "  measures  had  cast  a  reproach  on  the 
good  name  of  the  State,"  and  that  she  is  dishonored— and  the 
costs  of  suit,  besides  disgrace,  will  be  the  amount  of  the  Mas 
sachusetts  claim,  which  it  seems  is  no  longer  sought  as  the 
reward  of  services  but  of  REPENTANCE. 

H.  G.  OTIS. 


LETTER  VIII. 

SIR, 

THE  proposition  now  to  be  considered  is  this:  That  ad- 
Witting  the  Resolve  instituting  the  Convention  to  be  constitu 
tional  IN  TERMS,  it  was  the  intention  of  itsframers  under  cover 
(or  pretext)  of  it,  to  attempt  SOME  OBJECT  adverse  to  the  Con- 
tfitution  or  laics  of  the  Union. 


41 

From  a  charge  entirely  gratuitous  and  so  broad  as  to  defy 
mensuration  by  any  scale  or  compass  of  methodical  argument, 
it  is  plain  that  there  is  no  appeal  but  to  common  sense  and  ex 
perience  on  the  internal  evidence  of  its  folly  and  falsehood. 
This  evidence  in  the  present  instance  resulting  from  indispu 
table  facts,  and  from  the  organization  and  modes  of  procedure 
of  the  legislative  assemblies  in  the  United  States,  must  appear 
not  only  satisfactory,  but  overwhelming.     It  is  implied  in  the 
words  of  the  proposition,  and  is  universally  agreed,  that  the 
plan  of  opposition,  whatever  were  its  outlines,  was  to  receive 
its  form  and  pressure  in  the  Convention.  (The  combination 
which  originated  the  authority  was  the  Legislature;  but  the 
"authorized  combination'*  was  the  assembly  at  Hartford.  Nei 
ther  one  nor  the  other  was  possessed  of  the  means  of  doing 
any  thing — of  any  physical   force  applicable  to  purposes  of 
opposition  to  Government.     Every  act  of  the  Legislature  for 
that  end  would  have  exposed  its  abettors  to  the  penalties  of 
treason.     And  the  Convention  had  not  only  no  power  to  com 
mand  even  the  services  of  a  constable,  but  were  indebted  to 
the  courtesy  of  Connecticut,  for  house  room,  fire,  and  can 
dles.     Whether  the  plot  therefore  is  supposed  to  have  been 
invented  in  the  Legislature  of  Massachusetts  for  the  sanction 
of  the  Convention,  or  in  the  Convention  for  ratification  by  the 
States,  it  is  clear  that  nothing  more  could  be  expected,  than  a 
recommendation  of  measures  by  the  Convention,  which  being 
adopted  by  the  Legislatures,  should  by  them  have  been  recom 
mended  to  the  people.     I  pause  not  to  consider  whether  the 
charge  of  "  combination"  in  an  odious  sense,  as  applied  to  any 
project  which  must  be  submitted  to  the  people,  (in  whom  reside 
the  right  to  change  their  government)  be  not  destructive  of  it 
self  f  because  I  wish  never  to  anticipate  in  imagination  circum 
stances  that  would  justify  men  of  principle  in  counselling  their 
fellow  citizens  to  shake  off  or  even  weaken  the  bonds  of  our 
Union,  and  because  further,  I  would  disdain  to  take  shelter  in 
tke  dark  mazes  of  that  theory.     On  the  contrary,  I  admit  that 
if  the  framers  of  the  Convention  or  its  members,  permitted 
themselves  in  the  hour  of  their  country's  extreme  peril,  even  to 
brood  over  schemes  of  disunion,  whether  to  be  executed  by 
6 


42 

themselves  or  others,  their  impotency  of  means  would  furnish 
no  palliation  for  the  political  depravity  of  their  hearts. 

Still  it  is  material,  in  forming  our  estimate  of  clandestine  in 
tentions,  to  bear  in  mind,  that  all  which  the  Legislatures  and 

V  Convention  together  could  do,  must  have  terminated  in  recom 
mendations  and  reports: — For  in  judging  of  a  man's  disposition 
to  commit  a  crime,  which  he  had  the  power  to  do,  but  from 
which  he  may  have  been  deterred  by  circumstances,  it  is  often 
sufficient  to  be  acquainted  with  his  character.  But  in  forming 
an  opinion  of  the  likelihood  of  his  intentions  to  give  bad  and 
desperate  councils  to  others,  we  look  not  merely  to  his  charac 
ter,  but  to  that  of  the  party  for  whom  the  advice  is  supposed  to 
have  been  intended.  No  sower  will  be  presumed  to  destine  his 
seed  for  a  soil  in  which  he  knows  it  cannot  vegetate — and  the 
waste  of  bad  advice  is  for  that  reason  probably  less  than  that  of 
good.  When,  therefore,  the  federal  members  of  the  Legisla 
ture  of  Massachusetts,  or  such  of  them  as  were  behind  the  cur 
tain,  intended  in  the  first  instance  to  convey  (by  no  matter 
what  occult  act)  to  the  Convention  (a  case  almost  too  absurd  to 
be  stated  as  a  possibility)  their  project  of  disorganization,  what 
was  the  chance  of  a  favorable  hearing  ?  When  the  members  of  the 

1  Convention  or  any  of  them  in  their  turn  entertained  the  design 
of  recommending  "  treasons,  stratagems,  or  plots"  for  adoption 
by  the  several  Legislatures,  and  finally  by  the  people,  what  was 
their  prospect  of  success  ?  These  questions  must  have  occurred, 
and  were  not  very  difficult  to  be  resolved.  The  people  had 
spoken  loudly,  and  their  Representatives  were  perfectly  appriz 
ed,  how  far  they  would  go  in  opposition.  They  were  either  ripe 
for  proceeding  to  extremes,  or  they  were  not.  If  they  were  not 
thus  ready,  their  Representatives  knew  it ;  and  unless  qualified 
for  the  Insane  Hospital,  they  could  never  intend,  under  cover  of 
any  authority,  to  propose  measures  which  must  ultimately  come 
before  the  people,  and  which  being  rejected,  would  redound  to 
the  confusion  and  disgrace  of  their  authors.  If  on  the  other  hand, 
the  people  were  thus  prepared — the  Convention,  who  instead  of 
taking  advantage  of  the  excitement,  aimed  by  their  report  to 
soothe  their  irritation  and  stimulate  their  patriotism ;  to  recon 
cile  them  to  a  more  enduring  patience,  and  cheer  them  with  a 
more  enlivening  hope ;  as  also  the  Legislatures  of  the  different 


I 
43 

States  who  accepted  that  report — deserved  ivell,  not  ill,  of  their 
country. 

But  to  proceed  to  facts.  The  number  of  federalists  (or  of 
persons  composing  the  majority,  for  there  were  among  them  a 
few  of  the  "flying  squad,")  in  both  Houses,  in  the  session  of 
1814,  when  the  Convention  was  formed,  may  be  taken  at  an 
average  of  three  hundred— varying  but  not  materially  from  time 
to  time.  The  members  of  the  Convention  were  elected  from 
the  people  at  large  from  the  different  sections  of  the  country  in 
Massachusetts  and  Maine,  two  only  being  Members  of  the  Le 
gislature. 

At  the  time  of  passing  the  resolve  and  appointing  the  mem 
bers  of  the  Convention,  it  was  uncertain  and  impossible  to  bje 
known  whether  any  other  State  would  concur  in  the  measure. 
Application  was  publicly  made  to  each  of  the  New  England 
States,  after  the  passing  of  the  resolve,  and  not  before,  through 
the  same  organ — its  Executive.  Those  of  New  Hampshire  and 
Vermont  did  not  convene  their  respective  Legislatures  in  sea 
son  to  come  into  the  plan  of  a  Convention.  Now  the  readiest 
mode  of  ascertaining  whether  it  was  practicable  for  the  major-, 
ity  of  a  legislative  body,  (organized  and  doing  business  with 
open  doors,  according  to  the  forms  of  our  State  Constitution) 
to  enact  a  combination,  of  the  kind,  and  for  the  purposes  imagi 
ned,  and  under  the  circumstances  just  hinted,  will  be  for  any 
person  acquainted  with  legislative  proceedings,  to  bring  his  own 
mind  to  a  clear  and  satisfactory  conception  of  any  mode  of 
effecting  it.  It  must  I  think  baffle  the  attempt  of  the  most 
vigorous  fancy  however  versed  in  the  beau  ideal  of  plot  making. 
He  will  first  determine  whether  the  entire  majority  shall  be 
presumed  privy  to  the  project,  or  only  the  few  leading  and  know 
ing  ones.  To  begin  with  the  first.  A  secret,  (for  secrecy  is  im 
plied  in  the  proposition,  and  was  indispensable)  must  have  been 
imparted  to  three  hundred  persons,  "  more  or  less,"  and  by  the  by 
must  have  been  kept  by  them  to  this  hour.  And  what  was  the  na 
ture  of  the  secret?  Why,  only  that  this  confidential  party  should 
by  a  solemn  act,  confer  an  authority  upon  certain  agents  in  e.v- 
press  words:  with  a  secret  understanding  that  the  authority 
should  be  violated,  and  that  their  commission  should  be  execu 
ted  in  a  manner  diametrically  opposite  to  the  terms  of  the  po 


44 

scribed  power.  These  legislators  must  have  understood  and  in 
tended  that  instructions  to  devise  means  for  the  defence  of  the 
^country  should  be  perverted  to  inventions  for  betraying  it; — 
that  instead  of  taking  counsel  together  for  the  preservation  of 
the  Union  according  to  the  letter  of  the  resolve,  they  should 
convene  with  a  latent  purpose  of  laboring  for  its  dissolution. 
Thus  their  Commissioners  appointed  for  the  ostensible  object 
of  united  defence,  would  become  Commissioners  of  a  separate 
peace  "in  disguise," — and  their  faithfulness  to  their  employers 
would  be  manifested  only  by  their  perfidy  to  their  country.  It 
would  seem  to  require  a  drill,  of  unprecedented  industry  and 
severity  to  bring  this  "host"  under  the  discipline  of  a  corps  of 
flluminati,  in  the  very  few  days  which  elapsed  between  the 
beginning  of  the  session  and  the  day  on  which  the  Convention 
project  was  adopted.  To  reconcile  this  body  of  substantial 
Christian  Yeomanry  to  hold  their  oaths  of  office  in  contempt : — 
To  habituate  them  all  to  keep  their  tongues  as  with  a  bridle, 
except  only  when  they  spoke  to  deny  the  truth  and  to  repel 
suspicion  ; — To  listen  without  horror  to  the  unblushing  denials, 
and  to  witness  the  affected  vehemence  and  indignation  of  otherg 
in  spurning  the  imputations  of  their  opponents ; — Much  address 
would  also  be  requisite  to  initiate  the  new  comers  from  the 
country,  and  to  prevent  those  who  had  leave  of  absence  from 
telling  tales.  And  there  would  seem  to  be  need  not  only  of 
address  but  of  necromancy,  to  be  sure  that  the  choice  of  agents 
by  ballot  from  all  quarters,  would  fall  upon  persons  who  should 
be  prepared  to  disobey  their  instructions  and  to  execute  the 
unknown  and  incommunicable  intention  of  their  employers. 

All  these  difficulties  would  be  multiplied  and  reiterated  in 
the  legislative  bodies  of  such  other  States  as  should  agree  to 
send  deputies  to  the  Convention.  The  Governors  of  those 
States  could  not  collect  from  the  circular  letter  of  our  Gover 
nor,  the  real  intent  of  the  Convention.  Is  it  then  credible  that 
Governor  Strong  would  have  ventured  to  hold  with  the  other 
Governors,  one  language  "official,  and  another  confidential,"  by 
letter ,  without  knowing  his  men.  Or,  are  they  also  to  be  con 
sidered  as  conspirators,  ab  initio  ?  If  yea,  when,  where,  and  by 
what  means  was  the  understanding  among  them  originated.  If 
nay,  how  were  they  qualified  to  give  to  their  several  Legisla- 


45 

tures,  the  proper  impulses  ?  Recollect  that  to  make  sure  work, 
all  these  preliminaries  must  have  been  adjusted  within  a  very 
few  days;  all  before  the  appointment  of  the  delegates  from 
Massachusetts  and  Maine.  The  electors  in  the  Legislature  of 
Massachusetts  must  also  have  either  known  their  men,  or  have 
been  willing  to  commit  themselves  and  their  machinations  to 
the  discretion  of  strangers.  There  must  have  been  an  intelli 
gence  between  them,  otherwise  the  delegates  could  not  discern 
by  the  resolve  or  their  credentials,  what  was  expected  of  them. 
And  this  mysterious  intelligence  between  the  electors  and  the 
elected — between  the  different  Governors — between  those  Gov 
ernors  and  their  Legislatures — and  between  those  Legislatures 
severally  and  their  delegates ;  must  (for  any  thing  that  has 
hitherto  appeared,  or  which  can  be  conceived  possible ;)  have 
been  carried  on  by  the  "Prince  of  the  power  of  the  Air,"  and 
lie  must  have  made  good  speed  with  his  despatches. 

But  these  are  not  the  only  obstacles  which  must  have  existed 
in  the  way  of  "  the  combination."  The  legislative  faction  unless 
besotted  would  look  to  the  issue.  Whatever  it  was  intended  the 
Convention  should  do,  could  have  been  only  recommendatory, 
and  in  the  form  of  a  report.  Suppose  matters  brought  to  this 
point;  the  Convention  agreed;  and  all  the  glowing  ingredients 
of  faction  thrown  into  that  caldron,  to  be  melted  and  cast  into  a 
brazen  image  of  sedition,  and  brought  home  and  placed  before 
our  General  Court.  In  what  mode  was  it  to  be  disposed  of? 
How  were  they  to  set  about  the  work  of  a  disruption  of  the 
States,  or  a  separate  peace,  or  a  Northern  Confederacy? — 
The  report  would  be  made  to  the  whole  Legislature,  foes  as 
well  as  friends.  Now  then,  if  not  before,  the  plot  must  be  dis 
covered,  previous  to  consummation  and  nothing  gained  by  con 
cealment  thus  far.  The  Legislature  would  be  near  the  ordinary 
termination  of  its  Winter  session,  and  not  far  from  the  end  of 
its  political  existence.  To  adjust  any  proposed  substitute  for 
the  National  Government  would  require  some  little  time  even 
for  the  wisest  statesman.  The  Union  could  not  be  dissolved 
by  "Presto  begone!"  nor  a  northern  constellation  created  by 
"let  there  be  light."  It  would  have  been  madness  indeed  to 
scuttle  the  ship  and  quit  the  wreck,  without  getting  readv  a 
boat  or  a  raft. 


46 

After  a  report  of  the  Convention  in  favor  of  a  revolution,  the 
opposition  could  not  advance  an  inch,  without  Legislative  aid — 
and  every  act  of  legislation  in  furtherance  of  it  would  be  a  pub 
lic  act  of  usurpation.  It  is  therefore  inevitable  that  the  makers 
of  the  Convention — the  sober,  solid,  cautious,  and  unaspiring 
yeomanry  of  Massachusetts  must  have  prepared  to  convert 
themselves  into  a  "Rump  Parliament,"  and  to  arrange  a  new 
order  of  things  without  any  constitutional  power,  after  the  plan 
of  disunion  should  be  promulgated,  upon  the  faith  that  the  Le 
gislatures  of  other  States,  not  then  in  session,  or  the  people  of 
those  States,  would  uphold  their  project.  Otherwise  they  must 
have  gone  home  to  their  constituents,  leaving  behind  the  abortion 
and  taking  with  them  the  disgrace. 

To  those  gross  outrages  upon  probability  and  reason  insepa 
rable  from  the  affirmative  of  the  proposition  at  the  head  of  this 
letter,  I  add  another.  Every  plan  of  opposition  to  the  Consti 
tution  or  laws  must  have  consisted  of  many  particulars.  It  was 
to  embrace  States,  and  to  expose  persons.  That  the  plan  with 
its  necessary  details  and  ramifications  was  digested  by  the  Le 
gislature  into  form,  to  be  presented  to  the  Convention,  is  a 
notion  too  extravagant  to  have  been  yet  hinted  by  the  most 
prejudiced  enthusiast.  It  was  then  to  be  fashioned  in  the  Con 
vention.  A  case  is  thus  presented  of  intelligent  men  giving 
authority  to  others,  to  make  a  plot  in  their  behalf.  A  plot  per 
haps  pregnant  with  tremendous  consequences  to  their  country 
and  themselves.  Nor  was  it  possible  to  ascertain  beforehand 
to  whom  this  trust  of  confidence,  of  fortune,  life  and  character 
was  to  be  confided.  The  Conventiclers  were  to  be  elected  by 
ballot — some  from  other  States.  And  in  the  election  of  these 
last1  Massachusetts  could  have  no  agency.  In  reference  there 
fore  to  Massachusetts,  the  plot  was  to  be  made  not  even  by 
immediate  proxy — but  by  agents,  strangers  themselves  and 
chosen  by  persons  also  strangers.  Be  it  then  agreed,  that 
great  and  wise,  and  even  good  men,  have  sometimes  conspired 
to  effect  revolutions.  They  nevertheless  manufacture  their  own 
plots,  or  know  their  accomplices  and  what  is  intended  to  be 
done.  They  do  not  put  out  treason  and  conspiracy  to  be  made 
for  them  by  the  job.  But  such  was  the  predisposition  of  a  ma 
jority  of  both  branches  of  our  Legislature  to  sedition,  that  they 


47 

must  have  been  reckless  of  what  form  it  might  assume,  or  of 
the  hands  that  were  to  mould  it.  The  power  of  ratification  was 
indeed  reserved  to  the  Legislature;  but  individuals,  after  giv 
ing  the  power,  must  have  incurred  the  risk  of  such  ratification 
in  spite  of  their  own  opposition — "ce  n'est  que  le  premier  pas 
qui  coute."  I  ask  with  confidence  if  the  history  of  man  can 
produce.a  parallelism  to  such  a  case?  Did  ever  a  set  of  men 
give  a  "carte  blanche"  to  involve  themselves  in  the  entangle 
ment  of  the  pains  and  penalties,  and  casualties  of  a  criminal 
conspiracy,  without  knowing  to  whom  such  authority  would  be 
filled  out  and  executed  ! ! ! 

There  is  indeed  something  so  unnatural  and  revolting  to  com 
mon  sense,  antecedently  to  all  reasoning  upon  the  subject,  in 
the  idea  of  comprehending  the  majority  of  the  Legislature  in 
any  secret  conspiracy,  that  the  most  prejudiced  persons  pressed 
by  these  suggestions  are  compelled  to  abandon  it,  and  fasten 
the  imputation  upon  the  "knowing  ones,"  "the  leaders"  the 
"Boston  stamp,"  &c.  But  this  will  rather  aggravate  than 
lighten  the  mass  of  the  objections.  For  although  it  would  be 
easier  in  the  first  instance  for  a  few  to  agree  upon  a  scheme, 
and  to  keep  their  own  counsels,  than  for  many — yet  the  objec 
tion  arising  from  the  clanger  of  discovery  applies  in  a  great  de 
gree  to  every  supposable  number  of  confederates  in  a  plan  of 
this  nature ;  and  all  the  other  objections  apply  in  the  same  degree- 
to  the  supposition  now  assumed,  with  the  addition  of  one  that 
would  seem  to  be  insuperable.  This  cabal  of  leading  men  must 
have  taken  upon  themselves  not  only  to  deceive  their  antago 
nists  in  the  Legislature,  but  the  bulk  of  their  own  party.  They 
could  have  calculated  upon  no  certain  support  even  from  friends 
after  the  mask  should  be  lifted,  but  must  have  incurred  the  haz 
ard  that  when  the  report  of  the  Convention  should  be  made, 
and  their  party  thus,  for  the  first  time,  apprized  of  their  trea 
sonable  intrigue,  (besides  encountering  all  the  other  impedi 
ments)  they  would  be  disavowed  and  deserted,  and  left  in  "a 
hole  by  themselves." 

But  there  is  no  end  to  the  tissue  of  idle  conjectures  which 
can  be  woven  by  ardent  imaginations.  And  yet  one  sentence 
should  suffice  to  dissipate  them  all — JVo  act  of  disunion  is  fea 
sible  by  a  State  Legislature,  without  a  previous  authorization 


48 

by  the  people.  Suppose,  (though  the  extravagance  of  the  very 
hypothesis  is  nauseating)  that  the  Legislature  of  one  or  more 
States  had  passed  such  acts — they  would  have  been  merely 
void.  The  next  Legislatures,  unless  the  State  Constitutions 
were  also  annihilated,  might  have  repealed  them.  Who  would 
have  dared  to  execute  such  acts?  Whence  could  have  been 
procured  the  men  and  money  indispensable  for  this  new  atti 
tude  ?  What  provision  could  be  made  for  the  public  debt  prin 
cipally  held  by  the  agitators  or  their  friends;  and  by  what 
means  could  a  separate  peace  be  effected  ?  Yet  for  all  these 
contingencies  the  "combination"  must  have  been  prepared — as 
if  the  fabric  of  the  National  Constitution  could  be  dissolved  and 
replaced  by  another,  with  more  ease  than  "Hamilton's  baWn 
could  be  turned  into  a  barrack  or  a  malt  house."  In  a  word, 
the  history  of  the  Convention  is  "a  plain  unvarnished  tale," 
similar  to  that  of  other  associations  created  by  law.  For  its 
objects  you  must  look  to  its  charter— for  its  proceedings,  to 
its  private  books.  When  these  stand  fair  you  have  all  the  evi 
dence  required  in  cases  affecting  incorporated  societies,  to  de 
fend  their  rights.  And  while  that  is  unimpeached,  there  is  the 
same  unreasonableness  and  injustice  in  presuming  that  it  was 
instituted  for  an  object  foreign  to  its  commission,  as  for  imagin 
ing  that  the  State  Bank  was  intended  to  be  organized  for  the 
purposes  of  counterfeiting  and  forgery. 

H.  G.  OTIS. 


LETTER  IX. 

SIR, 

I  PASS  now  to  the  inquiry,  whether  admitting  the  Legisla 
ture  of  Massachusetts,  (and  of  course  the  Legislatures  of  the 
other  States)  to  be  innocent  of  every  purpose  of  opposition  to 
the  Constitution  and  laws,  the  Convention  were  guilty  either  in 
fact  or  intention  of  any  such  design. 

This  proposition  is  founded  upon  the  supposal  that  the  Con 
vention  either  actually  violated,  or  was  disposed  to  violate  ths 


49 

authority  and  instructions  of  its  constituents,  and  will  be  exa 
mined  on  the  presumption  that  the  legality  of  these  is  fairly 
established.  If  downright  and  incontestible  facts  had  not  ren 
dered  the  course  of  the  Convention  as  plain  as  the  path  of  the 
sun,  it  might  be  worth  while  to  expatiate  upon  some  general 
principles  and  analogies  connected  with  the  subject,  on  which  a 
few  words  only  shall  be  said.  In  judging  of  the  probability 
of  enterprizes  which  it  may  have  entered  into  the  views  of 
the  Convention  either  to  suggest  or  even  to  intend;  the  ex 
tent  of  its  means  for  the  accomplishment  of  its  ends,  whether 
physical  or  moral  or  both,  is  material  to  be  considered.  The 
efforts  of  men,  as  hinted  in  a  former  letter,  are  generally  limit- 
fed  by  the  consciousness  of  their  potentiality.  No  man  attempts 
to  break  a  massive  chain  by  mere  manual  strength — or  swim 
over  an  ocean.  The  Convention  could  not,  by  any  act  of  theirs, 
separate  the  Union,  nor  see  their  way  to  dry  land  beyond  the 
red  sea.  They  had  not  the  power  of  the  thirty  tyrants,  nor  of 
the  forty  thieves,  nor  any  other  power  of  execution.  They 
could  at  most  recommend  measures,  to  be  by  others  recommend 
ed  to  the  people,  and  they  would  hardly  counsel  what  they 
knew  must  be  rejected.  Suppose,  however,  (for  the  indulgence 
of  imagination)  that  the  disunion  of  the  States  had  been  a  topic 
of  discussion  (no  matter  how  ushered  in)  before  the  Convention. 
If  the  people  were  ready  to  receive,  but  the  Convention  not 
willing  to  give  counsel  to  that  end — so  much  more  for  the  honor 
of  the  latter.  If  the  people  were  not  ready,  but  the  Convention 
were  so — will  men  calling  themselves  republicans  invade  the 
recesses  of  private  judgment  and  suspend  us  in  perpetual  effigy, 
because  we  prudently  sacrificed  our  genuine  sentiments  to  pub 
lic  opinion — to  their  opinion !  Will  they  overwhelm  us  with 
obloquy  for  concealing  or  renouncing  those  errors  which  they 
held  in  abhorrence  themselves,  and  for  making  a  report,  which 
if  they  are  correct  in  their  bad  opinion  of  our  dispositions,  is  an 
abjuration  of  our  doctrines,  and  in  degree  at  least  a  proof  of 
proselytism  to  theirs  ? 

Yet  this  is  the  measure  meted  to  the  Conventionists  by  the 
friends  of  liberal  opinions — by  the  advocates  of  the  unlimited 
right  of  the  people  to  change  and  modify  government  at  plea 
sure.     We  were  traitors  say  they  for  entertaining  certain  opin- 
7 


50 

ions,  and  cowards  for  hot  expressing  and  acting  up  to  them. 
We  are,  as  they  will  have  it,  responsible  for  all  the  abominable 
heresies  inculcating  opposition  and  disunion  that  were  afloat 
previous  to  the  Convention — and  for  collecting,  combating,  and 
exploding  them  in  that  assembly,  and  replacing  them  by  a  di 
gest  of  sound,  constitutional,  federal  doctrine,  we  are  not  only 
responsible  but  despicable.  So  <£oes  the  world. 

But  a  truce  with  suppositions.'  The  fact  is,  the  people  of  New 
England  never  wavered  for  a  moment  in  their  fidelity  to  the 
Union.  In  no  official  document  or  state  paper  of  any  of  its  con 
stituted  authorities  that  has  met  iny  eye,  was  the  separation  of  / 
the  States  alluded  to  but  as  a  visitation  to  be  deprecated.  A  • 
warning  voice  was  sometimes  heard  from  these  authorities 
announcing,  fears  that  a  prostrate  commerce,  a  needless  war, 
and  entangling  alliances  might  put  the  Union  in  jeopardy. 
It  was  a  voice  often  expressive  of  deep  emotion,  sometimes  of 
anger,  frequently  of  amazement,  never  of  despair,  in  which, 
however,  the  yearning  of  fraternal  hearts,  and  the  predomina 
ting  attachment  to  the  Union  were  always  discernible.  It  spoke 
the  language  which  Franklin  held  to  BurKe,  at  the  time  to 
which  the  latter  refers  when  he  avers  his  comyiction  of  the  sin 
cere  desire  cherished  by  the  former  for  the  reconciliation  of 
America  with  the  parent  country ; — a  language  of  expostulation 
and  regret,  but  to  the  full  as  kind,  as  tender,  and  affectionate 
as  that  which  proceeded  from  other  warning  and  threatening 
voices,  in  all  the  States  south  of  Delaware  pending  the  Missouri 
question.  Common  it  has  certainly  been — much  too  common 
in  all  quarters  of  our  nation,  in  different  periodyMjrf  excitement, 
to  hint  at  "shuffling  off"  the  "coil"  of  the  UQ&I&  But  this  is 
the  language  of  the  passions.  "  Vox  et  prceterea  nihil."  All 
allusions  to  it  should  be  dropped  on  all  sides  by  common  con 
sent,  as  serving  only  to  perpetuate  the  recollections  of  family 
broils,  in  which  all  have  something  to  answer  for. 

Such  being  the  state  of  the  public  mind  in  New  England,  it 
must  have  been  known  to  the  Convention.  Their  advice,  there 
fore,  to  dissolve  the  Union,  would  have  been  a  torch  applied  to 
a  mountain  of  ice,  the  flame  of  which  would  have  been  driven 
back  upon  their  own  faces.  The  Convention  needed  no  super 
natural  information  to  be  aware  of  this.  How  monstrous  then 


* 


51 

the  idea  that  the  members  of  that  body  or  any  of  them,  could 
harbor  a  thought,  not  only  without  authorization,  but  in  the 
very  teeth  of  their  principal's,  the  Legislatures,  to  recommend 
measures  conflicting  with  the  National  Government,  and  to  en 
counter  the  surprize,  disgust,  resistance,  and  odium  which  could 
not  fail  to  be  consequent  upon  the  broaching  of  so  unprecedent 
ed  an  infringement  of  duty  and  outrage  on  decorum !  It  im 
plies  that  the  Convention  was  made  up  of  fools  or  maniacs. 
Let  any  man  figure  to  his  mind,  the  scene  to  be  anticipated 
in  the  Legislatures  of  the  different  States  on  the  presentation 
of  a  report  recommending  a  temporary  or  perpetual  suspension 
of  our  relation  to  the  Union,  (and  an  authorized  opposition  to 
constitutional  laws  under  any  imaginable  form  would  have  been 
equivalent  to  this)  by  a  committee  distinctly  inhibited  from 
treading  on  that  sacred  and  dangerous  ground.  And  let  him, 
if  he  can,  settle  down  in  the  belief  that  any  person  of  sound 
and  sober  intellect  would  have  felt  any  conceivable  inducement 
to  provoke,  and  meet  the  consequences  of  such  an  insult.  Where 
then  can  the  incurably  jealous  look  for  evidence  of  the  imputed 
machinations  of  Jhe  Convention,  which  could  never  have  been 
encouraged  by  awospect  of  success  ?  All  they  are  known  to 
have  done  wears  fr  very  different  complexion.  In  their  publish 
ed  report  is  embodied  the  result  of  all  their  proceedings.  *Their 
private  jour|pfe^mce  published  also)  is  a  faithful  diary  of  all 
that  was  moved  in  that  assembly.  The  fact  has  been  so  certi 
fied  by  the  lamented  President.  What  more  can  be  offered,  or  * 
is  ever  required,  than  the  natural,  intrinsic,  irrefragable  evi-  L 
dence  arising  from  the  original,  genuine  records  and  papers  of 

*More  than  four  years  ago,  an  eminent  Judge  of  the  Supreme  Court,  from 
a  Southern  State,  in  a  conversation  at  which  several  of  his  brethren  and 
other  distinguished  persons  were  present — inquired  of  me  why  the  Conven 
tion  did  not  publish  their  private  journal?  Adding  his  opinion,  that  if  that 
were  done,  and  it  appeared  free  from  anti-federal  proceedings,  all  reasons 
for  jealousy  would  be  removed.  This  gentleman  had  been  always  of  the  re 
publican  party  and  a  censor  of  the  Convention.  It  was  in  consequence  of 
this  hint,  that  the  journal  was  published.  That  it  produced  a  most  entire 
conviction  in  the  minds  of  many  high-minded,  individuals  of  the  republican 
party,  hi  the  South,  with  whom  I  have  been  in  habits  of  intimacy,  I  have 
the  happiness  to  know.  That  it  had  that  effect  generally,  I  have  reason  to 
believe. 


52 

an  organized  assembly  ?  What  evidence  can  be  so  conclusive  un 
less  it  be  supposed  that  these  men,  with  GEORGE  CABOT  at 
their  head,  agreed  to  drop  a  plot  and  hide  their  shame  by  forgery  ? 

In  vain  will  the  keenest  adversary  of  the  Convention  sift 
these  documents  in  search  of  expressions  implying  a  feeling  of 
hostility  to  the  Union,  or  urging  to  active  animosity  against  the 
Government.  The  reverse  of  this  is  eminently  true.  The  re 
port  breathes  in  every  page  a  spirit  of  attachment  to  the  Union, 
and  admits  that  "No  parallel  can  be  found  in  history  of  a 
transition  so  rapid  as  that  of  the  United  States  from  the  condi 
tion  of  weak  and  disjointed  Republics  to  that  of  a  great  and 
prosperous  nation."  While  it  complains  in  a.  strain  of  severe 
animadversion  of  the  "  prevalence  of  a  weak  and  profligate  po 
licy,"  and  enumerates  evils  and  grievances  inflicted  by  a  mal 
administration  of  affairs,  it  expressly  reprobates  "  the  attempt 
upon  every  abuse  of  power  to  change  the  constitution,"  which 
it  says  "  would  but  perpetuate  the  evils  of  revolution."  This 
is  followed  by  a  train  of  reasoning,  dissuasive  of  all  measures 
calculated  to  disunite  the  States,  appealing  to  the  good  sense, 
experience,  and  mutual  interests  of  those  Sjjtes,  whose  policy 
was  most  objectionable,  and  stating  circumiBBices  encouraging 
the  firmest  confidence  that  time,  patience,  and  events  would 
effect  every  desirable  reform.  Not  a  variation  from  this  patri 
otic,  federal,  and  consoling  tone  can  be  detected  throughout 
the  report.  It  is  a  manual  of  elementary  principles; — a  com 
mentary  on  WASHINGTON'S  Farewell  Address— by  which, 
(whatever  may  be  its  defects  in  other  respects,)  the  most  zeal 
ous  friend  to  the  Union  may  be  content  to  live  or  die. 

So  much  for  the  theory  of  the  report. 

The  measures  it  recommended  were  in  substance  but  two : — ' 

First — An  application  to  Congress  for  their  consent  to  an 
arrangement  whereby  the  States,  parties  to  the  Convention, 
"may  separately,  or  in  concert,  assume  the  defence  of,  their 
territory  at  the  national  expense." 

Second — Certain  amendments  to  the  Constitution. 

The  utility  of  these  amendments  is  a  fair  subject  for  an 
honest  difference  of  opinion.  If  the  proposed  mode  of  bring 
ing  them  before  the  States  for  adoption  may  be  regarded  as 
inexpedient,  I  care  not  (now)  to  contend  that  point.  The 


53 

ebject  of  these  amendments,  however,  was  to  diminish,  what 
the  decision  of  the  Missouri  question  is  calculated  to  in 
crease — the  representation  of  Slaves.  But  this  proposal  may  be 
laid  aside  in  this  investigation.  It  has  no  bearing  upon  the 
charge  of  disorganizing  intentions,  and  has  not  to  my  knowl 
edge,  been  a  cause  of  serious  complaint,  except  by  those  who 
think  it  a  needless  departure  from  the  mode  of  amending  the 
Constitution  provided  in  the  instrument.  As  to  the  other  great 
and  principal  object — The  faculty  of  defending  the  States  by 
their  own  militia  and  at  the  expense  of  the  United  States,  what 
more  need  be  added,  than  a  repetition  of  the  fact  THAT  CON 
GRESS  HAS  SINCE  GIVEN  AN  EXPRESS  SANCTION  TO  THE  PRINCI-  • 

PLE.  Had  this  been  done  at  an  early  period  of  the  war,  the 
main  root  of  the  bitterness  that  afterwards  grew  up  would  have  • 
perished  in  the  ground.  Had  it  not  been  done  at  length,  and 
had  the  war  continued,  I  am  free  to  declare  that  I  see  no 
mode  in  which  the  Eastern'  States  could  have  been  defended. 
It  was  done  however,  but  not  in  season  for  the  Legislatures  of 
those  States  to  take  c6gnizance  of  it. 

Here  then  I  repeat  is  a  subject  of  curious  speculation  for 
posterity. 

The  principal  measure  of  an  assembly  intended  (as  is  said) 
to  concentrate  all  the  force  of  opposition  to  the  constituted  au 
thorities  of  the  nation ;  was  by  the  deliberate  act  of  those  au 
thorities  virtually  adopted,  and  the  egg  that  was  laid  in  the 
darkness  of  the  Hartford  Conclave,  was  hatched  by  daylight 
tinder  the  wing  and  incubation  of  the  National  Eagle. 

But  independently  of  what  the  Convention  is  known  to  have  < 
done,  if  all  the  proceedings  of  the  prison  house  had  remained 
secret,  the  character  of  the  men  who  composed  it,  afforded  an 
ample  guarantee  of  the  purity  of  their  motives  and  conduct. 
Take  them  for  all  in  all,  they  were  persons  of  exemplary  mode 
ration,  and  eminent,  for  wisdom,  prudence,  experience,  love  of 
country,  and  all  the  virtues  of  the  man  and  the  citizen.  Among 
them  were  some,  since  gone  from  us  with  "all  their  coun 
try's  honors  blest,"  who  preserved  through  life  the  station  of 
"little  lower  than  the  angels,"  as  nearly  as  it  is  given  to  the 
best  men  to  maintain  it  in  this  state  of  imperfection.  In  the 
number  were  individuals  who  had  been  long,  and  often,  and  a! 


54 

most  constantly  employed  in  high  offices,  Legislative,  Executive, 
Judicial,  and  Military—in  State  and  Nation.  One  at  least  of 
the  elder  generation  who  had  been  honored  with  the  confidence 
and  friendship  of  WASHINGTON  :— Others  who  had  been  his 
companions  in  arms : — And  among  the  younger  generation  were 
the  sons  of  those  who  had  fought  the  earliest  battles  for  their 
country's  freedom — of  the  heroes  of  Bunker  Hill  and  Lexing 
ton,  who  had  made  good  their  claim  to  hereditary  patriotism  by 
their  own  public  services. 

Some  of  these  worthy  persons  had  long  since  withdrawn  from 
the  bustle  and  turmoil  of  the  political  arena,  and  become  passive 
though  anxious  spectators  of  the  signs  of  the  times.  They  had 
now  been  brought  together  from  distant  locations,  without  means 
or  opportunity  of  previous  intercommunication,  and  in  the  great 
er  number  of  instances  without  the  slightest  personal  acquaint 
ance,  and  of  course  without  any  common  sympathy  but  what 
arose  from  a  reciprocal  persuasion  that  each  was  influenced  by 
the  same  love  of  country  and  the  same  honorable  views.  Of 
this  merit  I  pretend  not  to  claim  any  share.  I  am  sensible  that 
among  such  men  I  was  not  "  meet  to  be  called  an  Apostle" — 
But  having  nothing  to  retract,  no  favors  to  ask,  no  propitiatory 
incense  to  offer  upon  new  altars,  I  hope  there  will  be  seen 
neither  vanity  nor  condescension,  in  my  declaring  that  I  am 
unconscious  of  any  conduct  that  would  justify  the  singling  me 
out  as  a  political  desperado  who  offered  to  the  Convention  pro 
jects  by  which  they  were  revolted.  I  challenge  the  production  or 
quotation  of  any  speech  or  writing  for  which  I  am  accountable, 
without  garbling  or  interpolation,  conspicuous  for  unseemly  vi 
olence,  intolerance,  or  even  disrespect  for  my  political  adversa 
ries  ;  much  less  pointing  to  a  disunion  of  the  States,  which  I 
should  dread  as  a  national  and  perpetual  earthquake.  In  the 
ardor  of  debate  I  have  repelled  personalities  by  giving  "  mea 
sure  for  measure:" — But  if  I  am  inimical  to  republican  princi 
ples  and  equal  rights,  I  must  have  basely  degenerated  from  my 
parent  stock — And  though  I  claim  no  merit  from  "genus  et 
proavos;"  yet  that  I  should  go  into  the  Convention  to  instigate 
others  to  pull  down  that  "  Temple,"  which  for  at  least  "  forty 
and  six"  years  my  ancestors  with  their  countrymen  had  been 
engaged  in  building  from  the  first  trench  and  corner  stone,  and 


55 

-/ 

in  which  I  had  always  professed  to  worship,  would  seety  to  be 
an  unnatural  act  at  least,  of  which  all  just  men  will  one  day 
require  better  proof  than  has  been  or  can  be  furnished  by  the 
unjust.  To  return  however  to  my  colleagues.  I  may  add  with 
truth  that  they  were  persons  in  circumstances  of  ease — Some 
of  them  in  affluence — And  all  surrounded  by  those  endearing 
domestic  relations  in  hazarding  whose  security  even  the  bold 
become  cowards  and  the  rash  discreet.  Who  then  ever  heard 
of  a  conspiracy  made  of  such  materials?  What  could  incline 
such  men  to  organize  an  active  opposition  to  their  government? 
To  amass  fuel  for  a  fiery  furnace  through  which  they  must  pass — 
To  destroy  tbowork  of  their  own  hands.  To  put  in  jeopardy 
comfort,  safety,  property,  wife,  child,  and  brother.  To  vary 
the  dangers  of  foreign  hostility  by  provoking  the  horrors  of  a 
civil  war,  and  to  fly  to  anarchy  for  refuge  from  the  remediable 
evils  of  a  bad  policy !  It  would  be  difficult  to  conceive  which  of 
the  malignant  or  restless  demons,  that  influence  human  destiny, 
could  preside  over  such  councils.  Whether  "Ate  hot  from  Hell" 
or  simply  the  spirit  of  infuriate  ambition.  Ambition  for  what! 
For  a  place  to  sit  and  mourn  over  the  ruins  of  our  country ! 
And  was  there  not  in  those  days,  a  "balm  in  Gilectd"  for  dis 
appointed  ambition,  to  be  found  by  turning  from  the  old  road 
and  taking  the  turnpike  ?  Besides  what  becomes  of  the  ambition 
of  men,  whose  choice  was  seclusion — whose  eyes  were  then  full 
fixed  on  Heaven.  Did  the  tumult  of  ambition  swell  the  veins 
of  such  men  as  Cabot,  Treadwell,  West,  and  others  ?  Will 
Brutus  say  they  were  ambitious ! 

For  the  rest — The  principal  evidence  of  the  miracles  wrought 
by  the  founder  of  our  holy  religion  rests  upon  "  the  labors,  dan 
gers,  and  sufferings  voluntarily  undergone"  by  the  witnesses  to 
the  accounts  of  them.  And  so  far  as  the  comparison  can  be 
made  with  due  reverence,  it  may  be  safely  contended  that  the 
same  principles  of  human  nature  forbid  the  belief,  that  the  mem 
bers  of  the  Hartford  Convention  would  have  voluntarily  expo 
sed  themselves  and  their  families  and  friends,  in  opposition  to 
government,  to  perils  like  those  of  martyrs — So  that  the  pre 
sumption  in  favor  of  the  innocence  of  the  Convention  (keeping 
always  in  view  the  disparities  of  importance  in  the  subjects)  is 
analagous  to  that  which  forms  the  basis  of  the  Christian  religion. 

H.  G.  OTIS. 


56 

V 

XETTEK  X. 

SIR, 

MY  last  proposed  point  of  inquiry  is,  whether  the  appoint 
ment  and  procedure  of  the  Hartford  Convention,  allowing  its 
innocence,  were  in  all  events  INEXPEDIENT  ?  Here  indeed  is  a 
question  very  different  from  those  hitherto  considered ;  a  ques 
tion  fairly  open  to  controversy,  and  respecting  which  alone, 
ingenuous  and  well  informed  persons  at  this  day  can  entertain 
serious  doubts.  The  ^oe^eeffing  propositions  depend  on  facts 
and  inductions,  many  of  which  are  self-evident,  and  all  of  which, 
in  connexion,  amount  to  the  fulness  of  demonstration.  But  it 
is  not  pretended,  that  this  inquiry  is  susceptible  of  the  same 
unequivocal  and  satisfactory  illucidation.  Political  expedi 
ency  is  not  like  patriotism  and  the  cardinal  virtues,  "  steadfast 
and  unmoveable,"  admitting  of  neither  shade  or  variation — But 
it  is  an  accommodating  quality,  which  though  honorably  enga 
ged  in  the  service  of  patriotism,  depends  on  the  calculation  of 
chances  and  events,  acts  often  in  the  dark  or  by  a  doubtful 
light,  and  must  be  governed  by  time  and  circumstances.  There 
is  but  one  genuine  love  of  country.  Though,  as  has  been  said 
of  other  love,  there  are  a  thousand  different  copies  of  it.  It  is 
seated  in  the  heart: — But  the  domicil  of  expediency  is  the 
head.  Patriotism  is  a  matronly  virtue  which  never  changes 
the  simplicity  of  her  dress : — But  expediency  may,  and  indeed 
must,  conform  to  the  fashion,  and  though  she  ought  never  to 
wear  a  mask,  she  may  occasionally,  when  she  appears  in  a  pub 
lic  assembly,  "give  her  cheek  a  little  red,"  without  losing 
either  innocence  or  reputation.  When  patriotism  is  questioned 
for  her  conduct,  she  calls  upon  truth  and  principles  and  honor 
for  her  sponsors — But  the  vouchers  of  expediency  are  wisdom 
and  time.  We  may  say  of  patriotism  what  it  is  very  desirable 
to  affirm  of  the  law  of  the  land,  t(non  erit  lex  alia  Romce  alia 
Jlthenis,  $c."  It  is  always  the  same.  But  the  rule  of  expedi 
ency  at  Athens  may  not  only  be  differently  graduated  from 
that  of  Rome,  but  in  each  of  those  places  it  may,  like  the  cli 
mate,  depend  on  the  state  of  the  atmosphere,  on  the  tempests 
and  calms  which,  though  they  "balk  not  Heaven's  design," 
baffle  the  prognosticks  of  tke  most  careful  observers. 


57 

Hence  it  is  apparent  that  expediency  and  inexpediency  are 
not  mere  abstract  generalities,  but  relative  terms.  And  when 
one  says  that  the  Convention  or  any  other  measure  was  inexpe 
dient,  it  may  import  either  that  it  was  impolitic  or  superfluous — 
or  not  adapted  to  the  proposed  end — or  unreasonable,  liable  to 
misapprehension  and  unpopularity — or  so  injudiciously  concert 
ed  as  to  defeat  its  object.  (The  inexpediency  of  a  measure 
may  thus  be  exceedingly  gross  and  palpable,  betraying  an  ab 
sence  of  political  wisdom,  forecast  or  experience,  and  justifying 
a  perpetual  forfeiture  of  public  confidence  in  skill  and  talents. 
Or  it  may  be  extenuated  by  circumstances,  and  amount  only  to 
such  excusable  error  of  judgment  as  sometimes  befalls  the  most 
wise  and  experienced.  And  though  a  correct  estimate  of  a  po 
litical  movement  can  seldom  be  formed  until  after  the  event- 
Yet  is  not  the  event  always  the  standard  by  which  it  should  be 
tried. 

Within  the  boundaries  of  this  immense  region  of  expediency, 
one  would  imagine  that  citizens  of  the  same  country  could  find 
space  enough  for  tilt  yards  and  race  grounds  without  convert 
ing  the  whole  into  a  Bear  Garden.  That  they  might  fairly 
contend  for  the  prize  of  ambition  and  the  rewards  of  wisdom, 
and  be  satisfied  that  those  who  are  distanced  should  quit  the 
field  and  pocket  their  loss,  without  being  hooted  and  insulted 
by  bullies  and  bravos,  and  stoned  and  pelted  with  rotten  eggs. 
I  can  discern  no  reason  why  one  assemblage  for  political  pur 
poses  rather  than  another;  whether  Convention  or  Caucus; 
whether  members  of  a  State  or  National  Legislature ;  however 
inexpedient  may  be  their  plans  or  proceedings ;  availing  them 
selves  only  of  the  liberty  of  opinion  and  speech,  should  be  dealt 
with  as  a  den  of  bandits.  It  savors  indeed  of  impartiality  that 
a  portion  of  the  chief  censors  of  the  Convention,  assail  their  old 
colleagues  and  friends  of  the  Caucus,  with  quite  as  much  of  viru 
lence  and  reproach  as  have  been  showered  on  their  ancient  ad 
versaries.  But  it  savors  more  of  the  fierce  intolerance  which 
bears  with  no  difference  of  sentiment  in  respect  to  measures  or 
to  men — which  imputes  as  crime  to  others  what  it  has  done 
itself,  and  what  it  stands  ready  to  repeat  under  any  allurement 
of  interest  or  change  of  times.  Which,  doing  whatever  seemeth 
expedient  in  its  own  eyes,  and  reversing  the  operation  of  that 
8 


58 

laudable  self-love  that  serves  "the  virtuous  mind  to  wake," 
contracts  the  circle  that  ought  to  embrace  all  the  good  and  great 
of  the  country,  by  excluding  first  adversaries,  then  friends,  till 
it  is  confined  to  a  little  clan  of  which  each  member  intends  that 
self  shall  be  the  centre.  To  the  fair  and  ingenuous  persons  to 
whom  I  have  just  alluded,  I  submit  the  intimation,  that  in  judg 
ing  of  the  expediency  of  the  Hartford  Convention,  they  should 
look  to  the  state  of  things  in  the  time  of  it.  It  may  be  admitted  </ 
that  similar  associations  for  political  purposes  would  hereafter 
be  inexpedient,  unwise,  and  impolitic ;  without  surrendering 
the  point  that  the  Hartford  Convention  should  be  thus  charac 
terized.  Public  opinion  has  now  become  consolidated  in  disap 
probation  of  such  Conventions  for  political  objects.  It  is  of  no 
consequence  in  this  view,  by  what  means — Future  Conventions 
must  be  accompanied  by  a  general  sensation  of  jealousy  and 
aversion,  which  would  divest  them  of  the  faculty  of  doing  good. 
This  is  an  all  important  consideration.  It  is  the  duty  of  every 
independent  citizen  employed  in  the  public  councils,  first,  to 
attempt  fearlessly  by  his  talents  and  influence  to  guide  public 
opinion ;  and  next,  to  conform  to  that  public  opinion,  which  he 
fails  to  lead.  No  terrors  of  unpopularity  should  deter  him  in 
the  first  case,  and  no  pride  of  opinion  make  him  inflexible  in  the 
last.  It  is  the  part  of  a  time-pleaser  to  hesitate  in  great  emer 
gencies  until  he  knows  the  people  are  with  him ;  and  of  a  head 
strong  bigot  to  persevere,  when  he  finds  they  are  fixed  against 
him.  To  decide,  therefore,  upon  this  question  of  expediency, 
or  indeed  to  form  a  judgment  in  what  degree,  if  any,  the  mea 
sure  was  inexpedient,  and  of.  consequence  how  far  its  promo 
ters  are  culpable  for  deficiency  of  political  wisdom  and  foresight, 
it  becomes  indispensable  to  take  a  rapid  view  of  the  posture  of 
affairs,  at  the  time  when  the  measure  was  proposed. 

It  would  only  obscure  this  view,  to  connect  with  it  any  ex 
amination  of  the  merits  of  the  policy  by  which  affairs  were 
brought  to  their  actual  condition.  Whether  that  was  a  perni 
cious  and  erroneous  course  or  otherwise  is  an  inquiry  foreign  to 
this  subject.  One  which  in  its  proper  place  I  am  willing  to  meet. 
But  the  present  question  is  whether  a  crisis  had  arrived  in  the 
affairs  of  the  State  demanding  recourse  to  be  had  to  extraordi 
nary  means  for  its  salvation,  and  whether  it  was  expedient  to 


59 

look  for  such  means  to  a  Convention — whether  the  ship  was 
running  on  to  the  breakers,  and  proper  means  were  taken  to 
keep  her  away,  not  whether  there  had  been  a  deviation,  or  bad 
reckoning  kept  in  any  former  stage  of  the  voyage.  With  re 
spect  to  the  existence  of  such  a  crisis  there  can  be  but  one 
opinion.  Our  prospects  were  shrouded  in  clouds  and  darkness. 
We  were  exposed  to  the  calamities  which  threaten  a  people 
vulnerable  by  foreign  hostility,  unprotected  by  their  Govern 
ment,  fettered  by  constitutional  restraints  from  using  their  own 
resources  to  protect  themselves,  and  embittered  against  each 
other  by  feelings  of  party  rancor.  The  storm  of  war  was  gath 
ering  on  the  sea  coast  and  frontier  of  the  State.  The  territory 
had  been  invaded,  and  part  of  it  remained  in  the  occupation  of 
the  enemy ; — A  hostile  fleet  hovered  near  our  harbors,  menacing 
descent,  and  proclaiming  the  intention  to  pursue  a  system  of 
conflagration  and  plunder.  The  treasury  had  been  declared 
bankrupt  "de  facto;" — Stocks  were  nt  a  discount  of  20  per 
cent. ; — No  means  were  possessed  by  the  National  Government 
(if  inclination  were  not  wanting,)  of  fortifying  posts  and  har 
bors,  or  of  furnishing  troops  for  their  defence.  To  crown  these 
misfortunes,  a  misunderstanding  had  prevailed  between  the 
President  of  the  United  States  and  the  Governor  of  Massachu 
setts  respecting  the  concurrent  authorities  of  the  National  and 
State  Governments  over  the  militia.  And  although  the  Governor 
in  a  spirit  of  accommodation  had  actually  receded  from  his  ob 
jections  so  far  as  to  place  a  detachment  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Presidential  Prefect,  yet  such  were  the  inconveniencies,  jeal 
ousies,  and  heart-burnings  among  the  officers  and  men  themselves, 
without  regard  to  party  distinction,  from  this  arrangement, 
and  so  invincible  their  apprehension  of  being  marched  off  to 
Canada,  leaving  defenceless  their  own  homes,  that  the  Governor 
was  compelled  to  revert  to  the  original  plan  of  retaining  them 
under  the  command  of  .their  own  officers.  Thus  arose  a  dis 
tressing  dilemma.  To  surmount  the  repugnance  of  the  militia 
to  be  turned  over  to  the  Prefect  was  impossible ; — Unless  this 
could  be  done,  the  National  Executive  refused  to  assume  the 
payment  of  the  troops  ; — A  million  had  already  been  disbursed 
from  the  State  Treasury  in  military  expenditures; — All  the 
sources  of  revenue  were  occupied  by  the  General  Government — 


60 

and  the  requisitions  for  another  campaign  must  have  drained 
the  State  Treasury  of  its  last  cent.  No  augury  favorable  to 
peace  appeared  in  any  quarter,  and  no  expectation  was  cherish 
ed  but  of  a  protracted  and  arduous  contest.  Constitutional 
difficulties  and  embarrassments  from  the  same  causes,  in  a 
greater  or  less  degree,  were  felt  in  all  the  New  England  States. 
Without  the  aid  of  their  own  militia,  they  had  nothing  to  save 
their  towns  and  villages  (near  the  coast  especially)  from  pro 
miscuous  ruin ; — And  without  revenue  they  could  not  command 
their  services.  Never  was  a  more  perilous  emergency.  The 
Governor  impressed  with  its  importance  convened  the  Legisla 
ture,  and  communicated  to  them  his  sense  of  the  wants  and 
dangers  of  the  State. 

The  proceedings  of  that  body  and  the  origin  of  the  Conven 
tion  shall  be  reserved  for  another  letter.  I  shall  therein  attempt 
to  shew  that  this  State  was  under  an  absolute  necessity  of  ap 
plying  to  Congress  for  its  consent  to  some  special  arrangement 
for  its  defence ; — That  the  other  New  England  States  were  some 
of  them  in  fact,  and  others  likely,  to  be  subject  to  the  same  ne 
cessity  ; — Hence  it  will  follow  that  the  expediency  of  the  Con 
vention  depends  on  the  consideration  of  how  far  it  was  proper 
for  these  States  to  unite  in  attempting  to  obtain  for  the  accom 
modation  of  all ; — what  each  would  have  been  obliged  (in  the 
progress  of  the  war)  to  ask  for  itself. 

H.  G.  OTIS. 


LETTER  XI. 

SIR, 

AMONG  the  causes  which  have  contributed  to  diffuse  aw 
impression  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  Hartford  Convention, 
none  has  had  a  greater  effect,  than  a  confused  notion,  generally 
prevalent,  of  its  being  in  itself  an  independent  or  isolated  plan, 
intended  for  the  principal  and  original  basis  of  some  new  scheme 
of  policy — "A  castle  in  the  air,"  from  whose  invisible  towers 
and  parapets  destruction  was  to  be  poured  forth  upon  the  Fed* 


61 

cral  Union.  But  this  is  a  great  mistake — It  was  not  a  scheme 
of  any  sort — but  simply  one  of  a  chain  of  measures  emanating 
from  one  source,  and  at  one  time.  The  end  and  aim  of  the 
Legislature  which  appointed  it  was  the  defence  of  the  country. 
The  scheme  was  to  organize  a  force  and  to  provide  a  fund  for  1 
supporting  it.  The  Convention  was  a  measure  subsidiary  to 
this  scheme.  It  is  in  connexion  with  this  only  that  it  can  be 
fairly  examined.  It  was  designed  as  an  instrument  to  effect 
ends,  to  which  it  was  from  the  beginning  declared  to  be  adapt 
ed.  But  its  enemies  will  have  it  that  it  was  secretly  destined 
for  other  ends,  which  we  have  seen  it  was  not  calculated  to 
promote.  They  refuse  to  the  inventor  the  benefit  of  his  specifi 
cation.  They  deny  the  utility  of  the  wheel  and  pully,  not  be 
cause  they  were  ill  adapted  to  produce  an  effect  intended,  but 
for  the  reason  that  they  might  be  misapplied  so  as  to  cause  some 
other  effect.  This  is  not  fair,  in  ordinary  cases.  Means  in 
trinsically  bad,  can  never  justify  ends — But  in  judging  of  the 
expediency  of  means,  not  liable  to  this  reproach,  what  have  we 
to  rest  on  without  keeping  sight  of  the  end  ? 

Every  member  who  came  to  the  autumnal  session  of  the  Le 
gislature  of  1814,  knew  that  he  was  summoned  to  aid  in  devising 
means  of  defending  the  country.  The  Governor's  Message  was 
confirmation  enough  of  the  fact,  that  the  militia  or  State  troops 
was  the  only  force  to  be  relied  on ;  that  the  expense  attending  le 
vies  of  these  was  not  to  be  expected  from  the  National  Treasury; 
that  the  resources  of  the  State  were  inadequate  to  defray  it,  and 
consequently  that  without  some  arrangement  with  the  General 
Government,  the  horrors  of  unresisted  warfare,  or  unconditional 
submission,  presented  the  only  and  deplorable  alternative.  This 
communication  of  the  Governor  was  referred  to  a  large  Com 
mittee  of  both  Houses — And  their  report,  of  which  it  is  neces 
sary  to  give  an  epitome,  comprehended  a  scheme  of  defensive 
measures,  already  alluded  to,  and  to  which  the  Convention,  as 
it  will  appear,  was  contemplated  as  being  merely  instrumental. 
The  first  resolution  reported,  was  in  these  words : 

Resolved,  That  the  calamities  of  war  being  now  brought  home  to  the  ter 
ritories  of  this  Commonwealth — a  portion  of  it  being  in  the  occupation  of 
the  enemy — our  sea  coast  and  rivers  being  invaded  in  several  places  and  in 
all  exposed  to  immediate  danger — the  people  of  Massachusetts  are  impelled 


62 

by  the  duty  of  self-defence,  and  by  all  the  feelings  which  bind  good  citizens 
to  their  country,  to  unite  in  the  most  vigorous  measures  for  defending  the 
State  and  expelling  the  invader,  and  no  party  feelings  or  political  dissen 
sions  can  ever  interfere  with  the  discharge  of  this  exalted  duty." 

This  resolution,  which  one  would  think  pledged  all  its  sup 
porters  to  some  effective  measures,  passed  unanimously. 

•Another  resolution  was  that  providing  for  the  appointment  of 
the  Convention*  recited  in  a  former  letter. 

Another,  recommended  provision  to  be  made  for  raising  a 
corps  of  State  troops,  not  exceeding  ten  thousand  rank  and 
file,  to  be  organized  by  the  Governor,  for  the  defence  of  the 
State. 

Another,  for  accepting  and  organizing  volunteers  as  a  part 
of  that  force,  who  should  hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  inarch 
at  a  moment's  warning,  to  any  part  of  the  Commonwealth,  to 
be  entitled  to  full  pay  when  in  service,  and  to  a  compensation 
short  of  full  pay  for  the  term  of  their  enlistment. 

Another,  for  authorizing  a  loan  not  exceeding  a  million  of 
dollars,  pledging  to  provide  funds,  &c. 

It  cannot  be  too  often  repeated,  that  these  resolutions  apart 
from  that  relative  to  the  Convention,  embraced  a  system  of 
State  defence,  the  adoption  of  which  was  rendered  imperative 
by  circumstances.  But  to  secure  to  it  a  permanent  efficiency, 
the  consent  of  Congress  must  be  had  to  some  mode  of  providing 
or  reimbursing  the  expense,  the  Executive  Government  having 
declined  defraying  it.  Without  calling  a  Convention,  the  State 
might  have  requested  that  consent  on  its  own  account.  No  ob 
jection  could  be  made  to  its  doing  so.  To  its  petitioning  CON 
GRESS  for  what  the  State  is  now  endeavoring  to  obtain — pay 
ment  of  its  troops.  Here  then  this  question  of  expediency  is 
straitened  down  to  a  single  point — WAS  IT  FIT  AND  PROPER  TO 
REQUEST  THE  CO-OPERATION  OF  OTHER  STATES  IN  APPLICATION 
TO  CONGRESS  FOR  A  CONCESSION,  WHICH  IT  WAS  FIT  AND  PRO 
PER  FOR  MASSACHUSETTS  TO  REQUEST  FOR  HERSELF;  AND  IN 
THE  OBTAINING  WHICH,  THOSE  STATES,  BEING  IN  SIMILAR  CIR 
CUMSTANCES,  HAD  A  SIMILAR  INTEREST?  If  tlllS  be  Considered 

doubtful,  or  decided  in  the  negative,  another  arises ;  was  it 
manifestly  and  flagrantly  unfit  and  improper — so  much  so,  that 
for  attempting  to  unite  more  States  than  one  in  a  request 


63 

which  each  one  might  very  reasonably  have  preferred  by  itself, 
those  who  favored  such  joinder  in  petition,  should  be  regarded 
as  destitute  of  justification  or  apology  for  their  indiscretion? 

To  assist  the  judgment  in  forming  a  satisfactory  conclusion 
upon  either  or  both  these  questions,  certain  facts  which  have 
been  but  little  noticed,  become  extremely  material.  Before 
Massachusetts  made  any  overture  to  her  sister  States,  and  in 
deed  a  fortnight  prior  to  the  sitting  of  the  Legislature,  the  State 
of  Rhode  Island  made  THE  FIRST  ADVANCE  to  the  States  of  Mas 
sachusetts  and  Connecticut.  Governor  Jones  by  letter  of  21st 
September,  informs  Governor  Strong,  that  By  an  act  of  the  Le 
gislature  of  Rhode  Island,  he  is  authorized  and  requested  in  case 
of  invasion,  to  march  to  the  assistance  of  any  neighboring  State, 
and  accordingly  offers  his  aid,  and  requests  the  co-operation  of 
Massachusetts  upon  a  like  emergency.  Governor  Strong  in  re 
ply,  engages  to  lay  his  communication  before  the  Legislature 
when  it  should  assemble ;  and  promises  in  the  mean  time  to  use, 
all  the  constitutional  means  at  his  disposal,  to  aid  Rhode  Island 
in  case  of  need.  In  Connecticut  the  same  misunderstanding  | 
between  the  General  and  State  Governments,  concerning  the 
authority  over  the  militia,  had  arisen,  and  in  consequence,  the 
former  withdrew  its  assistance  and  supplies  to  the  troops  called 
out  to  protect  New  London  (actually  blockaded)  and  other  pla 
ces.  In  Vermont,  some  time  before  this  period,  the  Governor  | 
had  actually  ordered  back  the  militia  which  had  been  marched  * 
out  of  the  State,  conceiving  his  own  State  to  be  in  danger : — 
And  in  New  Hampshire,  where  Gov.  Plumer  had  conformed  to 
the  requisition  of  the  President,  he  the  next  year  lost  his  election. 
To  this  state  of  things,  so  much  alike,  in  all  parts  of  New  Eng 
land — and  to  the  communication  first  made  from  Rhode  Island, 
may  be  traced  so  far  as  I  am  acquainted  writh  the  subject,  the 
first  germ  of  the  Convention.  In  favor  of  the  expediency  of 
the  measure,  it  will  be  obvious,  that  a  joint  application  from 
several  States  would  promise  a  more  favorable  result  than  a 
solitary  one.  The  New  England  States  were  notoriously  under 
the  influence  of  similar  opinions,  and  the  embarrassment  of  the 
same  collisions  with  the  National  Executive  respecting  the  mi 
litia  as  I  have  just  hinted.  Their  contiguous  situation,  military 
system,  general  habits,  exposure  to  the  same  dangers,  facilities 


64 

for  reciprocal  aid,  and  experience  in  past  times,  furnished  all 
the  inducements  and  promised  all  the  advantages  of  the  most 
natural  alliance. 

Nothing  even  at  this  day  justifies  a  doubt  that  the  New  Eng 
land  States  would  have  defended  themselves  with  more  vigor 
and  economy,  and  of  consequence,  with  more  advantage  to  the 
Union  in  the  proposed  mode.  Congress,  I  say  again,  acquiesced 
in  that  idea. 

Was  there  then  any  thing  unnatural  or  extravagant  in  the 
conception  that  these  States  might  by  their  delegates  strike  out 
a  plan  for  their  mutual  defence,  by  State  troops  under  the  au 
thority  of  their  own  officers ;  which  would  obviate  all  difficulties 
and  secure  the  assent  of  Congress  ?  Can  it  now  be  contended 
to  have  been  thus  monstrous  and  inadmissible,  inasmuch  as  it 
has  in  fact  the  authority  of  Congress  in  its  favor  ?  And  having 
determined  to  meet  in  Convention  for  that  purpose,  was  it  out 
rageously  amiss  to  embody,  with  one  accord  and  in  one  instru 
ment,  the  grievances  which  they  felt  and  the  remedies  they 
desired,  by  amendments  to  the  Constitution  divested  of  every 
intimation  of  aiming  at  redress,  through  any  but  the  most  peace 
able  and  legitimate  medium  ? 

Protesting  against  conclusions  drawn  from  the  subsequent 
unpopularity  of  the  measure,  I  ask  who  could  have  foreseen  this, 
in  its  full  extent  ?  What  reason  should  have  led  men  conscious 
of  honor  and  integrity,  to  presume  that  their  opponents  would 
fasten  upon  this  measure  rather  than  any  other  as  the  spell  by 
which  their  motives  were  to  be  branded  as  suspicious  and  odious. 
The  minority  in  this  State  for  many  years,  had  done  what  seem 
ed  to  be  their  utmost,  to  impress  the  world  with  a  belief  that 
the  Federal  Party  was  disaffected  to  the  Union.  But  it  was 
thought  the  only  converts  to  their  idle  stories  were  Sir  James 
Craig,  and  John  Henry.  The  cry  of  Union  in  danger,  *had  been 
raised  for  years  against  its  old  friends  by  its  new  ones,  upon 
occasions  of  every  shew  of  discontent  with  the  ever  varying  and 
always  hideous  features  of  the  restrictive  system.  That  it  would 
now  become  a  general  yell,  and  rend  the  welkin,  it  was  not  pos 
sible  to  foresee.  It  is  true  that  an  opposition  of  unparalleled 
virulence  and  effrontery  was  made  to  the  acceptance  of  the  re 
port  of  the  Committee  in  both  Houses.  But  to  have  yielded  to 


65 

such  a  torrent  would  have  seemed  to  justify  the  opening  of  the 
flood  gates,  through  which  it  issued.     There  seemed  then  to  be 
no  good  reason  for  desisting  from  a  measure,  felt  bj  its  advo 
cates  to  be  innocent  and  useful,  especially  as  it  would  open  a 
natural  avenue  for  a  disavowal  in  behalf  of  the  Eastern  States 
of  the  unworthy  aspersions  cast  upon  their  character  and  mo 
tives,  and  for  conveying  to  the  whole  people,  the  sentiments  of 
persons  thought  worthy  of  their  confidence,  upon  the  obligations 
imposed  and  the  sacrifices  required  by  the  trying  emergency ; 
which  while  it  should  avoid  revolting  their  feelings,  by  denying 
their  justness,  might  calm  the  irritation  that  tended  in  time,  to 
run  into  extremes.     But  further,  the  violence  of  the  opposition 
was  directed  against  all  the  resolutions,  except  the  first.   Never 
was  there  a  display  of  more  egregious  inconsistency.     They 
agreed  that  the  country  was  in  danger,  and  that  party  discord 
should  cease,  so  that  a  cordial  and  vigorous  union  might  be  had 
for  its  defence — But  they  voted  against  the  resolution/or  raising 
men  and  money  as  well  as  against  that  for  the  Convention.  They 
outraged  decorum  and  lost  sight  of  self-respect  in  suggestions, 
that  the  proposed  force  was  to  be  organized  as  a  corps  of  obser 
vation  on  the  National  Government,  and  not  for  co-operation 
with  it  in  defending  the  country.     No  substitute  was  offered, 
but  that  of  placing  the  militia  at  the  disposal  of  -The  Prefect. 
An  effort  to  effect  this  would  have  been  the  signal  for  general! 
insubordination.     The  abhorrence  of  the  measure,  coupled  with 
the  apprehension  of  being  converted  into  regulars,  and  marched 
to  Canada,  while  their  homes  were  exposed  to  the  incursions  of 
the  enemy  was 'insurmountable.     Thus  the  majority  were  left 
to  act  by  the  light  of  their  own  discretion  in  circumstances  al 
together  new,  and  painfully  urgent,  and  were  naturally  inspired 
with  a  disposition  to  fortify  their  own  measures  by  a  consulta 
tion  with  those  who  were  placed  by  the  course  of  events  in  like 
circumstances  with  themselves.     As  it  was  thus  evidently  the 
design  of  the  opposition  to  brand  with  the  stigma  of  disaffection 
to  the  Union,  whatever  was  proposed  by  the  advocates  for  the 
resolutions ;  the  latter  could  not  hope  to  avoid  the  effect  of  the 
clamor  by  discarding  the  resolution  for  the  Convention  rather 
than  the  others.    Much  less  could  they  anticipate  that  any  such 
impression  of  the  character  of  that  measure,  could  prevail  in 
9 


66 

an  enlightened  community,  convinced  as  they  wer*  that  deli 
rious  party  rage  and  malice  were  the  sole  motives  of  those  who 
wished  to  create  it. 

There  was  then  nothing  to  forbid  the  call  of  a  Convention 
on  the  score  of  expediency,  but  the  objection  of  an  abstract 
principle.  It  may  be  said,  that  all  meetings  of  delegates  from 
State  Legislatures,  to  consult  upon  the  great  political  subjects 
which  are  confided  to  the  province  of  the  National  Govern 
ment,  must  be  in  their  nature  inexpedient.  I  am  not  inclined 
to  break  a  lance  with  the  supporters  of  this  principle,  but 
rather  to  admit  its  justice — But  the  situation  of  the  Eastern 
States  was  conceived  to  afford  an  exception  to  the  principle, 
A  question  of  constitutional  law  had  arisen  between  the  Gene 
ral  and  State  Governments,  respecting  their  several  obligations 
and  authorities — It  was  a  question  of  that  nature  and  nothing 
more.  In  no  other  light  should  it  ever  have  been  viewed.  It 
was  one  of  the  many  questions  whicli  naturally  arise  in  all 
confederated  governments — A  "  casus  foederis" — Of  the  same 
description  with  questions  that  were  frequent  before  the  Am- 
phyctionic  Councils  in  ancient  times,  and  the  Aulic  Councils 
in  modern  times — analagous  to  controversies  which  have  arisen 
in  Germany,  Holland  and  Switzerland — And  not  different  in 
reality  from  the  dispute  on  the  Missouri  question,  and  twenty 
other  questions  concerning  the  conflict  of  jurisdictions  which 
have  been  raised  under  our  government,  and  one  of  which  (the 
steam  boat  question)  has  been  lately  adjudicated  by  the  Supreme 
Court.  This  controversy  ought  to  have  been  conducted  and 
discussed  with  the  same  temper.  Instead  of  which,  such  pains 
had  been  taken  to  chafe  the  public  mind,  and  indeed  so  unfa 
vorable  were  the  times  to  temperate  investigation,  that  the 
majority  in  Massachusetts  could  do  nothing  but  endeavor  to 
defend  the  State  by  the  best  practicable  means.  There  could 
be  no  Umpire Jbetween  the  General  Government  and  the  State 
Government./  The  latter  therefore  deviated  from  its  regular 
sphere,  under  the  impulse  of  a  necessity  which  is  above  the  law 
— At  least  such  necessity  was  conceived  to  exist,  and  the  de 
parture  was  not  intended  to  be  drawn  into  precedent.  A  line 
of  sea  coast  extending  continuously  around  four  of  those  States, 
through  a  range  of  six  or  seven  hundred  miles,  indented  by  bays 


67 

and  inlets,  and  communicating  with  the  interior  by  navigable 
rivers,  for  the  most  part  unfortified,  and  altogether  unprotected 
by  the  National  arm,  was  threatened  by  hostile  fleets  and  armies 
with  all  the  horrors  of  fire  and  sword.  What  could  be  more 
natural  than  for  the  Governments  of  the  States  thus  circum 
stanced,  to  obey  the  dictates  of  the  law  of  nature,  and  endeavor 
to  consult  and  stand  together  in  their  own  defence !  Such  is 
the  fair  view  of  the  subject,  so  far  as  expediency  is  involved  in 
the  inquiry.  The  Convention  was  not  the  plan  or  contrivance 
of  one  man,  or  of  a  junto  or  cabal,  but  a  simultaneous  and  in 
stinctive  conception  of  many — prompted  by  the  nature,  and 
the  imagined  necessity  of  the  case.  If  indeed  the  utility  of 
this  measure  were  to  be  judged  of  by  the  effect  produced  by 
the  report  in  allaying  the  irritation  of  the  public  mind,  it 
would  be  every  where  crowned  with  encomium.  It  operated 
like  a  charm — like  oil  poured  upon  the  billows : — And  had  the 
war  continued,  (Government  having  assumed  the  payment  of 
the  State  troops,)  a  train  of  desirable  consequences  would  have 
followed  this  report.  But  if  the  war  had  continued  without 
such  provision,  and  an  attempt  had  been  made  to  enforce  the 
impending  conscription,  a  case  would  have  arisen  pregnant 
with  trouble,  and  calling  for  measures  not  contemplated  in  the 
Constitution.  What  would  have  been  their  character,  God  only 
knows.  The  powers  of  the  Convention,  had  ceased.  If  new 
Conventions  had  been  called,  they-  would  have  proceeded  di 
rectly  from  the  people.  They  alone,  (and  in  extreme  cases 
only — cases  not  to  be  anticipated,)  have  a  right  to  decide  when 
they  are  absolved  from  their  Federal  obligations.  Whenever 
such  a  case  occurs,  the  PEOPLE  AND  NOT  THEIR  LEGISLATORS 
WILL  CUT  THE  GORDIAN  KNOT.  May  no  prophetic  eye  see  far 
enough  to  discern  when  that  will  happen !  May  the  evil  hour  be 
postponed  until  all  the  governments  of  this  world,  and  the  world 
itself,  shall  be  dissolved  and  "leave  not  a  wreck  behind!" 

H.  G.  OTIS. 


68 


LETTER  XII. 
SIR, 

YOUR  readers  may  probably  be  glad  to  hear  that  I  have 
finished  the  examination  I  proposed  to  make  of  that  part  of  the 
Governor's  Speech  which  alluded  to  the  Hartford  Convention. 
1  will  not  increase  the  risk  of  being  insupportably  tedious  by  a 
recapitulation  of  the  points  which  I  have  aimed  to  establish. 
Some  general  considerations,  however,  are  connected  with  it 
which  seem  to  require,  at  least,  a  bird's-eye  view,  but  to  which 
justice  could  riot  be  done,  in  less  than  the  compass  of  a  respect 
able  volume. 

It  seems  to  be  generally  admitted,  that  the  influence  of  the 
Eastern  States  in  the  councils  of  the  Union,  has  been  long  in 
the  wane,  and  that  the  importance  of  Massachusetts  has  dwin 
dled  into  absolute  insignificance.  Natural  causes  accounting 
for  a  considerable  diminution  of  her  weight  may  be  found,  in 
the  varying  ratio  of  her  population,  in  the  amputation  that  she 
submitted  to  in  the  hope  of  saving  her  constitution  and  her  life 
in  the  multiplication  of  new  States,  and  the  growing  dispropor 
tion  between  that  interest  which  in  one  part  of  the  Union  is 
homogeneous,  and  those  various  interests  in  another,  among 
which  there  is  no  bond  of  sympathy.  In  these  and  some  others 
we  must  acquiesce,  for  they  are  inevitable  and  included  in  the 
price  we  pay  for  our  Union.  But  these  causes  are  light  and 
slow  of  operation  in  forcing  us  into  the  back  ground,  in  com 
parison  with  the  disparagement  which  too  many  among  us  have 
for  years  been  eager  to  bring  upon  their  native  State.  One 
sickens  with  chagrin  in  realizing  what  a  gulf  stream  of  calumny 
has  set  in  the  same  direction  from  Massachusetts  towards  the 
South  for  years  together,  bearing  on  its  dark  and  troubled  bil 
lows  the  shipwrecked  characters  of  most  of  those  who  were 
once  dear,  and  loved,  and  honored  among  this  people,  and  of 
the  people  themselves.  It  is  humiliating  indeed,  while  one 
sees  the  representatives  of  the  South  and  West,  always  prompt 
to  catch  and  to  resent  a  murmur  uttered  against  the  character 
and  pretensions  of  his  State — Proud  of  the  virtues  and  talents 
of  the  good  and  great  among  his  political  opponents ; — blazon- 


69 

ing  on  all  fit  occasions  the  claims,  services,  sacrifices,  and 
qualities  of  his  constituents — The  Virginian  especially,  eulo 
gizing  his  own  State  as  the  "  hominum  sator  atque  divorum"— 
It  is,  I  say,  humiliating  to  see  this,  and  at  the  same  time  to  feel 
that  if  a  member  from  Massachusetts,  though  he  were  an  "angel 
trumpet  tongued,"  should  take  up  the  same  strain  in  favor  of 
his  own  State,  or  of  her  claims  of  whatever  description  ;  though 
decorum  might  dissemble  the  sneer  and  prevent  the  smart  or 
severe  reply,  it  would  be  in  the  power  of  an  unkind  adversary 
to  bring  up  the  Governor's  "  old  song"  and  the  recitative  of  the 
Legislature,  and  to  say — out  of  the  mouth  of  thine  own  Govern 
or,  "will  I  condemn  thee,  thou  wicked  servant" — I  will  prove 
by  transcripts  of  your  recorded  infamy,  under  your  great  seal, 
that  for  many  long  years  there  was  no  public  virtue  extant 
among  you — That  your  great  men  were  in  the  interest  of  the 
enemy ;  and  that  your  bands  of  patriots  were  nests  of  vipers. 

In  all  this  there  is  nothing  of  exaggeration.  From  the  era 
of  the  first  embargo  to  the  present  hour,  individuals  have  suc 
ceeded  each  other  in  laboring  not  merely  to  counteract  the 
policy,  but  to  disgrace  the  character  of  this  State  especially, 
and  of  the  other  Eastern  States  in  general,  whenever  their  own 
party  was  not  in  power.  I  truly  thought  that  every  gentleman 
who  had  been  in  Congress  of  late  years,  without  distinction  of 
party,  and  notwithstanding  the  personal  civility  and  respect  he 
may  have  experienced,  had  been  sensible  of  the  shyness  with 
which  any  measure  is  regarded,  that  comes  from  Massachusetts. 
There  is  much  of  urbanity,  of  respect  to  private  feelings,  of  at 
tention  to  expressed  opinions,  but  nothing  of  weight  or  influ 
ence.  Civilities  are  exchanged,  and  kindness  and  friendships 
between  individuals  formed  and  cultivated — But  every  Yankee^ 
as  I  have  had  reason  to  imagine,  feels  that  he  is  not  at  home — 
acts  under  restraint,  expects  no  success  in  measures  he  origi 
nates,  and  at  most,  faint  praise  in  those  he  supports.  It  is  not 
because  the  former  political  dissentions,  as  between  individ 
uals,  are  kept  in  vivid  remembrance — Nur  because  one  is  now 
for  Paul,  and  another  for  Apollos.  No  doubt,  these  consider 
ations  have  some  effect.  But  while  the  old  party  tracks  are 
becoming  gradually  eftkced  and  confounded,  by  time  and  the 


70 

course  of  events,  the  monumental  stones  and  finger  posts 
which  indicate  the  by-road  supposed  to  be  taken  by  this  State, 
are  preserved  and  pointed  out  perpetually  by  our  own  citizens. 
The  good  sense  and  true  interests  of  the  republican  party  are 
surrendered  to  the  mercy  and  disposal  of  editorial  popinjays 
and  other  "ultras,"  who,  in  contempt  of  the  example  of  the 
wise  and  liberal  of  their  own  party,  in  other  places,  and  of  the 
most  respectable  portion  of  it  here,  indulge  an  unnatural  mania 
for  running  down  the  character  of  poor  Massachusetts.  These 
disinterested  persons  (apostates  and  others,)  have  become  so 
Outrageously  federal,  that  they  affect  to  think  the  disgrace  of 
the  State  promotes  the  glory  of  the  nation.  By  heightening 
the  aspect  of  the  general  depravity,  they  would  make  more 
conspicuous  the  righteousness  of  the  few,  for  whose  sake  the 
city  shall  be  saved.  It  seems  to  be  with  them  an  aphorism, 
that  he  who  humbleth  his  State  shall  be  exalted.  They  are  un 
natural  children  who  reverse  the  story  of  Saturn,  and  devour 
their  own  mother.  What  weakness ! — Not  to  perceive  that  the 
character  of  a  State  is  a  common  franchise,  which  like  its  at 
mosphere,  is  incapable  of  division,  and  that  whoever  goes  from 
a  district  reputed  to  be  infected,  will  be  received  with  shyness 
if  he  is  not  shunned,  though  he  carries  with  him  the  .Doctor's 
certificate  of  his  personal  health!  By  reason  of  this  infatuation, 
which  too  nearly  resembles  that  which  kept  the  petty  States  of 
Greece  forever  divided  and  dependent  on  Athens  or  Sparta;  it 
has  happened  that  the  good  people  of  this  State  are  in  a  fair 
way  to  part  with  their  self-respect.  As  with  men,  so  with  com 
munities,  when  the  consciousness  of  dignity  of  character  is  no 
more,  the  merited  loss  of  character  itself  soon  follows.  Al 
ready  it  has  come  to  pass  that  Massachusetts  no  longer  in 
deed  the  tall  "  anchoring  bark"  which  bore  the  Admiral's  flag, 
but  shamefully  "  razeed,"  yet  still  a  sound  and  well  manned 
vessel,  appears  from  the  Capitol  Hill  diminished  to  "her  buoy, 
almost  too  small  for  sight."  It  is  so  universally  taken  for 
granted,  that  during  the  war  we  not  only  "left  undone  what 
we  ought  to  have  done,"  but  committed  the  correlative  sin, — 
that  in  our  opposition  to  the  war,  there  was  something  of  ma- 
lignity  or  treachery  of  a  peculiar  and  distinctive  character,  not 


71 

belonging  to  opposition  elsewhere — that  it  is  now  almost  too 
late  to  deny  it,  without  appearing  to  incline  to  the  affectation 
of  supporting  paradoxes. 

Nevertheless  for  one,  at  this  or  any  other  hazard,  I  pro 
nounce  the  charge  as  it  respects  the  Eastern  States  generally,  or 
Massachusetts  alone,  entirely  destitute  of  foundation.  But  my 
remarks  will  be  principally  confined  to  the  latter — and  they 
must  of  necessity  be  of  a  general  character. 

In  order  to  fix  upon  those  States  or  either  of  them,  a  charge 
of  disaffection  more  virulent  in  its  nature  or  dangerous  in  its 
object  than  was  common  to  the  opposition  to  administration 
elsewhere — it  ought  to  appear  either  that  the  manifestation  of  it 
was  accompanied  by  a  preparation  to  resist  the  laws,  or  by  re 
sistance  in  fact ;  or  else  that  the  opposition  in  this  quarter  was 
grounded  on  alleged  pretences  of  discontent,  in  which  the  op 
position  in  other  States  did  not  participate.  If  neither  of  these 
assertions  can  be  maintained  ; — if  no  show  of  actual  opposition 
was  made; — nor  no  pretence  of  grievance  agitated  among  us, 
but  such  as  was  regarded  in  the  same  light  in  other  places,  there 
is  manifest  injustice  in  the  condemnation  of  one  and  the  acquit 
tal  of  another,  upon  evidence  equally  applicable  to  all.  How 
then  stands  the  evidence  ?  None  has  ever  been  suggested  of 
any  actual  opposition  prepared  or  offered  to  the  laws.  None 
of  Massachusetts  having  done  (I  speak  of  deeds  not  words) 
"what  she  ought  not  to  have  done.'*  What  omission  of  posi 
tive  duty  can  then  be  laid  to  her  charge  ?  In  her  political  ca 
pacity  as  a  member  of  the  Union  she  had  no  duty  to  perform 
but  that  of  furnishing  troops  in  obedience  to  requisitions  r 
And  can  it  be  pretended  that  she  did  not  furnish  them  ?  Her 
militia  was  held  in  constant  readiness  from  the  beginning  to 
the  end  of  the  war.  They  were  always  on  the  alert ;  detach 
ments  were  made  to  the  full  number  at  any  time  required ; — 
detachments  of  soldiers,  not  mere  human  bipeds,  as  destitute  of 
equipments  as  of  "feathers  ;"  but  of  horse,  foot,  dragoons,  and 
artillery,  ready  to  be  embattled.  Nothing  comparable  to  this 
state  of  preparation  could  be  found  out  of  New  England.  It 
was  so  perfect  at  "the  head  quarters"  of  the  "Boston  Stamp," 
as  to  extort  the  approbation  of  the  National  Executive  Govern- 


ment.  The  preparatives  diifered  only  in  two  particulars  from 
those  of  the  South.  First,  in  their  completeness,  and  next  in 
their  being  furnished  at  our  own  expense — Money  was  supplied 
as  well  as  men.  The  taxes  in  all  their  odious  and  oppressive 
variety  were  paid  with  exemplary  promptness.  It  is  certain 
that  the  militia  was  not  in  most  instances  surrendered  to  the 
National  Prefect,  and  thereby  hangs  a  constitutional  question. 
The  merits  of  which  I  pause  not  now  to  examine.  But  is  it 
strange  that  it  should  be  a  question  ? 

When  in  a  time  of  no  peculiar  excitement  we  see  the  Legis 
lature  of  Virginia  employing  counsel  to  contest  the  right  of 
selling  a  paltry  ticket  in  the  ancient  dominion,  and  that  of  Ken 
tucky  convufsed,  by  the  assumption  of  jurisdiction  by  the  Su 
preme  Court  in  cases  involving  the  validity  of  a  municipal  law, 
and  her  Governor  speaking  the  language  of  absolute  defiance. 
When  we  attend  to  the  flame  kindled  in  Ohio,  in  South  Caro 
lina,  and  ready  to  burst  forth  in  every  State,  South  and  West, 
upon  any  construction  of  the  Constitution  which  encounters 
local  convenience  or  habitual  prejudice,  can  it  be  matter  of 
wonder  or  of  censure,  that  in  a  case  of  incomparably  greater 
concernment,  such  a  question  should  have  arisen  ?  If  the  Presi 
dent  has  the  right,  not  only  of  deciding  upon  the  presence  of 
the  constitutional  contingency  which  justifies  his  calling  out 
the  militia,  but  also  of  appointing  his  Prefects  to  command  them, 
he  possesses  the  power,  at  any  moment,  of  converting  the  whole 
militia  of  the  nation  into  Pretorian  Cohorts.  I  repeat  that  I  stop 
not  to  discuss  this  question.  I  only  say  it  is  a  tremendous  pow 
er  arid  an  awfully  pregnant  question.  A  question  compared  with 
which,  the  controversies  about  sedition  acts  and  alien  acts,  and 
national  banks,  and  Cumberland  roads,  and  lottery  tickets,  and 
occupying  claimants,  and  "id genus  omne>"  are  paltry  squab 
bles.  It  is  a  question  about  the  power  of  the  sword,  which 
settles  all  other  questions.  If  you  say  it  is  clear  the  President 
has  it — be  it  so.  But  let  me  ask  again  ; — Was  it  then  so  clear 
that  doubtfulness  must  not  be  presumed  ?  So  clear  that  hesita 
tion  became  crime  ?  Was  the  retention  of  the  command  by  the  , 
State  Executive,  under  the  circumstances  of  that  day,  equiva 
lent  to  an  obstruction  of  the  laws — a  "paralyzing  of  the  means 
and  agents  of  the  Government?"  It  cannot  be  pretended.  The 


73 

orders  of  the  Government  were  carried  into  effect,  though  not 
by  the  appointed  organ. 

Exclusive  of  this  controversy,  not  an  instance  can  be  addu 
ced  of  a  topic  of  complaint  or  remonstrance  from  the  earliest 
hour  of  the  new  order  of  things  under  Mr.  Jefferson,  to  the 
close  of  the  war,  in  which  either  New  England  or  Massachu 
setts  stood  alone.  None  in  which  they  were  not  countenanced 
and  supported  by  the  opposition  in  Congress  from  every  State 
in  the  Union; — By  the  majorities  of  the  Legislatures  in  other 
States,  when  occasionally  federal; — By  the  minority,  when 
otherwise ; — By  meetings  in  cities,  towns,  counties,  court 
houses,  and  squares,  in  all  the  States  on  this  side  of  the  Poto 
mac — sometimes  beyond  it; — And  by  the  invariable  tenor  of 
the  federal  newspapers  in  every  State  of  the  Union. 

These  are  broad  assertions,  which  it  is  in  any  one's  power  to 
establish  or  refute,  who  will  consult  the  newspapers,  records 
and  documentary  evidence  of  those  times.  To  confirm  them 
by  adducing  the  plenary  proof  of  which  they  are  susceptible, 
would  require  compilations  and  references  much  too  copious  for 
the  limits  prescribed  to  these  letters.  But  enough  may  be  com 
prehended  in  a  glance,  to  satisfy  most  readers,  or  to  put  them 
in  a  train  to  satisfy  themselves. 

To  commence  with  the  opposition  antecedent  to  the  war. 
The  object  of  it  is  comprized  in  two  words — The  restrictive 
system.  In  all  its  moods  and  tenses — through  all  its  labyrinths 
of  embargo,  nonimportation,  and  nonintercourse,  with  its  acts 
supplemental  and  explanatory,  and  all  its  reduplications  of  pains 
and  penalties,  on  land  and  water.  It  was  to  this  system  and 
to  this  alone,  to  which  any  idea  of  serious  discontent  or  disaf 
fection  could  be  attached.  This  alone  had  a  bearing  upon  our 
foreign  relations,  and  the  peace  of  the  country.  In  proof  of 
this  it  need  only  be  mentioned  that,  upon  the  intelligence  of 
Mr.  Erskine's  arrangement,  with  our  Government,  which  it  was 
supposed  had  put  an  end  to  the  "Terrapin"  system,  the  most 
unqualified  commendation  was  bestowed  on  Mr.  Madison  by 
his  former  opponents,  and  according  to  a  writer  devoted  to  his 
interest,  *"he  was  claimed  as  a  federalist  and  Washingtonian" 
•—and  "the  democrats  began  to  grow  jealous."  Decisive  testi- 

*  « Olive  Branch,  by  M.  Carey," 
10 


monials  of  gratification  in  the  arrangement   were  indubitably 
manifested  by  the  federalists. 

The  repugnance  felt  for  these  measures  every  where  partook  of 
the  same  character,  and  grew  out  of  similar  views  of  their  impol 
icy.  After  pronouncing  the  system  to  be  impolitic,  oppressive 
and  unconstitutional,  originating  in  fear  or  partiality  to  France, 
leading  to  an  alliance  with  her,  destructive  of  commerce,  which 
it  was  a  main  purpose  of  the  Union  to  protect ;  censure  would 
seem  to  be  exhausted.  Those  who  held  this  language  could  carry 
opposition  by  word  no  further.  It  expressed  the  all  comprehen 
sive  articles  of  the  opposition  creed.  Those  who  agreed  in  them 
were  of  one  faith.  No  reason  for  attempting  to  divide  them 
into  various  sects  arises  from  the  consideration  that  one  repeat 
ed  the  creed  oftener,  with  greater  zeal,  or  in  a  more  varied 
phraseology  than  another.  Whatever  of  hostility  to  the  Union, 
was  the  import  of  this  faith  in  one  part  of  the  country,  just  so 
much  and  no  more  was  implied  in  any  other.  This  was  un 
doubtedly  the  faith  of  Massachusetts,  of  her  Legislature,  and 
of  her  people.  For  this  she  is  responsible,  judging  her  always 
by  the  record,  not  by  fugitive  or  anonymous  essays,  or  philippics 
of  any  sort.  This  is  the  extent  of  her  transgression  before  the 
war.  Was  then  this  the  faith,  and  this  the  language  of  other 
States — of  respectable  popular  meetings  in  other  places  ;  of  the 
opposition  wheresoever  existing  ?  W^as  it  held  by  any  one  as 
sembly  or  by  any  one  respectable  person,  in  whom  it  cannot  be 
presumed  to  have  shewn  a  spirit  of  antipathy  to  the  Union  ?  It 
so,  neither  can  such  inference  be  admissible  against  Massachu 
setts.  I  affirm  then,  as  matter  of  notoriety,  that  these  opinions 
were  held  in  extenso,  and  sounded  by  the  trump  of  opposition 
through  all  its  regions  and  departments.  For  vouchers  I  appeal 
to  the  public  documents  as  before — And  in  a  particular  manner 
to  the  resolutions  of  the  Philadelphia  meeting,  Com.  Truxton, 
Chairman ;  which  as  the  writer  above  quoted  admits,  "  embrac 
ed  the  essence  of  all  the  objections  raised  against  it  throughout 
the  Union.'*  I  refer  also  to  the  resolutions  at  Staunton  in  Vir 
ginia  ; — To  the  debates  in  Congress,  in  which  the  "hand  of 
Napoleon''  was  declared  to  be  visible  in  the  whole  system — to 
the  celebrated  argument  of  Samuel  Dexter,  who  contended 
against  the  constitutionality  of  the  act,  and  did  more  to  fix  that 


75 

impression  in  the  minds  of  the  people  than  any  other  man,  and 
finally  again  to  Matthew  Carey,  (his  work  being  the  text  book 
of  the  rcvilers  of  this  State)  who  admits  that  "no  act  of  the 
Federal  Government  since  its  first  organization  excited  so  much 
outcry  and  clamour,"  and  "incessant  abuse  in  all  the  federal 
papers  from  New  Hampshire  to  Georgia,  and  from  Mississippi 
to  the  Atlantic."  The  same  writer  also  truly  states  that  the 
nonintercourse  acts  were  condemned  by  both  parties.  With 
this  evidence,  which  might  be  heaped  like  "Pelion  upon  Ossa," 
I  inquire  why  is  Massachusetts  doomed  by  the  Inquisition  to 
the  ditto  dafe?  Is  it  because  she  was  more  sensitive  under  the 
previous  torture  ?  because  her  agony  was  more  exquisite  ?  her 
groans  louder  and  oftener  repeated  ?  If  the  measure  of  her  ab 
erration  is  the  same — if  she  said  and  wrote  nothing  more  in 
substance  against  the  Pope  and  the  Cardinals  than  her  heretical 
accomplices,  why  was  she  alone  of  the  "American  family"  ex 
cluded  from  the  pale  of  the  Church  ?  Let  her  citizen  calumni 
ators  answer  that  question. 

By  principles  analagous  to  those  just  considered,  and  by 
evidence  of  the  same  kind,  it  may  be  demonstrated  that  the 
opposition  of  the  Eastern  States,  including  Massachusetts,  SUB 
SEQUENT  to  the  war,  was  nowise  distinguished  by  any  peculi 
arity  or  hideousness  of  feature.  But  even  the  very  general 
observations  which  I  intend  to  make  on  that  subject,  must, 
contrary  to  my  first  intention,  be  reserved  for  another  commu 
nication. 

H.  G.  OTIS. 


LETTER  XTTT. 

SIR, 

IN  discussing  the  last  question  with  which  I  propose  to 
trouble  the  public — the  comparative  demerit  of  the  opposition 
subsequent  to  the  war,  in  Massachusetts  and  other  places — 1 
regard  an  inquiry  into  the  policy  of  the  war  itself  as  foreign  to 
my  purpose.  With  the  multitude  in  all  countries,  success  i> 


76 

the  test  of  wisdom.  And  in  this  country  our  escape  from  the 
impending  calamities  of  protracted  war,  is  considered  by  the 
war-makers,  as  equivalent  to  success,  though  peace  could  not 
be  made  until  our  Ministers  were  expressly  instructed  to  aban 
don  the  great  object  of  contention — impressment;  and  though 
we  were  left  with  an  hundred  millions  of  additional  debt,  to 
say  nothing  of  loss  from  other  sources. 

But  conceding  for  the  sake  of  argument,  (what  is  a  very 
ample  concession,)  that  success  is  merit — that  "finis  coronat 
opus,"  and  as  the  war  was  wise,  the  opposition  was  of  conse 
quence  impolitic  and  unjustifiable ;  I  come  to  the  comparison 
between  the  conduct  of  opposition  in  Massachusetts  and  in 
other  places,  meaning  to  maintain,  that  the  character  or  moral 
quality  of  this  opposition  is  not  distinguishable  from  that  which 
prevailed  elsewhere,  and  was  supported  by  those,  the  purity 
of  whose  motives  and  love  of  country  is  not  questioned  by 
their  political  adversaries.  This,  however,  seems  to  be  enter 
ing  upon  an  immense  field,  and  were  it  necessary  to  survey  it  in 
its  full  extent,  I  should  desist  from  the  undertaking.  To  exe 
cute  it  would  be  to  write  a  history  of  the  war — But  I  persuade 
myself,  that  a  few  plain  and  undeniable  postulates,  and  as 
many  examples,  will  enable  me  satisfactorily  to  establish  the 
position,  or  at  least  to  put  those  who  wish  to  go  farther,  in  a 
way  to  satisfy  themselves. 

It  must  be  allowed  me  then,  that  the  character  of  an  opposi 
tion  to  an  administration,  consists  in  the  moral  quality  of  the 
principles  on  which  it  is  founded. 

When  such  opposition  is  confined  to  words,  the  language  of 
opposition,  and  that  only,  affords  evidence  of  its  principles. 

When  the  principles  of  such  an  opposition,  situated  in  differ 
ent  parts  of  a  country,  are  expressed  in  language  which  imports 
similar  ideas,  the  character  of  that  opposition  in  all  those  places, 
must  be  considered  as  the  same.  The  proclaiming  of  these  prin 
ciples,  more  or  less  frequently — with  more  or  less  of  zeal  or 
indignation — by  greater  or  smaller  numbers,  and  with  various 
phraseology,  so  long  as  the  ideas  expressed  are  alike,  does  not 
vary  the  character  of  the  opposition,  wheresoever  situated. 

It  is  moreover  material  to  determine  clearly,  for  what  species 
of  opposition  a  State  or  people  is  fairly  responsible.  A  Legis- 


77 

lature  certainly  is  not  accountable  for  the  doctrines  of  the  pul 
pit  or  the  press,  farther  than  they  are  adopted  by  itself.  The 
people  of  a  State  are  not  so,  farther  than  approbation  of  them  ex 
pressed  in  popular  meetings,  or  in  their  elections,  amounts  to  an 
indication  of  their  general  sense.  Persons  entirely  destitute  of 
the  confidence  of  their  party,  may  push  sound  principles  to  an 
indefensible  extreme — Persons  possessing  that  confidence  in  full 
measure,  frequently  write  or  speak  under  impulses  by  which 
they  would  not  permit  themselves  to  be  governed,  when  called 
to  act.  Neither  State  or  people  are  to  be  tried  and  convicted 
upon  the  impassioned  apostrophizing  of  occasional  sermons,  es 
says,  or  speeches.  Let  those,  who,  dissenting  from  this  posi 
tion,  insist  upon  these  things  as  good  evidence,  tell  us  in  what 
balance  we  shall  weigh  off  against  them,  I  will  not  say  merely 
the  abominations  and  scurrilities  against  WASHINGTON  and 
ADAMS,  but  the  inflammatory  resolutions  and  denunciations  of 
the  constituted  authorities  and  their  measures,  for  the  first 
twelve  years  after  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution.  Let  them 
shew  us  by  what  process,  we  may  work  equations  between 
given  quantities  of  opposition  language  found  in  the  grave  dog 
mas  of  Virginia  and  Kentucky,  in  Pennsylvania  resolutions, 
and  Ohio  resolutions,  and  Governor  Adair's  speech ;  and  that 
which  abounded  in  the  proceedings  of  Massachusetts  and  the 
Eastern  States,  and  the  speeches  of  Governor  Strong;  so  as  to 
find  out  how  much  the  former  were  minus,  and  the  latter  plus, 
the  constitutional  standard  which  is  exactly  one  degree  short 
of  moral  treason.  If  this  operation  could  be  performed,  and  all 
the  menacing,  disorganizing,  anti-federal  tenets  pervading  the 
columns  of  the  opposition  papers  of  those  days,  could  be  con 
trasted  with  those  of  later  times,  though  it  would  be  an  odious 
occupation  to  go  through  with  it,  this  people  need  not  fear  the 
result.  Rejecting  then  all  ebullitions  of  passion,  and  all  ex 
pressions  by  individuals  of  disloyalty  to  the  Union,  as  incon 
clusive  and  of  no  account,  except  with  the  limitation  just  now 
mentioned;  I  affirm  with  confidence  that  the  doctrines  main 
tained  by  the  Legislature  of  Massachusetts,  and  by  all  such 
popular  meetings,  as  by  their  numbers  or  any  other  circum 
stances,  can  be  justly  supposed  to  express  &  general  sentiment; 
may  be  demonstrated  upon  the  principles  above  assumed,  to  be 


78 

the  same  in  substance  with  such  as  were  avowed  in  other  States, 
without  subjecting  them  to  any  particular  reproach. 

The  great  objections  to  the  war  were,  that  it  was  unnecessa 
ry — declared  im  providently— partial  as  it  respected  the  selec 
tion  of  an  enemy — influenced  by  a  fear  of  France — leading  to  an 
alliance  with  her — involving  the  destruction  of  commerce — 
threatening  national  bankruptcy — tending  to  the  disunion  of  the 
States — without  any  prospect  of  attaining  its  professed  ends. 

All  these  objections  most  certainly  were  urged  at  various 
times  against  the  war,  in  the  public  proceedings  of  Massachu 
setts.  They  probably  comprehend  all  the  principal  objections 
that  could  be  made  to  it.  If  the  same  objections  were  adopted 
by  other  States,  or  popular  meetings,  or  branches  of  opposition, 
or  individuals  acting  in  public  and  official  capacities,  upon 
whose  views  and  motives  no  aspersions  derogatory  to  their  in 
tegrity  and  patriotism  have  been  cast,  the  comparison  is  justi 
fied  and  the  case  proved.  The  first  example  in  point  might  be 
cited  from  the  debates  of  the  Congress  which  made  the  war,  and 
those  of  their  successors  until  the  close  of  it.  Not  a  censure 
upon  the  war  is  included  in  the  enumeration  just  made,  which 
will  not  be  found  reiterated  in  every  form  of  words,  by  mem 
bers  in  opposition  from  different  States,  South  of  New  England. 
In  the  month  of  August  following  the  declaration  of  war,  a 
meeting  of  citizens  was  convened  in  New  York,  whose  proceed 
ings,  without  any  auxiliary  evidence,  are  ample  for  my  purpose. 
"Never  was  such  a  meeting  witnessed  in  New  York  for  its  re 
spectability  and  numbers."  The  Chairman  was  Colonel  FISH — 
The  Committee  who  framed  the  resolutions  were  JOHN  JAY, 
RUFUS  KING,  GOUVERNEUR  MORRIS,  RICHARD  HARRISON,  E. 
BENSON,  M.  CLARKSON,  RICHARD  VARICK.  After  stating  "the 
war  declared  by  a  slender  majority  to  be  unwise" — "declared 
under  unfavorable  circumstances,  and  that  the  consequences  to 
which  it  leads  are  alarming,"  and  explaining  the  reasons  for 
this  conclusion,  the  report  adds : 

"That  we  are  irresistibly  drawn  to  the  conclusion  that  the  American  peo 
ple  will,  under  the  name  and  form  of  an  alliance,  be  submitted  to  the  will 
and  power  of  the  French  Emperor."  "That  in  this  view  of  the  subject,  the 
question  of  peace  or  war,  involves  all  that  is  dear  and  valuable  to  man  on 
this  side  the  grave."  "We  are  therefore  under  the  dire  necessity  of  declar 
ing'  that  we  have  no  confidence  in  the  men  who  have  brought  us  to  this 


79 

perilous  condition."     They  further  resolved — "That  Representatives  be  rho-  ' 
sen  in  the  several  counties — discreet  men — friends  of  peace.     These,  Repre 
sentatives  can  correspond  or  confer  with  each  other,  and  CO-OPERATE  -vvnii 
TIII:   FRIENDS  OF  PEACE  in  our  sister  Stales,  in  devising  and  pursuing  such    \ 
constitutional  measures  as  may  secure  our  independence  and  preserve  our  Union,   :> 
both  of  which  are  endangered  by  the  present  war." 

These  resolutions  include  the  essence  of  all  the  invectives  that 
were  ever  uttered  or  that  could  be  uttered  against  the  policy 
of  the  war,  and  its  threatened  consequences.  They  point  also 
to  the  formation  of  a  Committee  of  correspondence,  and  TO  CO 
OPERATION  WITH  OTHER  STATES  ;  to  the  very  object  intended 
by  instituting  the  Hartford  Convention.  In  order  to  lend  his 
name  to  these  proceedings,  the  venerated  JAY  left  the  retire 
ment  chosen  for  his  "  life's  decline."  Mr.  KING  also  gave 
them  the  weight  of  his  distinguished  character.  Indeed  the 
entire  Committee  is  composed  of  men  of  the  very  highest  emi 
nence,  for  talents,  virtue,  and  patriotism ;  and  the  Chairman 
was  a  distinguished  officer  of  the  revolution.  They  said  and 
recommended  in  effect  all  that  was  said  or  done  by  Massachu 
setts.  From  New  York,  I  pass  on  to  Virginia,  though  ample 
confirmation  of  my  position,  that  the  language  of  opposition  was 
every  where  uniform,  may  be  found  in  every  State  between  the 
two,  and  no  where  more  decided  than  in  Maryland.  In  Sep 
tember  1814,  a  Convention  of  delegates  from  eighteen  Counties 
of  Virginia  was  held  in  Staunton — a  very  animated  address  was 
adopted ;  too  long  to  be  here  inserted.  I  give  only  the  fol 
lowing  extract : — 

'•As  friends  of  Commerce  we  ask  your  co-operatiou  in  removing  from  office 
an  administration  which  has  nearly  accomplished  its  total  annihilation.  As 
friends  of  Peace  we  invite  your  solemn  protest  against  the  authors  of  our 
impolitic  and  unnecessary  war.  As  friends  of  Union  we  invoke  you  to  ar 
rest  the  progress  of  a  system  tending  to  its  speedy  and  awful  dissolution.'' 

In  their  circular  letter  they  say, 

<;It  is  to  show  to  our  sister  States  that  a  powerful  ininoritv  in  Virginia  i- 
opposed  to  the  fatal  policy  that  has  consummated  its  career,  in  an  unneces 
sary,  precipitate,  and  ruinous  war/' 

It  would  be  quite  impossible  to  confine  within  the  bounds  of 
as  many  letters  as  I  have  written,  the  quotations  that  might  be 
made  of  this  same  language  held  in  all  parts  of  the  conn1 


80 

They  may  be  found  in  overwhelming  abundance  in  the  files  of  the 
Gazettes  of  the  day,  by  whosoever  will  take  the  trouble  of  mak 
ing  the  research.  There  was  in  fact  but  one  opinion  respecting 
the  policy  of  the  war  and  the  necessity  of  bringing  it  to  a  close 
by  a  change  of  administration,  among  all  its  opponents.  The 
proportional  numbers  of  the  opposition  in  the  Eastern  States 
undoubtedly  exceeded  that  of  other  sections  of  the  United  States; 
but  the  more  it  became  general,  the  less  did  it  deserve  the  char 
acter  of  faction  or  to  be  deemed  an  object  of  suspicion.  How 
indeed  is  it  possible  to  reconcile  the  conduct  of  men  who  pre 
tend  great  deference  for  the  voice  of  the  people,  and  in  the 
same  breath  calumniate  an  opposition  so  extended  and  power 
ful  !  In  the  election  which  first  ensued  upon  the  declaration  of 
Avar,  Mr.  Madison  had  not  a  vote  in  New  England,  (Vermont 
excepted,)  none  in  New  York,  New  Jersey,  or  Delaware.  We 
were  a  divided  people  in  relation  to  that  conflict,  and  the 
grounds  of  the  division  were  uniformly  known  and  felt  to  be 
the  same.  Against  this  statement  there  is  absolutely  nothing 
to  oppose  but  the  threadworn  tale  of  the  withholding  the  militia 
by  Governor  Strong,  and  the  fact  that  the  complaints  of  Massa* 
chusetts  were  more  frequent  and  emphatical.  With  respect 
to  the  Militia  question,  not  only  were  the  Governors  of  the 
New  England  States  agreed  in  their  opinion,  on  the  constitu 
tional  question,  but  the  State  of  Maryland  maintained  the  same 
construction,  though  not  being  opposed  and  dishonored  by  her 
own  sons,  she  has  received  the  payment  of  her  claim.  And  as 
to  the  repetition  of  grievances  and  the  vehemence  of  the  lan 
guage  of  complaint,  it  was  to  be  expected  where  most  was  suf 
fered  and  most  to  be  apprehended — in  a  country  dependent  for 
its  very  existence  on  resources  which  were  on  the  eve  of  anni 
hilation.  That  an  opposition  from  a  portion  of  the  country  thus 
circumstanced  should  be  more  general  and  intense,  and  that 
they  should  exclaim  with  emotion  against  measures  which  threat 
ened  to  frustrate  a  main  object  of  the  Union,  was  naturally  to 
be  expected;  and  perhaps  it  was  not  out  of  the  ordinary  course 
of  paltry  intrigue  that  individuals  should  be  desirous  of  recom 
mending  themselves  by  magnifying  the  merit  of  their  own  trials 
and  efforts  at  the  expense  of  the  character  even  of  the  State 
itself;  and  thus  making  good  their  claims  to  the  loaves  and 


'81 

fishes  which  the  persecution  endured  by  prophets  in  their  own 
country,  and  among  their  own  kin,  would  seem  to  deserve. 
Hence  the  attrocious  misrepresentations  of  persons,  who,  in  the 
time  of  our  tribulation,  were  preparing  themselves  for  the  vo 
cation  of  sycophants  and  toad-eaters  to  the  National  Govern 
ment,  may  be  accounted  for;  but  that  His  Excellency  should 
take  up  and  new  vamp  the  tales  of  other  times,  seeing  that  he 
has  already  had  all  the  reward  he  can  expect  from  the  fountain 
of  honor,  and  consent  to  become  Captain  General  and  Com 
mander  in  Chief  of  the  legion  of  defamation  instead  of  the  Com 
monwealth,  must  be  an  embarrassment  to  any  true  man  who 
shall  have  the  charge  of  writing  his  epitaph.  On  the  whole,  it 
will  appear  in  the  page  of  impartial  history  that  the  federal 
party  not  merely  in  Massachusetts,  but  in  all  the  States  most 
adverse  to  the  war,  conducted  itself  with  a  moderation  and 
dignity  unexampled  in  the  party  struggles  of  great  States.) 
When  Erskine's  arrangement  promised  peace,  they  prepared  to 
withdraw  opposition.  When  peace  was  afterwards  made,  they 
actually  and  with  one  accord  did  withdraw  it.  The  Admin 
istration  and  its  friends  affected  to  consider  the  delirium  of  the 
public  joy  at  our  escape  from  the  war  as  a  homage  to  their 
popularity.  Because  our  brave  citizens  defended  their  House 
hold  Gods,  in  some  instances^  from  invasion,  and  our  army  kept 
its  ground  upon  our  own  frontier,  and  our  navy  supported  and 
made  glorious,  the  reputation  of  our  flag,  the  Government  Party 
claimed  for  themselves,  as  much  as  if  they  had  achieved  the  con 
quests  of  ALEXANDER,  or  destroyed  the  fleet  of  XERXES,  or  the 
ARMADA  of  Spain.  They  exulted  as  if  the  prowess  of  their 
countrymen  by  land  and  water  was  a  new  discovery,  of  which 
they  were  entitled  to  the  benefit,  and  as  if  there  had  never  ex 
isted  a  Bunker  Hill,  or  Saratoga,  or  Monmouth,  or  Stony  Point, 
or  Cowpens,  or  Yorktown;  and  as  if  a  naval  establishment  had 
been  their  original  and  favorite  measure. 

They  boasted  of  their  peace  as  if  they  had  not  instructed 
their  Ministers  to  conclude  a  treaty  omitting  stipulations  re 
specting  the  principal  cause  of  war,  and  left  the  great  subject 
of  controversy  precisely  where  it  was.  Still  certain  incidental 
advantages  had  resulted  from  the  war.  A  favorable  impression 
of  the  resources  and  spirit  of  the  nation,  was  made  in  Europe. 
11 


82 

The  popularity  of  the  Navy  was  established,  and  what  was  more 
important,  visionary  theories  were  supplanted  by  the  practical 
policy  of  the  old  federal  party.  While  therefore,  Government 
boasted  of  its  victory  over  the  public  enemy,  the  opposition  had 
gained  a  bloodless  victory— a  victory  of  principle — the  only  one 
they  aimed  at,  over  their  antagonists.  With  this,  they  were 
content,  and  thus  not  only  acquiesced  in  the  triumph  of  their 
adversaries,  without  a  symptom  of  spleen  or  repining,  but  with 
real  good  humor  and  unaffected  joy. 

Instead  of  attempting  to  organize  and  engraft  upon  the  na 
tion,  an  artificial  and  undying  opposition  for  which  materials 
were  not  wanting,  they  shewed  that  their  object  was  principles 
not  men,  and  magnanimously  threw  away  their  badges  and  uni 
ted  in  electing  to  the  first  office,  the  man  designated  by  their 
opponents.  They  have  also  steadily  supported  his  administra 
tion,  although  throughout  its  seven  years  continuance,  they  have 
been  systematically  excluded  from  office;  as  much  so  as  the 
Catholics  in  England,  and  the  Jews  in  other  countries  ;  nearly 
as  much  so  as  Aliens  and  Outlaws  are  excluded  every  where, 
and  more  so  than  it  is  generally  thought  politic  by  a  conqueror 
to  exclude  the  citizens  of  the  conquered  country;  and  though 
the  "Union  of  the  republican  party"  (which  means  the  contin 
ued  interdiction  of  those  who  have  ceased  to  act  as  a  party)  is 
inculcated  as  a  vital  principle.  With  this  sacrifice  to  the  spirit 
of  harmony,  the  democratic  party  in  many  of  the  States,  appear 
to  be  content.  Seldom  have  we  found  them  seeking  or  even 
improving  an  occasion  to  tear  open  old  wounds.  The  leading 
men  among  them  under  the  influence  of  the  liberal  feeling  which 
in  generous  natures  accompanies  success,  disdain  reverting  to 
injurious  and  offensive  causes  of  animosity.  But  here  it  is  far 
otherwise.  Here  we  are  to  learn  even  from  our  Governors  that 
it  is  not  enough  for  our  State  to  offer  her  hand  without  bending 
the  knee.  That  the  Phoenix  of  our  influence  will  not  arise  until 
we  put  our  hands  on  our  mouths,  and  our  mouths  in  the  ashes 
of  that  which  has  expired.  That  it  is  not  sufficient  to  have 
waved  our  constitutional  rights,  but  that  pardon  must  be  asked, 
for  having  made  them  a  question.  Influence  indeed !  By  sur 
rendering  to  the  National  Government  every  questionable  point, 
we  shall  acquire  the  influence  of  a  rivulet  upon  the  opposing 


83 

tide  when  it  swells  its  mass  of  waters  and  is  lost  in  the  sea. 
But  the  only  valuable  influence  among  confederated  States  is 
of  a  very  different  description.  It  results  from  the  means  pos 
sessed,  of  bringing  over  to  its  measures  the  other  members  of  a 
confederacy  and  modifying  the  general  policy  by  its  peculiar 
views  of  the  national  interest — This  influence  has  its  founda 
tion  in  the  respect  which  the  State  preserves  for  herself.  In 
the  selection  of  able  representatives  and  agents,  and  the  in 
terest  she  displays  in  the  fame  of  the  men  of  principle  who 
serve  her  with  fidelity.  No  State  can  acquire  or  preserve  in 
fluence  which  has  not  self-respect,  and  this  is  not  to  be  the 
fruit  of  self-abasement.  Confessions  and  repentance  are  the 
conditions  of  forgiveness  and  happiness  to  the  humbled  sinner 
in  another  world — But  a  State  has  no  immortality.  She  must 
take  care  of  herself  in  this  world  and  whenever  she  admits  her 
reputation  to  be  tarnished  it  is  gone.  From  the  moment  that 
Massachusetts  stands  in  a  white  sheet  in  the  Hall  of  Congress, 
though  led  in  by  her  Governor,  she  will  be  held  in  contempt  by 
those  of  her  Sisters,  who  claim  for  their  own  peccadillos  the 
merit  of  virtues,  and  WHO  NEVER  MAKE  CONFESSIONS. 

H.  G.  OTIS, 


LETTER  XIV. 

SIR, 

SUGGESTIONS  have  reached  me  from  a  quarter  entitled  to 
respect,  that  while  the  parallel  I  have  attempted  to  draw  be 
tween  the  principles  of  opposition  in  the  State  of  Massachusetts, 
and  out  of  it,  is  correct  as  far  as  it  goes ;  I  have  left  unexamin- 
ed  two  themes  of  obloquy  and  complaint  in  which  this  State 
alone  is  implicated.  These  are  the  alleged  refusal  of  the  Le 
gislature  to  vote  thanks  to  our  victorious  naval  officers,  and  the 
discouragement  opposed  to  the  public  loans.  I  cheerfully  yield 
to  the  wish  expressed  for  my  view  of  these  matters,  though  it 
will  be  recollected  that  a  full  retrospect  of  domestic  transac 
tions,  is  what  I  expressly  disclaimed  the  intention  of  under 
taking. 


84 

In  the  Senate  of  1813,  the  following  resolve  passed  that 
body : — 

"Resolved,  As  the  sense  of  the  Senate  of  Massachusetts,  that  in  a  war 
like  the  present,  waged  without  justifiable  cause  and  prosecuted  in  a  man 
ner  which  indicates  that  conquest  and  ambition  are  its  real  motives,  it  is  not 
becoming  a  moral  and  religious  people  to  express  any  approbation  of  mili 
tary  or  naval  exploits  which  are  not  immediately  connected  with  the  defence 
of  the  sea  coast  and  the  soil." 

Upon  a  division,  the  usual  federal  majority  of  members  pre 
sent  voted  in  the  affirmative.  This  resolve  has  been  assailed  in 
every  form  of  censure.  A  solemn  invocation  of  defeat  and  dis 
grace  upon  the  navy  and  army  could  not  be  liable  to  greater  re 
viling.  But  though  the  House  of  Representatives  of  that  year, 
of  which  I  was  a  member,  unanimously  voted  thanks  to  PERRY 
and  others,  thereby  manifesting  a  different  view  of  this  pro 
cedure  from  that  entertained  by  the  Senate,  yet  a  dispassionate 
consideration  of  this  resolve  and  of  the  accompanying  circum 
stances,  will  shew  it  to  be  quite  undeserving  of  the  odium  an 
nexed  to  it,  and  far  from  justifying  any  inference  of  hostility  to 
the  navy  or  indifference  to  its  glory.  Had  the  sentiment  ex 
pressed  in  that  resolve  appeared  in  a  treatise  on  political  moral 
ity,  or  been  found  among  the  aphorisms  of  a  Peace  Society,  no 
exceptions  would  probably  be  made  to  it.  In  order  to  judge  of 
the  correctness  of  this  remark,  let  the  converse  of  the  proposi 
tion  be  stated.  For  example — "  It  is  becoming  a  moral  and 
religious  people,  to  exult  in  the  military  and  naval  exploits  of  a 
war  waged  without  just  cause,  from  motives  of  conquest  and  am 
bition,  not  connected  with  the  defence  of  the  sea  coast  and  the 
soil."  Would  not  many  moral  and  religious  persons  of  all 
parties  at  this  moment  hesitate  to  subscribe  to  this  as  an  axiom  ? 
If  so,  the  objection  to  the  resolve  must  be  found  not  in  the  infer 
ence,  but  in  the  assumed  premises — In  the  character  given  of  the 
war;  and  not  in  the  abstract  claim  of  military  and  naval  prow 
ess  to  the  approbation  of  the  people.  But  this  same  character 
of  the  war,  I  have  already  said,  whether  justly  or  not,  had  been 
given  to  it  a  thousand  times  before  this,  and  in  that  view  the 
resolve  is  left  on  the  same  ground  with  other  censures  upon  that 
measure.  Justice  however,  to  the  majority  of  that  day,  requires 
a  more  enlarged  consideration  of  this  matter.  Jt  has  just  been 


85 

noticed  that  the  House  of  Representatives,  in  which  the  federal 
members  were  more  than  two  to  one,  and  upon  the  motion  of  a 
federalist  passed  unanimously  votes  of  thanks  for  our  naval 
victories.  Here  then  was  a  notorious  difference  of  sentiment 
in  relation  to  this  point  between  the  two  Houses. 

The  doctrine  maintained  in  the  Senate  was — First,  that  it  was 
not  the  province  of  the  State  Legislatures  to  award  this  species 
of  homage  to  victorious  officers,  and  that  by  assuming  to  do  it, 
they  might  graduate  their  praise  by  a  rule  different  from  that 
which  the  National  Government  might  deem  proper  to  adopt. 
But  secondly,  and  principally,  it  was  said  there  was  manifest 
inconsistency  that  a  legislative  body  remonstrating  with  vehe 
mence  against  the  policy  and  necessity  of  the  war,  should  in 
the  same  breath  encourage  its  authors  to  persevere,  by  enacting 
plaudits  upon  their  agents ;  and  that  in  the  event  of  successful 
operations  IN  CANADA,  the  precedent  would  create  great  em 
barrassment  for  those  who  were  opposed  to  the  invasion  of  that 
country ;  and  who  might  be  called  upon  to  express  gratitude  for 
what  would  be  cause  of  regret.  If  the  allegation  of  these  rea 
sons  was  insincere,  and  a  mere  veil  for  lukewarm  feelings  to 
wards  the  navy ;  there  would  still  be  no  equity  in  selecting  a 
measure  in  which  the  Senate  dissented  from  the  House  and  the 
people,  and  holding  it  out  detached  from  innumerable  demon 
strations  of  very  different  feelings,  as  a  genuine  test  of  the  pre 
vailing  sentiment.  Judging,  however,  of  the  disposition  of  all 
who  voted  in  favor  of  the  resolve,  by  what  is  known  to  be  true 
of  many;  their  real  friendliness  to  the  navy  and  the  indulgence 
which  they  as  private  citizens  permitted  to  their  joy  in  its  suc 
cess,  were  displayed  in  too  many  and  conspicuous  modes  to 
leave  a  doubt  respecting  their  sincerity.  Among  those  Senators 
were  persons,  who  with  their  political  associates  were  first  and 
foremost,  to  receive  with  open  arms,  upon  his  landing,  the  hero 
who  achieved  the  first  naval  victory :  To  set  on  foot  and  pro 
mote  the  means  of  doing  him  and  his  gallant  officers  the  highest 
civic  honors : — To  renew  the  same  cordial  oblations  of  respect 
and  gratitude  to  him  who  succeeded  to  the  command  and  the 
glory  of  Old  Ironsides — and  to  those  who  shared  the  honors  of 
his  triumph.  Persons,  who  assisted  and  officiated  at  public  en 
tertainments  given  to  these  officers — who,  from  that  moment 


86 

cherished  and  cultivated  an  acquaintance  with  them  and  their 
brethren  of  the  sword  as  opportunity  offered,  and  to  this  hour 
have  remained  upon  terms  of  strict  intimacy  and  friendship  with 
many  of  their  number. 

Leaving  then  this  inquiry  as  it  relates  to  the  branch  of  the 
Legislature  ivhich  passed  the  resolve,  I  refer  you  a  moment  to 
other  indications  of  the  sense  of  the  whole  federal  party  on  the 
subject  of  our  naval  victories.  Those  whose  entire  stock  of  cal 
umny  against  that  party  is  composed  of  gleanings  from  the  Ga 
zettes,  must  admit  as  proof  of  public  opinion,  the  universal  and 
invariable  attestation  of  those  very  newspapers,  to  whose  occa 
sional  and  limited  overflowings  of  zeal,  they  resort,  in  order  to 
convict  the  people  of  disloyalty.  It  may  be  said  with  confi 
dence,  that  from  the  first  moment  of  the  war  to  the  last,  the  in 
variable  tenor  of  those  newspapers  showed  an  entire  devoted- 
ness  to  the  interest  and  honor  of  the  navy.  Their  columns 
were  promptly  filled  with  glowing  descriptions  of  naval  suc 
cess.  No  power  of  language  can  express  more  strongly  the  en 
thusiasm  felt  in  regard  to  every  thing  appertaining  to  the  navy. 
How  could  it  be  otherwise  ?  Every  victory  was  a  homage  offered 
to  federal  policy.  Every  brilliant  achievement  was  the  accom 
plishment  of  federal  prediction.  How  long  and  how  often  had 
the  enlightened  foresight  of  the  old  federal  party,  calculating 
upon  the  aptitude  of  our  people  for  this  species  of  defence, 
pointed  to  the  ocean  which  surrounds  us,  as  the  element  on 
which  danger  must  be  met,  and  protection  sought !  The  Con 
gressional  debates  from  the  days  of  Washington  to  the  epoch  of 
the  war,  are  a  continued  record  of  exertions  by  one  party  in 
favor,  and  of  another  in  opposition  to  a  naval  establishment. 
Every  bulletin  from  the  Ocean  and  the  Lakes,  was  an  encomi 
um  upon  the  policy  recommended  by  Washington,  strenuously 
inculcated  by  Adams,  rejected  by  Jefferson,  and  forced  upon 
Madison ;  as  it  was  also  a  satire  upon  the  "Chinese"  system, 
by  which  it  was  so  long  counteracted.  The  object  which  was 
constantly  and  preeminently  the  favorite  of  the  old  federalists, 
was  the  NAVY.  They  regarded  the  thirteen  stripes  as  the 
consecrated  "LABARUM."  Their  prophecy  from  the  first,  was, 
"by  this  sign  you  shall  conquer."  Yet  by  the  wayward  fate 
which  attends  human  affairs,  our  naval  heroes  have  fought  their 


87 

adversaries  into  popularity,  while  their  friends,  the  original 
patrons  of  the  navy,  are  put  to  act  upon  the  defensive,  and  to 
maintain  by  argument  their  friendliness  to  a  darling  object. 
The  "Lilliputian  ties,"  have  been  broken,  and  the  fleet  has 
been  trr.ved  into  the  enemy's  harbor.  Against  this  constancy 
of  affection,  this  policy  of  the  heart  as  well  as  of  the  head  of 
New  England,  evinced  by  day  and  by  night,  in  season  and  out 
of  season,  there  is  nothing  to  oppose,  but  the  solitary  vote  above 
mentioned.  Yet  this  has  been  exaggerated  and  tortured  into 
every  form  of  obloquy.  The  withholding  of  thanks  has  been 
deemed  equivalent  to  a  denunciation  of  censure,  and  a  refusal 
to  exult  in  success,  regarded  as  the  avowal  of  regret  that  it  was 
not  defeat.  In  conclusion.  From  the  proceedings  of  the  Le 
gislature  of  Massachusetts,  taken  together,  no  sentiment  of  dis- 
aifection  to  the  navy,  or  want  of  interest  in  the  reputation  of 
its  officers,  can  be  inferred,  but  the  reverse.  The  Senate  (the 
number  of  federal  members  being  between  twenty  and  thirty) 
passed  a  resolve  (more  in  the  nature  of  an  abstract  position  of 
political  morality  than  of  a  legislative  enactment)  importing 
that  the  brilliance  of  the  exploit  is  not  a  subject  for  thanks  from 
those  who  do  not  approve  of  the  cause.  In  other  words,  that 
the  end  and  not  the  means,  is  always  to  be  regarded.  The 
House  of  Representatives  (the  number  of  federal  members  be 
ing  between  two  and  three  hundred)  voted  thanks  to  the  navy 
on  the  ground  that  the  officer  cannot  choose  his  service,  and 
that  honor  is  always  due  to  the  brave  who  obeys  orders.  But 
in  the  prosecution  of  the  goodly  work  of  dishonoring  ourselves, 
the  vote  of  the  Senate  detached  from  its  preamble,  has  served 
as  a  watchword  to  rouse  and  cherish  the  popular  prejudice, 
while  that  of  the  House  is  constantly  permitted  to  slumber  in 
silence. 

H.  G.  OTIS. 


LETTER  XV. 

SIR, 

THOSE  who  are  intent  upon  distorting  every  event  which 
occured  in  Massachusetts  to  the  depreciation  of  her  character, 


were  not  satisfied  with  denying  to  the  people  the  right  of  as 
sembling  and  consulting  upon  their  grievances,  and  to  the  Le 
gislature  that  of  public  protestation  against  measures  thought 
to  be  detrimental  to  the  Republic,  but  they  present  as  a  crying 
enormity  and  peculiar  to  our  citizens,  their  refusal  to  subscribe 
to  the  War  Loans.  In  order,  however,  to  avoid  the  manifest 
absurdity  of  applying  this  charge  exclusively  to  this  part  of  the 
country,  it  has  been  roundly  asserted,  that  "associations  were 
formed"  to  deter  persons  from  subscribing  by  threats.  This  as 
sertion  is,  I  have  reason  to  think,  entirely  unfounded.  No 
knowledge  or  even  whisper  of  any  such  association  ever  reach 
ed  my  ears,  and  I  believe  on  my  honor  and  conscience,  that 
none  such  was  ever  formed  or  thought  of,  though  as  usual  my 
name  has  been  audaciously  mentioned  as  a  party  concerned. 

It  is  very  certain,  that  when  the  war  was  declared,  a  general 
and  extreme  disinclination  prevailed  among  the  monied  men, 
against  taking  a  concern  in  the  public  loans — Nor  was  there 
any  very  considerable  abatement  of  that  aversion,  during  the 
continuance  of  the  war.  They  regarded  it  as  made  by  one  ge 
ographical  division  of  the  country,*  without  the  consent  of  the 
other,  and  by  the  procurement  of  other  classes  against  the  in 
terest  and  wish  of  the  monied  class.  They  persuaded  them 
selves  at  first,  that  the  conflict  must  speedily  be  terminated 
unless  money  was  supplied,  that  peace  was  within  the  control 
of  administration,  and  that  they  were  not  called  upon  to  find 
sinews  for  a  war  which  they  were  anxious  to  have  brought  to  an 
end.  Persons  entertaining  these  opinions,  would  naturally 
promulge  them — They  might  commune  with  and  influence  each 
other — To  lend  or  not  to  lend,  is  a  question  on  which  monied 

*VOTES  IN  CONGRESS  ON  THE  WAR  QUESTION. 

IN  SENATE. 

For  War.  For  Peace. 

North  of  Delaware,  -  -  -  -  5  I  South  of  Delaware,  ....  3 
South  of  Delaware,  -  -  -  14  |  North  of  Delaware,  -  -  -  10 

IN  HOUSE. 

For  War.  For  Peace. 

North  of  Delaware,  -    -  17    I    North  of  Delaware,      -     -     -     -  36 

South  of  Delaware,  -  62    |     South  of  Delaware,  -     -  13 

In  the  Autumn  immediately  following  the  declaration  of  war,  the  Peace 

ELECTORAL  Ticket  in  Massachusetts  succeeded  by  a  MAJORITY  of 


89 

men  in  all  countries  consult  together,  and  ascertain  each  other* 
general  views.  They  form  different  connexions  and  associa 
tions — accept  or  reject  terms — enter  into  competitions  for  the 
loan,  or  refuse  it  altogether  as  they  please.  The  terms  of  a 
loan  also  and  the  state  of  the  public  credit  are  fair  subjects  of 
discussion.  Every  man  may  declare  his  opinion  as  of  right — 
And  if  he  thinks  ill  of  them,  he  may  fairly  apprize  those  who 
rely  on  his  judgment,  of  his  sentiments.  In  these  transactions, 
men  are  governed  by  the  dictates  of  interest  and  not  of  patri 
otism.  Exceptions  to  this  rule  are  always  objects  of  admira 
tion.  If,  when  Mr.  Dallas  unveiled  the  secrets  of  the  treasury 
and  bankruptcy  stood  confessed,  it  had  pleased  some  of  our 
Republican  Millionaires,  to  have  descended  like  Jupiters  in 
showers  of  gold  through  the  roof;  they  would  have  deserved 
the  honors  of  him  who  plunged  into  the  Curtian  gulf,  and 
as  it  happens,  would  have  met  a  happier  fate.  But  many 
such  examples  were  not  to  be  expected;  and  I  believe  that 
not  one  was  found  who  loaned  money  at  par.  So  that  the 
parallel  of  patriotism  must  be  run  between  those  institutions  and 
individuals,  who  disapproving  the  war,  and  distrusting  the  se 
curity  of  the  public  resources,  withheld  their  contributions  and 
proclaimed  their  opinions;  and  those  who  thinking  favorably  of 
both,  assisted  their  injured  country  in  the  pursuit  of  redress, 
by  taking  the  loans,  demanding  a  discount  of  only  twelve  per 
cent,  as  a  premium  for  their  disinterested  love  of  country.  Un 
fortunately  for  mankind,  the  days  of  patriotic  oblation  have 
gone  by;  so  far,  I  mean,  as  respects  silver,  and  gold,  and  jew 
els.  Not  of  services — these  I  know  may  be  had  in  profusion. 
No  country  can  vie  with  ours  in  numbers  who  are  ready  to  de 
vote  their  talents  to  the  service  of  their  country,  in  the  humblest 
as  well  as  the  highest  departments.  These  talents,  however, 
are  not  golden  or  gratuitous.  Whatever  they  possess  of  ster 
ling  worth  of  another  description  must  be  paid  for,  though  not 
always  compensated.  Those  must  attain  to  a  great  age  indeed, 
who  live  to  see  the  thanks  of  the  nation  deserved  by  or  given 
to  any  man  for  taking  up  a  loan.  It  is  always  an  affair  of  cal 
culation,  though  it  may  be  prompted  or  accompanied  by  a  real 
desire  to  support  the  public  credit,  and  is  so  far  laudable.  In 
this  view  of  the  subject,  it  will  be  found  that  every  proposal  for 


90 

a  loan  gives  rise  to  some  sort  of  association.  When  the  Chan 
cellor  of  the  British  Exchequer  opened  his  budgets  during  the 
late  war  there  were  always  associations.  And  if  one  great 
banker  and  his  friends  known  to  be  in  opposition  to  the  Ad 
ministration  had  for  any  reasons  connected  with  his  views  of 
the  public  credit  or  the  terms  of  the  loan,  declined  taking  it  and 
made  his  reasons  known  at  Lloyd's  Coffee  House ;  and  another 
great  banker  with  his  friends  had  in  consequence  taken  it  with 
a  better  bonus,  would  it  not  have  seemed  ridiculous  to  the  En 
glish  nation  that  the  latter  should  have  crowed  up  his  own  well 
paid  patriotism,  and  decryed  the  conduct  of  the  former  as  in 
dicative  of  enmity  to  the  Constitution  and  safety  of  the  country ! 
To  shew  that  obstructions  to  the  loan  were  pushed  to  an  ex 
treme,  and  that  threats  were  employed  ;  extracts  as  usual  are 
made  from  the  newspapers.  It  is  not  incumbent,  I  repeat, 
upon  the  old  majority  of  the  State  to  justify  the  sallies  of  zeal, 
or  satire,  or  sensibility  which  may  have  escaped  from  the  pens 
of  individuals  on  this  or  any  other  topic.  Yet  what  was  the 
scope  of  the  imputed  theatenings  ?  Never  that  I  have  seen,  of 
pains  or  penalties,  of  injury  to  life,  or  limb,  or  property.  Nei 
ther  of  tar  and  feathers  or  effigies.  Some  half  dozen  essays, 
more  or  less,  may  be  found  by  those  who  go  mousing  among  old 
files  and  pigeon  holes,  wherein  the  writers,  of  their  own  mere 
authority  pronounce  very  strong  censures  upon  those  who  being 
opposed  to  the  war  will  nevertheless  contribute  pecuniary  aids. 
But  the  sum  total  of  the  threats  is  that  they  will  be  put  in  Co 
ventry  by  their  party.  And  what  very  dreadful  sentence  would 
that  have  been  to  those  who  were  restrained  by  that  consideration 
only,  from  lending  their  money,  even  if  the  writers  of  those 
essays  had  possessed  (which  they  did  not)  the  means  of  giving 
effect  to  their  menaces  ?  Verily  I  say  unto  thee,  they  would 
have  had  their  reward. 

But  the  most  shameless  argument,  (if  its  malignity  were  not 
neutralized  by  its  folly,)  to  prove  the  existence  of  "  a  reign  of 
terror,"  was  drawn  from  the  advertisements  of  brokers  who  of 
fered  to  receive  proposals  and  effect  subscriptions,  without  dis 
closing  names.  The  inference  is,  that  this  was  intended  as  a 
screen  for  those  who  were  afraid  to  be  known  as  subscribers. 
Now  the  plain  truth  is,  that  it  was  understood  at  the  Treasury 


91 

Department,  that  individuals  whose  proposals  might  be  rejected, 
would  (from  a  disposition  natural  to  most  men  to  conceal  nego 
tiations  which  issue  in  no  contract,)  be  desirous  of  keeping  their 
names  out  of  sight,  and  the  notices  from  the  treasury  encoura 
ged  the  expectation  that  this  should  be  done.  As  to  those  who 
should  take  the  loans,  the  concealment,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
could  be  but  temporary.  They  would  hardly  permit  the  brokers 
to  be  their  permanent  trustees.  They  would  either  hold  or  sell 
their  stock  when  subscribed  for,  and  their  names  could  not  fail 
to  be  known.  Besides,  the  treasury  documents  were  always 
subject  to  the  call  of  Congress.  The  brokers  therefore  issued 
their  proposals  in  conformity  to  those  of  the  treasury,  but  no 
man  could  have  expected  to  be  a  subscriber  and  keep  for  any 
length  of  time  under  the  rose. 

It  is  certainly  not  a  correct  view  of  the  social  compact,  to 
assume,  that  in  a  time  of  public  distress,  the  monied  capital 
ist  is  under  any  peculiar  obligation  to  advance  or  risk  his  money 
by  lending  it  to  the  country.  Such  an  obligation  is  equally 
binding  upon  all  who  have  any  money  to  spare,  whether  the  sum 
be  great  or  small ;  and  no  reason  can  be  perceived  why  those 
who  have  property  which  may  be  converted  into  money,  with 
out  material  sacrifice,  should  be  excused  from  such  contribu 
tion.  Those,  therefore,  who  had  neither  money,  or  property 
to  command  money  beyond  their  fair  and  ordinary  expendi 
tures,  are  alone  entitled  to  complain  against  their  fellow  citi 
zens,  who,  with  themselves,  declined  becoming  public  creditors. 
He  only  who  is  "guiltless,"  is  authorized  to  "cast  the  first 
stone/* 

I  now  sir,  take  my  leave  of  you,  and  of  those  who  have  con 
descended  to  read  these  letters.  In  writing  them  I  have  at 
tempted  to  discharge  a  duty  to  my  native  State,  and  to  defend 
the  people  against  the  slanders  of  their  Chief  Magistrate.  And 
though,  to  judge  from  appearances,  some  are  more  ready  to  kiss 
the  rod,  than  to  vindicate  their  own  honor,  the  time  will  come 
when  the  statements  and  principles  of  constitutional  law  con 
tained  in  these  letters ;  expounded  by  abler  pens  and  under 
more  auspicious  circumstances,  will  be  approved  by  all,  except 
those  who  acquiesce  in  the  disgrace  of  the  State,  so  long  as  it 
involves  the  disparagement  of  their  adversaries.  This  virulent 


92 

feeling  cannot,  I  trust,  continue  to  be  the  ruling  impulse  of 
great  numbers  of  any  party. 

For  myself,  I  am  aware  that  my  enlistment  in  this  defence, 
can  be  productive  of  no  possible  personal  advantage.  On  the 
contrary,  this  taking  up  of  the  gauntlet  in  behalf  of  my  party, 
may  seem  to  imply  the  admission,  that  I  am  peculiarly  respon 
sible  for  the  project  of  the  Convention,  and  other  measures  ob 
noxious  to  popular  jealousy  and  censure,  and  thus  to  sanction 
the  odiousness  which  is  attempted  to  be  brought  upon  my  polit 
ical  character.  To  all  this,  I  content  myself  with  opposing  my 
simple  negation,  and  appealing  to  the  well-informed  of  my  co- 
temporaries  of  both  parties.  My  political  sins  are  those  of 
Congresses,  Senates,  and  Houses  of  Representatives — of  a  ma 
jority  of  the  people,  first  of  the  United  States,  then  of  my  native 
State  and  City.  Of  my  full  aliquot  part  of  these  I  would  no 
thing  extenuate,  and  more  should  not  be  set  down  to  me  in 
malice.  I  have  lived  to  see  triumphant  all  the  principles  of 
the  great  original  federal  party,  of  which  Washington  was  the 
head,  and  of  which  I  was  an  individual  member,  though  by  the 
perversity  of  the  course  of  human  affairs,  I  have  survived  the 
downfall  of  the  party  itself.  There  is  no  prominent  feature  of 
federal  policy  (unless  the  alien  and  sedition  acts  be  so  regard 
ed  by  means  of  a  factitious  importance)  which  the  ruling  party 
has  not  found  itself  compelled  to  adopt,  and  place  in  a  bolder 
relief.  The  funding  system — bank,  navy,  army,  loans,  taxes, 
embassies,  in  short,  whatever  appertaining  to  the  civil  and  mil 
itary  establishments  was  formerly  a  theme  of  opposition,  have 
been  patronized,  not  merely  as  appendages,  but  essentials  to  the 
machinery  of  government.  All  the  hydras  and  chimeras  are 
transformed  into  goodly  shapes  and  proper  agents.  And  not 
a  question  has  been  decided,  nor  as  far  as  I  am  informed,  agi 
tated  upon  old  party  principles,  since  the  peace.  With  this 
state  of  things  as  it  affects  myself,  I  am  so  perfectly  content,  as 
to  be  inaccessible  to  any  uneasiness  or  regret,  except  what  ari 
ses  from  an  apprehension  that  these  letters  may  be  thought  by 
some  to  be  dictated  by  spleen  or  other  unworthy  personal  con 
sideration.  Against  this,  I  can  only  once  more  oppose  the 
assurance  of  my  word,  and  trust  to  time  to  become  my  compur- 
gator.  And  I  assure  those  by  whose  strenuous  opposition  I 


93 

have  become  privileged  to  devote  the  few  years  of  health  and 
vigor,  which  through  Divine  goodness  may  possibly  be  mine,  to 
retirement  from  public  employment,  that  they  have  not  only 
done  me  a  favor,  but  restored  to  me  a  tranquillity  of  mind 
which  is  interrupted  by  no  unkindly  feeling  towards  them  as  a 
party,  nor  even  to  their  musquito  auxiliaries,  which,  when 
gorged  with  my  blood,  will  fly  off,  and  in  due  time  fasten  their 
little  stings  in  some  new  prey. 

So  far,  however,  as  relates  to  the  great  party  with  whom  it 
will  be  always  a  subject  of  pride  and  pleasure  to  me,  to  have 
acted,  I  confess  that  I  regard  the  state  of  public  affairs  not 
without  emotions  of  apprehension  and  sorrow.  Our  party  divi 
sions  no  longer  deriving  nutriment  from  collisions  of  real  in 
terests  and  opinions  of  general  policy,  have  become  PERSONAL. 
This,  which  has  ever  been  the  most  dangerous  division  in  all  re 
publics,  inspiring  implacable  and  hereditary  animosities  among 
citizens,  after  the  causes  of  their  original  schisms  have  ceased ; 
threatens,  if  I  understand  the  tendency  of  things  aright,  more 
of  serious  and  permanent  evil  than  has  elsewhere  proceeded 
from  the  same  prolific  source.  In  other  countries,  where  these 
personal  divisions  (or  if  you  please  factions)  have  existed, 
the  representative  principle  was  at  best  but  imperfectly  under 
stood  or  adopted  in  practice.  The  contests  and  dissentions  of 
the  old  republics  were  carried  on  among  the  people  in  their 
primary  assemblies^  and  hence  it  was  impossible,  especially 
where  more  than  one  State  was  concerned,  to  give  such  a  di 
rection  to  the  suffrages  of  the  people  as  should  uniformly  secure 
a  dominant  party  against  the  enterprize  and  occasional  success 
of  its  rival  in  obtaining  a  share  in  the  administration  of  affairs — 
but  this  is  to  be  done,  and  is  pretty  nearly  effected  among  us,  by 
a  misapplication  of  the  Principle  of  Representation.  This  great 
principle,  in  its  purity  the  noblest  of  all  human  discoveries — the 
main  regulator  of  the  machinery  of  a  free  government,  may  be 
so  perverted  and  misapplied  as  to  give  an  overwhelming  force 
to  one  of  the  parties  in  a  State  instead  of  preserving  a  just  bal 
ance  among  all.  Through  this  medium,  a  tremendous  organi 
zation  of  the  dominant  party  has  already  taken  place  throughout 
the  Union,  for  permanently  securing  to  itself  the  powers  of 
Government  without  a  participation  by  those  who  once  were. 


94 

but  have  long  ceased  to  be  a  party  different  in  principle  from 
themselves.  This  great  party  is  itself  convulsed  by  feuds  and 
subdivisions,  and  cabals  in  behalf  of  different  favorites — But  all 
these  become  subservient  to  the  paramount  antipathy  entertain 
ed  against  their  ancient  rivals.  The  only  object  in  which  they 
are  unanimous,  is  so  to  concert  operations  as  to  keep  power  in 
the  hands  of  the  Republican  family,  when  in  truth  there  is  no 
difference  between  a  member  of  the  Republican  family  and  the 
persons  they  persecute,  but  what  consists  in  this  very  spirit  of 
intolerance  and  exclusion.  On  this  principle  they  act  openly  and 
universally— They  have  never  departed  from  it  a  moment— 
And  no  man  from  the  President  of  the  United  States  down  to 
the  Tub  Orators,  affects  to  disguise  it.  It  is  of  no  conse 
quence  in  this  connexion  that  the  leading  men  are  not  agreed 
upon  who  shall  be  in  office.  They  are  perfectly  of  a  mind  as 
to  who  shall  be  disqualified.  No  matter,  in  this  view,  which 
candidate  comes  to  be  President ;  it  being  understood  that  each 
under  the  pains  and  forfeitures  of  treachery  to  his  party  is  to 
maintain  them  in  their  monopoly  of  honor  and  office.  Here 
then  I  venture  to  affirm  is  a  personal  division  of  parties,  more 
formidable  than  the  world  has  ever  seen,  whether  we  regard 
numbers,  or  the  means  possessed  by  one  of  strengthening  itself 
and  oppressing  others.  When  this  state  of  affairs  is  consider 
ed,  and  one  reflects  that  the  tyranny  too  often  exercised  in 
republics  by  one  popular  faction  over  another,  has  been  display 
ed  in  every  variety  of  violence  and  oppression  that  are  imputa- 
ble  to  other  species  of  despotism ;  it  is  imposible  to  look  down 
the  vale  of  futurity  and  to  ruminate  "On  rising  kingdoms  and 
on  falling  States,"  without  sad  misgivings.  It  is  a  new  political 
problem  to  be  resolved ;  what  will  be  the  fate  of  a  republic, 
where  a  vast  number  of  citizens,  in  all  respects  qualified  to  take 
part  in  public  affairs,  find  themselves  and  their  families  degra 
ded  to  a  caste,  which  by  the  silent  but  irresistible  effect  of  an 
intelligence  among  equals  of  no  better  pretensions ;  and  for  no 
reason  but  a  difference  in  name,  (which  may  be  applied  with 
arbitrary  injustice  to  the  third  and  fourth  generation)  is  perma 
nently  shut  out  from  the  public  confidence.  They  must  indeed 
be  more  or  less  than  men,  to  remain  without  feelings  of  bitter 
resentment,  and  dispositions  to  seize  every  occasion  of  escape 


95 

from  this  ignominious  durance.  They  cannot  but  regard  them 
selves  victims  of  a  more  galling  dispensation  than  the-  Catholics 
in  England  or  the  Greeks  in  Turkey,  in  proportion  as  there  will 
be  less  of  pretence  for  any  discrimination.  First  or  last,  they 
will  be  driven  to  organize  themselves  in  their  turn.  And  new 
indications  of  concerted  movements  intended  on  their  part  will 
furnish  pretexts  for  a  more  vigorous  exclusion  and  a  more  intol 
erable  "dominatio  plebis."  But  I  have  no  inclination  to  trace 
consequences  further.  Let  those  who  incline  to  do  so,  resort 
to  history.  If  this  system  be  pursued ;  and  through  the  re 
deeming  qualities  of  intelligence  in  the  citizens — their  public 
virtue,  and  any  peculiar  principle  in  our  forms  of  Government, 
these  consequences  stop  short  of  those  which,  from  causes  sim 
ilar  in  character,  but  never  so  fearfully  combined,  have  befallen 
other  States,  those  who  live  after  us  will  have  abundant  cause 
to  claim  the  distinction  of  a  chosen  people. 

H.  G.  OTIS. 


96 


NOTE  TO  LAST  LETTER. 

HAVING  declared  my  opinion  that  Loans  to  Government 
during  the  war  were  not  a  subject  deserving  of  praise,  nor  the 
refusal  to  loan,  of  censure;  the  following  correspondence  arro 
gates  no  credit  for  opinions  held  by  me  during  the  war,  in  rela 
tion  to  that  subject.  It  leaves,  however,  all  at  liberty  to  judge 
how  far  those  opinions  are  consistent  with  dispositions  to  go  all 
lengths,  which  have  been  so  kindly  imputed  to  the  members  of 
the  Hartford  Convention.  Nothing  was  concluded,  at  the  meet 
ing  referred  to  in  these  letters.  All  were  left  free  to  act  for 
themselves.  I  am  bound  in  candor,  however,  to  admit  that  un 
til  after  the  expectation  of  stopping  the  war  had  ceased  by  the 
rejection  of  terms  of  accommodation,  I  cherished  the  hope,  and 
very  probably  expressed  it  in  conversation,  that  the  capitalists 
here  would  not  take  the  loans.  I  add,  as  my  opinion  merely, 
that  had  it  been  premised  in  this  quarter,  that  Government 
would  instruct  Ministers  to  treat  for  peace,  on  the  terms  after 
wards  agreed  to,  -they  could  have  commanded  much  of  the  dis 
posable  capital  in  this  part  of  the  country. 


BOSTON,  JULY  2,  1819. 

DEAR  SIR. ...You  must  doubtless  remember  that  during  the  last  war,  a 
gentleman  of  high  character,  came  hither  from  Philadelphia,  bearing  pro 
posals  from  some  opulent  persons  in  that  city  to  men  of  the  same  descrip 
tion  in  this,  to  be  concerned  in  taking  one  of  the  loans  proposed  by  the 
United  States.  That  on  this  suggestion  a  meeting  was  had  of  some  of  our 
principal  and  most  opulent  citizens,  at  which  the  expediency  of  subscribing 
to  this  loan  was  submitted  to  their  consideration.  On  that  occasion  I  was 
of  the  number  of  those  who  recommended  the  measure,  and  professed  my 
readiness  to  be  concerned  in  it  with  my  friends.  I  assumed  that  the  reasons 
which  might  have  induced  the  opposers  of  the  war  to  withhold  their  aid  in 
the  first  loan  through  a  hope  of  stopping  the  progress  of  hostilities,  had 
ceased  : — That  we  were  committed  with  the  Government  to  the  chances  of 
a  confirmed  state  of  open  war : — That  the  money  would  be  had,  however 
enormous  the  terms,  and  that  if  the  debt  should  be  redeemed,  those  who  did 
not  participate  in  the  profit  must  still  be  charged  with  the  burden  of  the  ex 
cessive  premium,  and  that  if  it  should  not  be  paid,  the  failure  must  be  in 
consequence  of  a  prostration  of  public  credit  that  would  be  detrimental  to 


97 

property  of  every  description,  and  which  of  course  the  rich  should  endeavor 
to  prevent.  That  an  ultimate  failure  of  the  public  credit  was  not  likely  to 
happen  in  a  country  whose  resources  were  increasing  like  ours,  and  that 
the  lenders  of  money  might  acquire  some  consideration  with  the  Govern 
ment  of  which  a  use  favorable  to  a  pacific  policy  might  be  made.  I  was 
however  overruled  by  the  opinion  of  a  majority,  and  nothing  was  done.  It 
would  be  gratifying  to  me  to  receive  at  your  leisure  ten  lines  expressive  of 
your  recollection  of  these  facts,  or  any  of  them,  and  of  any  other  circum 
stances  explanatory  of  the  part  I  then  took  in  that  discussion.  I  have  no 
view  to  any  specific  use  to  be  made  of  your  answer  in  humiliating  vindica 
tions  of  the  course  I  pursued,  or  in  idle  pretensions  to  foresight  and  cor 
rectness  of  opinion.  But  it  is  possible  I  may  avail  myself  of  it  to  satisfy  the 
curiosity  of  some  who  may  take  an  interest  in  the  humble  but  anxious  part 
which  I  bore  in  the  affairs  of  the  times. 

Respectfully,  yours, 

H.  G.  OTIS. 
HON.  G.  CABOT 


BOSTON,  JULY  3,  1819. 

MY  DEAR  SIR.. ..By  your  note  of  yesterday,  I  am  desired  to  state  my 
recollections  of  what  passed,  and  especially  of  what  part  you  took  in  a  con 
versation  at  an  early  period  of  the  war,  held  in  this  town,  on  the  expediency 
of  lending  money  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States.  I  remember  that 
at  the  request  of  a  gentleman  from  Philadelphia,  a  meeting  of  some  of  our 
wealthiest  citizens  was  called  at  the  time,  to  which  you  refer,  and  that  the 
question  proposed  for  their  consideration  was,  whether  the  federalists  here 
ought  to  become  subscribers  to  a  loan  solicited  by  the  Government  of  the 
United  States.  I  well  recollect  that  you  was  decidedly  in  favor  of  a  sub 
scription,  and  expressed  your  readiness  to  take  a  portion  with  your  friends. 
In  support  of  this  proposition  you  observed,  that  all  hopes  of  preventing  or 
stopping  hostilities  had  been  long  extinguished  ;  that  we  were  now  at  open 
war,  and  must  all  share  in  its  consequences  to  our  country  ;  that  the  tempo 
rary  failure  of  public  credit  would  be  a  great  calamity,  and  would  load  us 
Avith  a  heavy  debt,  which  would  be  contracted  at  a  ruinous  discount,  but  must 
probably  be  discharged  by  a  full  payment  of  the  nominal  amount.  You  agreed 
that  the  resources  of  the  nation  being  ample  for  its  defence,  must  be  consid 
ered  as  pledged  for  the  attainment  of  that  object  at  all  times,  and  that  if  we 
did  not  choose  to  partake  of  the  advantageous  premiums  on  the  loans,  we 
must,  at  any  rate,  bear  our  part  of  the  burden. 

These  are  my  general  impressions  of  the  subject  of  your  inquiry — doubt 
less,  there  are  many  unimportant  particulars,  which,  at  this  distance  of  time, 
I  am  unable  to  retrace ;  but  as  they  cannot  be  of  a  different  character,  I  shall 
be  happy  if  these  give  you  satisfaction, — being  very  truly,  and  with  great  re 
spect,  your  assured  friend  and  servant, 

GEO.  CABOT 
13 


[Several  of  the  subscribers  to  this  series  of  Letter*  upon  the  Hartford 
Convention,  have  expressed  their  desire  to  the  publisher  to  see  Mr.  Otis' 
Letter  upon  the  Massachusetts  Claim,  printed  in  the  same  volume; — this 
was  not  contemplated  in  the  prospectus,  but  he  most  readily  and  cheerfully 
accedes  to  the  suggestion  of  his  patrons.] 


MASSACHUSETTS  CLAIM- 


SIR, 

BEING  well  informed  that  very  significant  inquiries  are 
occasionally  made  concerning  the  delay  to  bring  before  Con 
gress  the  Massachusetts  Claim,  these  last  five  years,  I  consider 
it  due  to  my  colleagues  of  the  Senate  and  House  during  that 
period,  as  well  as  to  myself,  to  offer  you  for  publication  a  brief 
statement  of  facts.  Upon  taking  my  seat  in  the  Senate  in  the 
winter  of  1817-18,  (after  ascertaining  that  the  Secretary  of 
War  felt  himself  bound  by  the  former  decision  of  his  predeces 
sor,)  I  lost  no  time  in  consulting  with  Mr.  Ashmun,  my  brother 
Senator,  and  others  friendly  to  the  Claim,  especially  Mr.  King, 
upon  the  most  advisable  mode  of  introducing  the  subject  before 
Congress.  They  were  all  agreed  upon  the  inexpediency  of 
taking  the  first  step  in  the  Senate.  It  was  not  usual  to  origi 
nate  applications  of  this  nature  in  that  body.  The  right  of 
propounding  revenue  bills  in  the  House,  by  a  sort  of  tacit  con 
sent,  had  been  extended  to  other  bills  requiring  considerable 
new  appropriations.  The  Claim  would  encounter  much  of  pop 
ular  prejudice,  which  could  be  allayed  only  by  a  thorough  exa 
mination  of  its  merits  in  the  House.  Success  in  the  Senate 
might  not  be  auspicious  to  its  fate  in  the  House,  while  the  loss 
of  the  bill  in  the  former  branch  could  not  fail  to  augment  the 
obstacles  in  the  latter.  These  opinions  were  supported  by  sev 
eral  distinguished  gentlemen  of  the  majority,  who,  admitting 
that  their  first  impressions  were  adverse  to  the  Claim,  had  the 
magnanimity  to  wish  that  it  might  be  presented  under  the  most 
propitious  aspect,  and  receive  the  most  dispassionate  examina 
tion.  It  was  thereupon  determined  at  a  meeting  of  the  whole 


99 

delegation  of  both  Houses,  to  commence  operations  in  the  House 
of  Representatives,  and  for  this  purpose,  the  gentlemen  most 
friendly  to  the  Claim,  entered  with  me  upon  a  laborious  inves 
tigation  of  the  documentary  evidence,  and  requested  me  to  pre 
pare  a  statement  calculated  to  dissipate  prejudice,  and  call  the. 
attention  of  those  whose  duty  it  would  be  to  decide  upon  it,  to 
its  true  merits.  Such  a  statement  accordingly,  in  a  pamphlet 
form,  (with  references  to  the  very  able  memorial  of  Messrs. 
Lloyd  and  Sumner,  formerly  presented  to  the  War  Depart 
ment,  and  other  documents,)  I  digested  with  much  labor,  and 
all  possible  diligence,  and  it  being  approved  by  Messrs.  Mason, 
Whitman,  and  by  the  greater  part  of  my  associates,  was  printed 
and  a  copy  placed  in  the  hands  of  each  member.  The  Speaker 
evinced  great  liberality  in  the  appointment  of  a  committee  upon 
the  memorial  :  And  the  minority  of  the  committee,  though  at 
first  inclined  against  the  Claim,  (and  perhaps  not  finally  recon 
ciled  to  it,)  after  an  examination  of  the  documents,  magnani 
mously  agreed  that  the  majoritv  might  make  out  in  their  report, 
the  most  favorable  case,  which  in  their  view,  the  evidence  would 
warrant,  and  that  the  same  should  be  presented  with  an  under 
standing  that  they  were  not  pledged  to  support  it,  unless  upon 
mature  deliberation  and  debate  they  should  see  fit  to  do  so.  As 
my  attention  had  been  much  devoted  to  the  subject  in  writing 
the  pamphlet,  the  committee  did  me  the  honor  to  engage  me  to 
frame  the  report.  It  fortunately  received  their  approbation, 
and  was  made  without  any  material  variation.  By  the  prin 
ciples  therein  stated,  the  Claim  must,  I  am  persuaded,  stand  or 
fall.  They  are  the  principles  of  substantial  justice,  applicable 
to  facts  supported  by  the  most  conclusive  evidence :  And  when 
ever  they  shall  be  urged  by  the  cordial  and  concurrent  influence 
of  Massachusetts  and  Maine,  before  an  impartial  Congress,  they 
must  prevail.  The  report  was  made  to  the  House  of  Represen 
tatives  many  weeks  before  the  end  of  the  session,  but  such  was 
the  accumulation  of  business,  that  it  could  not  take  its  place  in 
the  orders  of  the  day,  before  the  end  of  the  session. 

Both  the  pamphlet  and  report  assume  a  correct  view  of  the 
question,  which,  however  repugnant  to  the  received  opinion,  is 
undeniably  true.  The  almost  universal  popular  impression  was, 
and  to  a  great  extent  among  the  friends  and  adversaries  of  the 


100 

Claim  yet  is,  that  the  withholding  of  the  militia  from  the  command 
of  General  Dearborn  by  Governor  Strong,  was  in  consequence  of 
the  difference  of  opinion  between  the  National  and  State  Exec 
utives  respecting  the  constitutional  right  to  command.  But  this 
opinion,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  troops  or  services  for  which  com 
pensation  is  now  claimed,  (with  the  exception  perhaps  of  some 
inconsiderable  particulars,)  has  no  foundation  in  fact.  In  July, 
1814,  (prior  to  which  the  State  claims  little  or  nothing,)  there 
were  no  orders  in  existence  from  the  President  to  the  Governor. 
The  orders  to  which  the  Governor  declined  a,  formal  obedience, 
were  issued  in  1812,  and  had  expired  in  April,  1814,  together 
with  the  law  from  which  they  emanated.  With  the  new  re 
quisition  made  in  July,  1814,  by  General  Dearborn,  Governor 
Strong  literally  complied.  This  put  an  end  to  the  constitu 
tional  controversy.  The  Governor  waved,  if  he  did  not  aban 
don  it:  And  though  he  did  not  afterwards  in  all  cases  literally 
(but  only  substantially)  comply  with  other  requisitions,  the  non- 
compliance  was  not  attributable  to  the  Governor's  disposition 
to  revive  that  question ;  but  to  other  circumstances.  In  fact,  to 
a  reluctance  on  the  part  of  the  militia  to  engage  in  service  un 
der  a  Military  Prefect — to  a  fear  of  being  drawn  off  to  Canada, 
and  a  determination  not  to  go  thither ;  and  to  the  derangement 
of  companies  and  officers  under  the  last  order.  These  pre 
vailed  without  regard  to  political  parties,  (as  the  documents 
prove,)  and  these  the  Governor  could  not  control,  though  he 
made  sincere  efforts  to  get  over  the  difficulties.  It  appeared  to 
the  federal  members  of  Massachusetts,  that  this  was  a  most  rad 
ical  and  important  distinction — that  it  placed  the  Claim  on  an 
impregnable  foundation,  and  taken  in  connexion  with  the  actual 
service,  and  the  real  concert  (sufficient  for  all  practical  purpo 
ses)  which  prevailed  after  July,  1814,  between  the  officers  of 
the  United  States,  including  General  Dearborn  himself,  and 
the  State  Officers,  put  an  end  to  all  just  objection  to  its  allow 
ance.  We  also  thought  this  ground  might  be  assumed  with 
perfect  consistency,  by  those  of  our  colleagues  whose  political 
creed  differed  from  ours — and  that  they  ought  to  be  glad,  and 
happy,  and  cordial,  in  aiding  us  to  maintain  it.  But  some  of 
them,  including,  I  believe,  all  from  Maine,  could  not  view  the 
question  in  this  light.  They  entirely  declined  pledging  them- 


101  .-/ALJ        RjiJlA 

selves  to  an  active  support  of  arguments  founded  on  this  basis. 
It  was  accordingly  the  decided  sentiment  of  every  friend  to  the 
Claim  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  that  this  disposition  of 
the  members  interested,  would  create  a  paralysis  in  one  quar 
ter,  while  a  fever  would  be  unavoidable  in  another,  and  that  the 
Claim  could  not  struggle  with  such  fearful  odds. 

In  the  next  session  the  bill  was  committed  to  a  Committee  of 
the  whole  House  ;  but  for  the  reasons  above  stated,  and  which, 
by  Mr.  Melleri  and  myself,  were  at  the  time  communicated  to 
the  Governor,  and  by  him  to  the  Legislature,  (and  for  no  other 
reasons,)  it  was  permitted  by  its  friends  to  slumber  on  the  files. 

In  the  session  of  1822,  Mr.  Mills  and  myself  received  from 
His  Excellency  the  Governor  new  instructions  to  bring  forward 
the  Claim — still  leaving  to  our  discretion  the  choice  of  means. 
Mr.  Gorham  was  our  fellow  lodger,  and  it  was  agreed  between 
us,  to  attempt  once  more  to  bring  the  members  of  the  delega 
tions  of  Massachusetts  and  Maine,  into  an  agreement,  to  renew 
an  application  to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  for  in 
structions  to  the  War  Department  to  examine  the  accounts. 
Since  the  exhibition  and  rejection  of  the  memorial  of  Messrs. 
Lloyd  and  Sumner,  in  1817,  the  Claim  of  Maryland  had  been 
allowed,  and  (as  we  conceived)  other  claims  of  a  less  merit 
orious  character  than  that  of  Massachusetts.  The  rejection  of 
the  memorial  of  those  gentlemen,  happened  during  a  vacancy 
in  the  chief  office  of  the  War  Department — before  the  ferment 
of  opinion  growing  out  of  the  war  had  subsided ;  and  under  a 
firm  conviction  in  the  mind  of  Mr.  Madison,  that  the  constitu 
tional  controversy,  and  that  alone,  had  occasioned  the  omission 
to  yield  the  militia  upon  every  requisition.  Several  meetings 
were  had,  at  which  it  was  proposed  to  make  a  respectful  appli 
cation  to  the  President,  recalling  to  his  recollection  these  facts, 
to  the  end  of  inducing  him  to  review  the  decision  on  the  above- 
mentioned  memorial,  and  authorize  the  examination  of  the 
vouchers.  Much  delay  took  place,  and  several  adjournments, 
to  afford  opportunity  to  the  Senators  from  Maine  to  receive  in 
structions.  We  prepared  a  memorial  to  the  President,  which 
we  endeavored  to  make  unexceptionable  to  gentlemen  of  both 
parties ;  but  I  left  Washington  before  the  Senators  from  Maine 
were  ready  to  act  upon  it.  The  gentleman  in  whose  hands  I 


102 

left  it,  informed  me  that  it  was  not  acceptable  to  some  individ 
uals,  who  were  averse  to  the  admission  of  any  fact  which  might 
exculpate  the  Government  of  Massachusetts.  Another  was 
therefore  framed  in  very  general  terms,  and  presented  too  late 
to  be  acted  upon;  but  in  consequence  of  which,  at  the  next 
session,  as  I  have  understood,  the  President  had  been  pleased 
to  grant  the  desired  order.  It  would  have  been  quite  impossi 
ble  for  those  of  my  colleagues  in  the  Senate  and  House,  with 
whose  views  I  had  the  honor  to  concur,  or  for  myself,  to  have 
exerted  ourselves  with  more  fidelity  and  industry,  if  the  reward 
for  performing  those  duties  had  been  the  amount  of  the  Claim. 
Nothing  could  be  done  in  the  Senate,  for  the  reasons  above  al 
leged,  more  than  to  discuss  the  merits  of  our  Claim  in  repeated 
conversations,  which  we  omitted  no  opportunity  of  doing.  And 
it  must  be  obvious,  that  to  agitate  the  question  in  the  House, 
while  a  portion  of  the  Representatives  from  the  interested  States 
were  indisposed  to  vindicate  the  justice  of  the  Claim,  and  while 
the  doctrine  was  constantly  maintained  in  public  newspapers  of 
our  own  State,  that  equity  afforded  no  ground  for  its  support, 
and  that  its  success  must  be  preceded  by  concessions  of  error, 
and  permitted  by  the  mere  bounty  of  Congress;  would  have 
been  an  undertaking  worse  than  hopeless.  I  rejoice  that  this 
high  concern  is  now  deposited  in  abler  hands  than  mine. 

Whatever  may  be  the  fate  of  the  Claim,  I  venture  to  predict 
that  any  allowances  made  towards  it,  will  never  be  the  fruit  of 
disavowals  or  retractions,  but  the  result  of  a  conviction  founded 
on  evidence,  and  carried  home  to  the  understanding  of  Con 
gress,  or  of  the  accounting  officers,  of  the  correctness  of  the 
principles  maintained  by  those  who  have  heretofore  been  char 
ged  with  the  solicitation  of  the  Claim.  I  am  well  satisfied  that 

<3  ~i-" . 

there  is  such  evidence,  and  that  the  principles  are  correct,  and 
that  the  Claim  may  be  placed  on  a  foot  that  would  require  no 
departure  from  the  political  tenets  of  any  party.  If  this  can 
not  be  done,  the  sooner  it  goes  to  profit  and  lossf  the  better. 
For  it  is  not  competent  to  Congress,  nor  to  the  Executive  Gov 
ernment  tojuake  a  grant  to  Massachusetts,  of  a  million  of  dol 
lars,  more  or  less,  as  a  bounty.  If  the  State  has  a  Claim  in  law 
or  equity  upon  the  National  Treasury,  it  ought  to  be  paid — but 
if  otherwise,  it  is  a  nullity  :  and  there  is  no  power  in  the  Con- 


103 

stitution  enabling  Congress  to  convert  an  unfounded  demand 
into  a  just  Claim,  on  condition  of  disavowing  political  heresies, 
or  of  any  sort  of  truckling  or  humiliation — no  power  to  give  us 
on  our  knees,  what  we  are  not  entitled  to  receive  in  the  erect 
posture  of  an  independent  State.  I  hope  this  statement  of  facts 
will  not  be  considered  obtrusive  upon  the  public,  or  offensive  to 
any  individuals.  I  mean  to  question  no  gentleman's  motives, 
nor  even  to  censure  the  course  of  those,  from  whom  I  have  the 
misfortune  to  differ  in  opinion.  While  I  cheerfully  leave  my 
general  political  character  to  the  disposal  of  the  public,  and  rest 
my  private  character  upon  the  opinion  of  my  neighbors,  attempt 
ing  no  vindication  of  either,  I  have  felt  it  to  be  a  duty  to  explain 
the  mode  in  which  I  have  endeavored  to  discharge  a  special 
trust,  deeply  interesting  to  my  heart  and  feelings,  and  in  re 
gard  to  which  I  do  not  feel  that  the  reproach  of  negligence  or 
indifference  can  justly  be  added  to  the  charge  of  other  failings. 

H.  G.  OTIS. 

JUNE  28,  1823. 


NOTE  A. 

The  writer  of  these  letters,  finding  them  called  for  by  his  friends,  in  the 
form  of  a  pamphlet,  intended  to  illustrate  certain  of  the  subjects  alluded  to, 
by  notes  and  references — But  upon  experiment  it  was  found  difficult  to  com 
press  them  within  the  limits  of  a  common  sized  pamphlet,  and  the  projert  j-, 
therefore  abandoned. 


e-'/ 


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